Biden Administration Reengages with International Institutions and Agreements

The newly inaugurated administration of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. took immediate steps to reengage with a variety of international institutions and agreements from which the Trump administration had withdrawn. On January 20, 2021, the administration deposited with the United Nations a new instrument of acceptance of the Paris Agreement on climate change, and it halted U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO). On January 21, the United States announced that it would participate in the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility, an international vaccine distribution scheme. The Biden administration also announced that it would reengage with and seek election to the UN Human Rights Council, and it quickly reached agreement with Russia for a five-year extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining arms control agreement between the two countries. These early moves are consistent with the foreign policy strategy President Biden previewed during the campaign when he promised to “renew American leadership” and “[e]levate [d]iplomacy.” In his first speech on foreign policy as president, delivered at the U.S. State Department on February 4, Biden asserted that “America is back” and that “[d]iplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy.” To implement these objectives, Biden has appointed a slate of experienced foreign affairs officials, many of whom worked in the Obama administration.

Eroding Arms Control Regime and US-Russia Relations

Two weeks after Joseph Biden took office as President, the U.S. and Russia extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for five years. This landmark arms control treaty limits the number of strategic offensive weapons each country can have. A ‘window of opportunity’ for a new stage of strategic stability discussions on arms control has opened. Strategic competition between the world’s most powerful countries, escalating global and regional threats, accelerating technological advances in the military sphere, which hold the potential to have a transformative impact on arms forces and military conflicts, have given added urgency to the bilateral dialogue on arms control between the two nuclear superpowers. Political barriers to a new agreement are significant. The perilous state of U.S.-Russia relations, lack of trust and mutual suspicion make it more difficult for the two powers to have sustainable negotiations toward a new treaty. However, if political will is in place coupled with a realistic approach and the United States’ readiness to address Russia’s concerns, a follow-on agreement could be reached.

Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND): a good faith, effective measure pursuant to Article VI NPT or empty gesturing?

It has been 50 years since the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which established the obligation upon all States Parties to work towards nuclear disarmament under Article VI. Yet, despite extensive reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles since the Cold War peaks, nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts are currently in disarray. After the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was terminated in 2019, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty remains as the only bilateral limitation on United States (US) and Russian nuclear forces in operation and is due to expire in February 2021. The US has justified its limited nuclear disarmament progress on the premise that the current international security environment is not conducive to further nuclear disarmament. Instead, the US has recently promoted a new initiative called Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND). The initiative aims to provide a platform for all States to engage in constructive dialogue to identify ways to improve the international security environment, which make nuclear deterrence necessary while addressing the hurdles that currently impede progress towards nuclear disarmament. Significantly, the US regards CEND as an ‘effective measure’ and an illustration of its commitment towards disarmament under Article VI. This article seeks to address the US claim that CEND represents a good faith, effective measure towards nuclear disarmament pursuant to Article VI. This will revisit existing doctrinal interpretative debates concerning the obligation under Article VI, particularly the requirements that negotiations and measures be adopted in good faith, and what constitutes an effective measure towards nuclear disarmament. The discussion will then determine whether the CEND initiative itself can be considered a good faith, effective measure towards nuclear disarmament, by considering its purpose, origins and implementation, and actions of the US.

Chances of US-Russian treaty extension look slim

Significance The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will expire next February unless Moscow and Washington agree an extension. The White House has proposed replacing it with a trilateral, comprehensive treaty drawing in China. Impacts Russia has indicated it would be open to folding hypersonic and other new weapons into the New START format. Moscow's modified nuclear doctrine will probably be read as a veiled threat to Washington and NATO. An intermediate-range arms race may already be beginning as US designers test weapons to match Russia's.

