christian conservatives
Recently Published Documents


TOTAL DOCUMENTS

24
(FIVE YEARS 2)

H-INDEX

3
(FIVE YEARS 0)

2021 ◽  
pp. 247-268
Author(s):  
Kathleen Wellman

This chapter revisits the Cold War world, divided between capitalists and communists, a conflict that these curricula cast as a good-versus-evil morality play. American evangelicals allied with the Republican Party. They connected religion and corporate capitalism and rejected Democrats as New Deal socialists. These curricula praise Joseph McCarthy’s campaign to root out communism in the United States and condemn internationalism, especially the United Nations, as fostering a totalitarian, one-world government. They see the United States’ wars in Korea and Vietnam as insufficiently committed to the fight against communism. These textbooks weigh whether other nations developed collective political actions or social welfare programs; they deplore both as socialism or incipient communism. Decolonization made new parts of the world ripe for American capitalism or Soviet communism. They and their leaders were good or evil depending on whether they subscribed to the agenda of Christian conservatives.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Jason E. Whitehead

Abstract This article combines historical and philosophical analysis to examine and critique the ideas motivating Christian conservative legal activism. Such activists routinely claim to be motivated by a Christian worldview, which they define as a comprehensive explanation of reality that determines all their thinking and action, including their legal activism and argumentation. Examination of the historical and philosophical roots of the concept of worldview identified by Christian thinkers reveals two understandings of the concept: an analytic tool for rationally comparing the evidence for different social philosophies, and a pre-theoretical lens that determines what counts as evidence in the first place. Christian conservatives have largely favored the first sense of worldview as a tool to understand issues like sexuality and gender identity in an essentialist way and to demonstrate with foundationalist logic the rational superiority of their legal conclusions about these issues. However, a comparison of the Christian conservative worldview and the queer theory worldview illustrates how this understanding of worldview as a tool fails because there is no neutral perspective outside of any worldview, from which one could examine and compare one to another. The idea of worldview as a pre-theoretical, historically, and socially contingent lens can be more productive. Embracing this notion of worldview in a personalist way is necessary to build a culture of dialogue that uses narrative to pursue the truth while also respecting and honoring the different perspectives from which these narratives are told.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 691-711
Author(s):  
Karin Edvardsson Björnberg ◽  
Helena Röcklinsberg ◽  
Per Sandin

Opposition against greenhouse gas emissions reductions is strong among some conservative Christian groups, especially in the United States. In this paper, we identify five scripture-based arguments against greenhouse gas mitigation put forward by a core group of Christian conservatives ('the Cornwallists'): the anti-paganism argument, the enrichment argument, the omnipotence argument, the lack of moral relevance argument and the cost-benefit argument. We evaluate to what extent the arguments express positions that can be characterised as climate science denialist and to what degree they are consistent with support for climate adaptation. Using Stefan Rahmstorf's (2004) taxonomy of climate science denial, we conclude that the Cornwallists could be labelled climate change deniers. However, their opposition is not only based on denial of climate science but often rests on premises that render the science irrelevant, a position we term 'relevance denialism'.


2020 ◽  
pp. 26-48
Author(s):  
Amanda Hollis-Brusky ◽  
Joshua C. Wilson

This chapter addresses larger political contexts, conditions, actors, and institutions that gave rise to the modern Christian Right and the Christian Conservative Legal Movement. In relaying this history, the chapter discusses how and why the Christian Right first invested in traditional politics and then later moved to develop Christian conservative public interest legal organizations. This history is then used to explain the deficiencies in the Christian Right’s initial legal support structures, and why they moved to found Christian conservative law schools and legal training programs. Central to the decision to create new institutions was Christian conservatives’ long-standing mistrust of lawyers, the legal profession, and the nation’s colleges and universities. Baylor University and University of Notre Dame are used as brief case studies to better explain the decision of Christian Right patrons to avoid investing in existing law schools and, instead, create their own.


