When Polls Disagree: How Competitive Results and Methodological Quality Shape Partisan Perceptions of Polls and Electoral Predictions

This study leverages a survey experiment in the lead up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election to evaluate how partisan biases, poll results, and their methodological quality interact to shape people’s assessments of polling accuracy and electoral expectations. In a nationally representative sample, we find that individuals disproportionately find polls more credible when their preferred candidate is leading. Partisan biases are mitigated when the polls themselves vary in objective indicators of quality: while more educated respondents are more likely to identify high-quality polls accurately, low education respondents’ bias was reduced when they encountered polls with varying methodological quality. Finally, these moderators influence respondents’ electoral expectations as well. We discuss the implications for journalistic coverage of polls, public opinion, and political polarization.

Ruling weakens Brazil's Lula but will not end his bid

Significance The three judges on the appeals court in Porto Alegre found Lula guilty of receiving a seaside apartment worth 2.2 million reais (currently 700,000 dollars) from construction company OAS in exchange for contracts with state-controlled oil giant Petrobras. The decision may make the former president unable to run for a third term in next October's election, but it is not yet final -- he still has further appeal options. Impacts Lula was a moderate president but has recently moved significantly to the left, which would make his candidacy even more divisive. The Bovespa stock exchange hit a record high after the ruling, in the belief that it will take Lula out of the race. The impact of the ruling is likely to strengthen the current orthodox reform agenda by shifting electoral expectations. Even a conservative president will likely struggle to pass ambitious reforms.

Electoral independence, dependence, or co -dependence?: A reassessment of second -order electoral expectations in subnational elections

In the electoral hierarchy, subnational elections have frequently been relegated to second-order status, as are supranational elections (i.e., European Parliament elections). According to the predictions of the second-order electoral framework, subnational elections should be dependent on national trends, manifest substantially lower participation levels, exhibit anti-government swing and higher support for small and regional parties. However, as subnational governments gain increasing powers and jurisdictional competencies, the potential for greater electoral participation and/or divergent and complex electoral behaviors between the state and substate levels becomes more likely. This dissertation explores what political factors and attitudes affect the likelihood of second-order behavior in a specific set of subnational elections, namely second-tier subnational elections.The first part of the dissertation employs a large cross-national aggregate analysis of second-tier elections in twelve countries from 1980-2002. The principal hypothesis is that a variety of institutional, economic, election-specific, and contextual features affect differential participation and vote choice in second-tier contests. Initial descriptive statistics provide evidence that there are significant variations between and among second-tier units regarding levels of differential turnout, electoral incongruence or deviation, and anti-government swing. Multivariate models indicate that factors such as the level of subnational revenue-raising capacity, subnational electoral timing, and bicameralism (among others) exert significant power over differences in electoral participation and electoral choice in multilevel electoral environments.Individual case studies of subnational elections in Spain, Germany, and Finland further help to elucidate inter-country differences in second-order expectations. The case studies further provide evidence of individual-level factors that impact the incidence of national political dominance, interlevel vote switching and participation in these contests. In particular, the surveys indicate that individual political attitudes and preferences predispose individuals in different manners to participate in second-tier elections, to focus more on national or subnational issues in their subnational electoral decisions, and to vote differently based on the arena in question. The individual and aggregate findings both point to the fact that the stakes of the election (both perceived and actual) directly affect the nature of electoral behavior. The dissertation's findings have distinct implications and consequences for broader political issues of decentralization, democracy, accountability, and representation.-- Chris Palazzolo, PhDHead of Collection ManagementSocial Sciences LibrarianAdjunct Professor, Department of Political ScienceEmory UniversityAtlanta, GA [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>404-727-0143________________________________This e-mail message (including any attachments) is for the sole use ofthe intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and privilegedinformation. If the reader of this message is not the intendedrecipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distributionor copying of this message (including any attachments) is strictlyprohibited.If you have received this message in error, please contactthe sender by reply e-mail message and destroy all copies of theoriginal message (including attachments).

Partisan optimism and political bargaining

Partisan voters are optimistic about electoral outcomes: their estimates of the probability of electoral success for their party are substantially higher than the average among the electorate. This has large potential implications for political bargaining. Optimistic electoral expectations make costly bargaining delay look more favourable, which may induce partisans to punish their party for agreeing to a compromise rather than waiting, for example by not turning out to vote. Party decision makers should take this into account when bargaining. We set up and analyse a simple game theoretic model to explore the implications of partisan optimism for political bargaining. We show that increased optimism among a partisan group leads to a stronger bargaining position for their party, but may hurt its electoral prospects. Another main finding is that even high levels of partisan optimism do not in themselves cause inefficient bargaining delay.

Who’s Hot and Who’s Not? Factors Influencing Public Perceptions of Current Party Popularity and Electoral Expectations

This study analyzes how perceptions of the popularity of political parties (i.e., the current opinion climate) and expectations about parties’ future electoral performance (i.e., the future opinion climate) are formed. Theoretically, the paper integrates research on the sources of public opinion perception and empirically draws on a representative survey carried out before the 2013 German federal election. We show that the perceived media slant and opinions perceived in one’s personal surroundings are closely related to perceptions of party popularity, whereas individual recall of poll results and personal opinions about the parties are not. However, poll results are shown to be the single most important predictor of expectations about the parties’ future electoral success.

Kyiv residents talking of socio-economic situation in the city, of living in the capital, of electoral expectations

The publication presents the results of sociological monitoring of public opinion of Kyiv residents in February 2012.