Opposing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in the U.S. Congress: Ideological analysis of Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee Hearings

The United States Senate voted to ratify the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia in 2010 by 74-26, all 26 voting against being Republicans. The change in the voting outcome compared to the 95-0 result in the 2003 SORT vote was dramatic. Using inductive frame analysis, this article analyzes committee hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations and the Armed Services committees in order to identify competing narratives defining individual senators’ positions on the ratification of the New START. Building on conceptual framework introduced by Walter Russel Mead (2002), it distinguishes four schools of thought: Jacksonian, Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, and Wilsonian. The argumentation used in the hearings is deconstructed in order to understand the increase in opposition to the traditionally bipartisan nuclear arms control regime. The results reveal a factionalism in the Republican Party. The argumentationin opposition to ratification traces back to the Jacksonian school, whereas argumentation supporting the ratification traces back to Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian and Wilsonian traditions. According to opposition, the Obama administration was pursuing its idealistic goal of a world-without-nuclear-weapons and its misguided Russia reset policy by any means necessary – most importantly by compromising with Russia on U.S. European-based missile defense.

US-Russian nuclear arms treaty may lose relevance

Subject Prospects for renewing the New START treaty Significance The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expires in 2021 and a five-year extension is a likely option. However, the treaty's quantitative limits on nuclear weaponry may be of diminishing importance as US and Russian technology evolves. Russia's modernised land-based missiles are coming into service 10-15 years before any US upgrade. Moscow and Washington are investing in new submarines despite fiscal constraints on both sides. Impacts Russia views US missile defence deployments in Eastern Europe and South Korea as offensive and will adjust its deterrent capacity. US budget pressures could see the life of ICBMs extended as the Pentagon invests in submarine upgrades. The US military is more concerned about the escalation risks of tactical nuclear arms than the benefits of deterring conventional attack.

Nuclear Arms Control: the End of History?

The article is addressed to an unprecedented crisis of the system and process of nuclear arms control – including nuclear arms reduction and non-proliferation. During a half century history of the practical nuclear disarmament (counting from the 1963 partial nuclear tests ban treaty – PTB) this process has had many ups and downs, but never has it been so deeply deadlocked. Although the two main nuclear treaties are still implemented: the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 2010 and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) of 1987, their future is increasingly uncertain and their validity is eroding, just as that of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and other agreements in this crucial sphere. For the first time in the last fifty years the world is facing a real threat of totally loosing control over the most destructive weapons created in the history of mankind. What is the most amazing – this is happening half a century after the end of the Cold War, when the hopes emerged that nuclear disarmament would finally become a realistic proposition. Dramatic events in and around Ukraine are badly exacerbating the crisis of nuclear arms control, but they are not its original cause. The article is analyzing the principal reasons of the present crisis: the transforming post-post Cold War world order; Russia’s position and role in the new international environment; the military-strategic, economic and technological developments, which are leading to disintegration of former conceptual premises and mechanisms of nuclear arms control and which are not adapted to the changing objective realities. In conclusion some general proposals are provided with the aim of saving, adopting and enhancing nuclear arms limitation and non-proliferation.

Indicators of Soviet Intentions and the End of the Cold War, 1985–88

This chapter examines the indicators used by the Reagan administration to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union between 1985 and 1988. Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in 1981 after an election campaign that expressed alarm over a “window of vulnerability” that endangered U.S. national security. Reagan's national security strategy featured schemes such as the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The chapter considers U.S. perceptions of Soviet military capabilities, military doctrine, and behavior during the period based on predictions derived from the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. It also explores how, when, and to what extent U.S. perceptions of Soviet intentions changed in order to elucidate the broader changes that eventually led to the end of the Cold War.

Nuclear Arms: Blind Alley or Pause?

Signing and ratification of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) by the U.S. and Russia in 2010–2011 inspired the adherents of interaction between two nations on arms reduction in both states, as well as in Western Europe and the rest of the world. Due to the new Treaty, in 2010 the summit of the leading states on nuclear materials and technologies security took place; a regular conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) scrutiny went successfully. Many a one thought that after 10 years of stagnation it set the wheels in motion, and the world free from nuclear arms that the Presidents of both countries called for became a closer reality. But by the end of 2011, the optimism gradually gave place to a growing pessimism. During the ratification of the Treaty of Prague in Winter 2010–2011, both Parliaments raised reservation clauses as requirements for execution of the Treaty – almost diametrically opposed, and incompatible with the prolongation of negotiations on arms reduction. In the present article, the attempt is made to sort out the reasons of such drastic strategic "volte-face", and to suggest both ways out of deadlocks and ways to restore progressive advance in the matter of arms control, which is a binding condition for non-proliferation regimes enhancement.