Author(s):  
Ivo Bischoff ◽  
Julia Hauschildt

Abstract We provide—to the best of our knowledge—the first empirical study on the political economy of public spending on vocational education. Vocational schools raise human capital among non-academics and give the latter a stronger bargaining position in wage negotiation—thereby supporting the clientele of leftwing parties. At the same time, they provide publicly funded inputs that raise firm productivity—an aim particularly important for conservative parties. We analyze expenditures on vocational schools of 301 West-German counties between 2002 and 2013 using two-way fixed effects and mixed models. We find the counties’ expenditures on vocational schools to decrease in the political power of Social Democrats and increase in the political power of Christian conservatives in the county council. Expenditures are higher in election years. We find no support for the conjecture building on Jensen (2011, Compar. Polit. Stud. 44, 412–435) according to which expenditures on vocational education are higher in regions suffering from deindustrialization. (JEL codes: H75, D72).


2020 ◽  
pp. 103-124
Author(s):  
Olivier Roy

This chapter explores the ‘culture wars’ both in Europe and in the United States. In Europe, ‘values’ have probably never before been mentioned so frequently in discourse and political debates as they have since the 2000s. This trend actually dates to the American ‘culture wars’, which have been going on since the 1970s. The expression ‘culture wars’ denotes the war on values within American society, a war pitting liberal culture, which stands against discrimination and in favour of abortion rights, gun control, and some form of social security, against a ‘Christian right’ led by evangelical Protestants in the southern United States, whose core political issues are the fight against abortion and same-sex marriage, and who oppose gun control, universal health care, immigration, and affirmative action. Things are more complex in Europe because the two fronts do not coincide. In the debate on values, the internal front pits Christian conservatives against secularists of all persuasions, liberals and populists alike; the main issues revolve around abortion and same-sex marriage. The external front, on the other hand, puts the idea of ‘Europe’ in opposition to Islam: the issue is concerned with the cultural antagonism between Muslim immigrants and Europeans and with European societies' fear of becoming ‘Islamized’.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Susan B. Ridgely

AbstractIn this article, I explore how, from 1977 through 2009, the conservative Christian media empire, Focus on the Family, acted as a model for and a creator of alternative news long before the 2016 election. In particular, since 1977, Focus linked proper Christianity with recognition of a world of hazards by defining danger as those people and institutions who refused to submit to God, especially feminists, secular universities, and the welfare state. Through the creation of a closed-media network, Focus taught Christian conservatives to see the mainstream news as undermining biblical Truth by espousing stories that supported postmodern relativism over God's singular truth. Simultaneously, Focus generated its own news sources to fill the vacuum left by the mainstream with stories highlighting the political and social structures needed to support the Focus-defined traditional family. Soon, other conservative media outlets began using these frameworks to attract listeners and to add veracity to their stories. Although mainstream media portrayed Focus as passé by 2009, I argue that the model that Focus developed led seamlessly to the creation of Fox News and, later, to the formation of internet communities around outlets such as Breitbart and to the believability of Russian bots.


2019 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-119
Author(s):  
Doron Avraham

In the early nineteenth century, a neo-Pietist circle of awakened Protestants emerged in Prussia and other German lands. Disturbed by the consequences of the French Revolution, the ensuing reforms and the rising national movement, these neo-Pietists—among them noble estate owners, theologians, and other scholars—tried to introduce an alternative meaning for the alliance between state and religion. Drawing on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pietist traditions, neo-Pietists fused their keen religious devotion with newly constructed conservative ideals, thus rehabilitating the legitimacy of political authority while investing the people's confession with additional meaning. At the same time, and through the same pietistic source of inspiration, conservative neo-Pietists forged their own understanding of national identity: its origins, values, and implications. In this regard, and against the prevailing view of the antagonist stance taken by Christian conservatives toward nationalism in the first half on the nineteenth century, this article argues for the consolidation of certain concepts of German national identity within Christian conservatism.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 835-870 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua C. Wilson ◽  
Amanda Hollis-Brusky

Author(s):  
Milton Gaither

Homeschooling as a self-consciously oppositional political movement emerged in the 1970s and 1980s among counterculturalists on both the left and the right due to a mix of historical trends, including the growth of suburbs, feminism, political polarization, and public school bureaucratization and secularization. In its early stages the movement saw cooperation between Christian conservatives and secular leftists, who worked together to relax homeschooling laws in every US state. By the late 1980s, however, a schism had developed and the much larger group of religious conservatives took control of the movement. Though very conservative Protestants continue to dominate the public face of the movement, in recent years homeschooling has grown increasingly common among a wide range of Americans. The historic antagonism between homeschooling and public education is also fading, as many hybrid forms have emerged that blur the boundaries between home and school.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document