Interstate Rivalries and Expansions in Military Capacity

This article addresses the scholarly debate on the relationship between interstate rivalry and military capacity. We draw on Tilly's bellicist theory of state formation in early modern Europe and Thies’ modifications to predatory theory, which prioritizes the role of interstate rivalry on state building, to explain variation in military capacity. We unpack the rivalry mechanism into spatial and positional rivalries and test how these two types of rivalry affect military capacity, and how positional rivalries affect military capacity in the long-term. Using time-series cross-sectional data analysis, we find that positional rivalries increase military capacity in the long term. Also, we find that spatial rivalry influences military capacity in the long-term, but its effects are uneven across indicators of military capacity, and it has a smaller effect on military capacity in comparison to positional rivalries. We conclude that not all types of rivalries have a uniform effect on military capacity and that competition over regional dominance, that is, positional rivalries, are the most impactful on military capacity. This study offers a more nuanced test of Tilly's bellicist theory and Thies’ modified predatory theory on state capacity.

Rivalry Type and Cyber Operations: “Hot” Rivalries, “Cold” Rivalries, and Cyber Incidents, 1990–2009

Cyber operations targeting government computers and network infrastructure are becoming increasingly common and have the potential to be extremely damaging. Interstate rivalry has been shown to shape a wide range of global patterns. This paper examines the intersection between these two important phenomena. It builds upon previous scholarship by developing a broader and more nuanced theory of the rivalry-cyber operation relationship and testing it empirically with newly developed data on cyber operations from 1990 to 2009. Our results go beyond existing studies to demonstrate that certain types of “cold” rivalries experience elevated numbers of cyber operations, while other “hot” rivalries experience fewer incidents. This finding sheds new light on our general understanding of the volume and location of cyber operations in the international system. It also underscores important distinctions among rivalries that help to explain significant cyber activities and may help to improve our grasp of other emerging threats.

Interstate rivalry, genocide, and politicide

Interstate rivalry not only influences a country’s international behavior, but also its domestic conduct. Here, I focus on the connection between interstate rivalry and domestic government mass killing, specifically genocide and politicide. I argue that interstate rivalry has both direct and indirect influences on a government’s decision to use mass violence against its civilian population. Directly, countries engaged in rivalry experience a heightened state of military tension, which increases the likelihood that the country will resort to political mass killing when handling domestic dissent. Indirectly, rivalry increases the likelihood of both inter- and intrastate conflict, which also increases the likelihood of genocide and politicide. Statistical analysis of all country-years from 1955 to 2011 reveals that interstate rivals are more likely to engage in genocide and politicide than are other states. This research illustrates the way in which interstate rivalry influences a state’s domestic politics and shapes the interactions between government and population. It also highlights the importance of how the international threat environment affects a state’s willingness to engage in domestic political mass murder. These findings indicate that rivals do not only engage in the most violent interstate behavior, but also some of the deadliest domestic politics, as well.

Interstate Rivalry in East Asia

It is difficult to overstate the importance of East Asia to U.S. national security policy. East Asia was an important venue of contestation for the United States during World War II and the Cold War. Presently, the United States has multiple regional alliances and partnerships and is deeply integrated with the region’s political economy. The region is also the site of a number of critical interstate rivalries that directly impinge on U.S. interests. This chapter evaluates the literature on the U.S.-China relationship and territorial disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea. This chapter contends that neorealist theory offers a particularly illuminating lens in which to understand interstate rivalry in East Asia.

Constructing a General Model Accounting for Interstate Rivalry Termination

Unlike many topics in international relations, a large number of models characterize interstate rivalry termination processes. But many of these models tend to focus on different parts of the rivalry termination puzzle. It is possible, however, to create a general model built around a core of shocks, expectation changes, reciprocity, and reinforcement. Twenty additional elements can be linked as alternative forms of catalysts/shocks and perceptual shifts or as facilitators of the core processes. All 24 constituent elements can be encompassed by the general model, which allows for a fair amount of flexibility in delineating alternative pathways to rivalry de-escalation and termination at different times and in different places. The utility of the unified model is then applied in an illustrative fashion to the Anglo-American rivalry, which ended early in the 20th century.