Análisis de la Influencia de la Función de Auditoría Interna sobre las Cuotas de Auditoría

The aim of this paper is to analyse the relationship between the internal audit function and auditor's fees using a sample of Spanish listed companies between 2003 and 2011. We use the audit fees model that was proposed by Simunic (1980). Our results indicate that fees are greater in those companies that have an internal audit function. In addition, if there are meetings between the audit committee and the internal audit function, this is statistically significant with audit fees. This paper contributes to literature in several ways. Firstly, there are no previous papers in Spain, unlike other contexts, on the relationship between internal audit and auditor fees. Secondly, the empirical results detected in previous studies are conflicting; therefore, there is a need to complement them. Finally, the findings have practical implications for companies, external auditors and regulatory agencies themselves. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la relación existente entre la función de auditoría interna y los honorarios del auditor sobre una muestra de empresas que cotizan en el mercado continuo español entre 2003 y 2011. Utilizando el modelo de honorarios de auditoría propuesto por Simunic (1980), los resultados indican que los honorarios de auditoría son mayores en aquellas compañías que cuentan con la existencia de un departamento de auditoría interna. Asimismo, la existencia de reuniones entre el comité de auditoría y la función de auditoría interna es estadísticamente significativa con los honorarios. Este estudio contribuye a la literatura de diversas formas. En primer lugar, no existen trabajos anteriores en España, a diferencia de otros contextos, sobre la relación entre auditoría interna y honorarios. En segundo lugar, los resultados empíricos detectados en estudios previos resultan contradictorios por lo tanto lleva a la necesidad de complementarlos. Finalmente, los resultados tiene implicaciones prácticas para la empresa, los auditores externos y los propios organismos reguladores.

The impact of conditional conservatism on creative accounting: A suggested framework

This paper provides a framework of how conditional conservatism contributes to the reduction of creative accounting which in turn affects auditor fees, litigation risk, auditor independence and improved auditing quality. All these factors are reflected in the degree of stakeholders’ confidence in financial reports. The absence of conservatism in the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) conceptual framework is due to its belief that conditional conservatism causes a bias in accounting information and that it compromises neutrality. However, by supporting conservatism with a set of controls including upgraded training, intensified effort of auditors, increased professional skills and activated audit committees, users’ financial statement become more reliable which helps users make the right decisions.

Auditor Fees and Going-Concern Reporting Decisions on Bankrupt Companies: Additional Evidence

SUMMARY The recent growth in non-audit services (NAS) at the major audit firms has the attention of auditing regulators. On several occasions recently, board members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) have indicated that the rise in NAS may place auditor independence at risk (Harris 2014; Tysiac 2014). Impaired independence can result in audit failure, which includes situations when auditors fail to issue going-concern (GC) audit opinions to soon-to-be bankrupt companies. In this paper, I examine the association between the propensity of auditors to issue GC opinions and NAS fees (and audit fees) to 203 bankrupt companies during 2002–2013. In analysis, I find no significant relation between GC decisions and NAS fees and audit fees. My results may interest U.S. regulators, who recently expressed concerns about the threat to auditor independence from the spike in NAS at the major firms. Data Availability: Publicly available from sources identified in the paper.