ACTIVIST BROWSER EXTENSIONS AS INTERFACE DÉTOURNEMENT: REMINDING, COPING, AND INFRASTRUCTURAL ALIGNMENT

This paper investigates web browser extensions as an under-researched media object for their capacity for activism. “Activist extensions” disrupt a webpage’s intended use and redirect users’ attention to social issues by modifying textual, visual, or auditory elements of the web user interface. The relevance of the study stems from the ubiquity of the web browser as a communication tool and the potential of browser extensions to counter its power in shaping how web content is delivered to users. Based on the notions of transduction and affordance, the critical vocabulary of the Situationist International, and the conceptualization of platform governance through the provision of infrastructural services, this paper asks: Through what mechanism do activist extensions redirect users’ attention to social issues? What are the potential implications for users? And, how can browser platforms affect the creation and distribution of activist extensions? The study adopts a mixed-methods approach that includes discursive interface analysis of the extensions’ modification of the browser interface, critical discourse analysis of user comments on these extensions, and semi-structured interviews with extension developers. Major findings of the study include: 1) the redirection of users’ attention from the webpage to social issues is achieved through the mechanism of $2 , 2) activist extensions function as $2 that provides users with a coping mechanism against certain online rhetoric, and 3) the creation and distribution of activist extensions are conditioned by an $2 imposed by the browser platform on extension developers.

Lean Library

This review explores the advantages and disadvantages of Lean Library. It also discusses setting up the tool and compares it to other browser extensions.

After you, please: browser extensions order attacks and countermeasures

Browser extensions are small applications executed in the browser context that provide additional capabilities and enrich the user experience while surfing the web. The acceptance of extensions in current browsers is unquestionable. For instance, Chrome’s official extension repository has more than 63,000 extensions, with some of them having more than 10M users. When installed, extensions are pushed into an internal queue within the browser. The order in which each extension executes depends on a number of factors, including their relative installation times. In this paper, we demonstrate how this order can be exploited by an unprivileged malicious extension (i.e., one with no more permissions than those already assigned when accessing web content) to get access to any private information that other extensions have previously introduced. We propose a solution that does not require modifying the core browser engine, since it is implemented as another browser extension. We prove that our approach effectively protects the user against usual attackers (i.e., any other installed extension) as well as against strong attackers having access to the effects of all installed extensions (i.e., knowing who did what). We also prove soundness and robustness of our approach under reasonable assumptions.