Creatures of artifice : Rodney Brooks and the bioethics of animated machines

Renowned robotics engineer Rodney Brooks has built a career engineering behaviourally intelligent machines for scientific research, military-industrial applications, and domestic service. Drawing lessons from biology and ethology, Brooks designs embodied, responsive robots that he provocatively calls "artificial creatures." He has also been vocal about the broad implications his research carries for the future, making bold predictions about a technological society increasingly shaped by ecologies of animated machines. This dissertation examines a number of popular and academic texts in which Brooks discusses his artificial creatures, his design methodology, and his futurological speculations. Focusing on key moments from these texts, I discuss how he constructs a rhetorical and narrative framework through which he ascribes a sense of "life" to his robots in order to probe the distinction between the living and the nonliving and deliberately unsettle the bounds of the biological and the technological. As he highlights the lifelike qualities of his robots that raise them to the status of creatures, he simultaneously emphasizes the machine-like qualities of human beings, leading him to charge people with "overanthropomorphizing" themselves. I argue that these contrapuntal shifts call into question models of subjectivity derived from modern liberal humanism, insofar as they destabilize traditional relations between machines, animals, and human beings. In order to develop the broader theoretical implications of Brooks' work, I engage in comparative readings that place him in dialogue with philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, Bernard Stiegler, Jacques Derrida, and René Descartes, early cyberneticists Norbert Wiener and W. Grey Walter, and an offbeat video game called Chibi Robo! These readings afford opportunities to challenge modes of thinking and acting that assume human mastery over nature and technology, and subsequently to reevaluate our intimate connections to nonhuman beings that make human life livable in the first place. Ultimately, I endeavour to lay the groundwork for a bioethics that is responsive to redefinitions of life by technological means, one that eschews anthropocentrism in order to suggest a concern for different ways of living and belonging between humans and nonhumans, rather than for the lives of human beings alone.

Creatures of artifice : Rodney Brooks and the bioethics of animated machines

Renowned robotics engineer Rodney Brooks has built a career engineering behaviourally intelligent machines for scientific research, military-industrial applications, and domestic service. Drawing lessons from biology and ethology, Brooks designs embodied, responsive robots that he provocatively calls "artificial creatures." He has also been vocal about the broad implications his research carries for the future, making bold predictions about a technological society increasingly shaped by ecologies of animated machines. This dissertation examines a number of popular and academic texts in which Brooks discusses his artificial creatures, his design methodology, and his futurological speculations. Focusing on key moments from these texts, I discuss how he constructs a rhetorical and narrative framework through which he ascribes a sense of "life" to his robots in order to probe the distinction between the living and the nonliving and deliberately unsettle the bounds of the biological and the technological. As he highlights the lifelike qualities of his robots that raise them to the status of creatures, he simultaneously emphasizes the machine-like qualities of human beings, leading him to charge people with "overanthropomorphizing" themselves. I argue that these contrapuntal shifts call into question models of subjectivity derived from modern liberal humanism, insofar as they destabilize traditional relations between machines, animals, and human beings. In order to develop the broader theoretical implications of Brooks' work, I engage in comparative readings that place him in dialogue with philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, Bernard Stiegler, Jacques Derrida, and René Descartes, early cyberneticists Norbert Wiener and W. Grey Walter, and an offbeat video game called Chibi Robo! These readings afford opportunities to challenge modes of thinking and acting that assume human mastery over nature and technology, and subsequently to reevaluate our intimate connections to nonhuman beings that make human life livable in the first place. Ultimately, I endeavour to lay the groundwork for a bioethics that is responsive to redefinitions of life by technological means, one that eschews anthropocentrism in order to suggest a concern for different ways of living and belonging between humans and nonhumans, rather than for the lives of human beings alone.

Intelligence without Representation: A Historical Perspective

This paper reflects on a seminal work in the history of AI and representation: Rodney Brooks’ 1991 paper Intelligence without representation. Brooks advocated the removal of explicit representations and engineered environments from the domain of his robotic intelligence experimentation, in favour of an evolutionary-inspired approach using layers of reactive behaviour that operated independently of each other. Brooks criticised the current progress in AI research and believed that removing complex representation from AI would help address problematic areas in modelling the mind. His belief was that we should develop artificial intelligence by being guided by the evolutionary development of our own intelligence and that his approach mirrored how our own intelligence functions. Thus, the field of behaviour-based robotics emerged. This paper offers a historical analysis of Brooks’ behaviour-based robotics approach and its impact on artificial intelligence and cognitive theory at the time, as well as on modern-day approaches to AI.

The Pransky interview: Dr Rodney Brooks, Robotics Entrepreneur, Founder and CTO of Rethink Robotics

Purpose – This article, a “Q&A interview” conducted by Joanne Pransky of Industrial Robot Journal, aims to impart the combined technological, business, and personal experience of a prominent, robotic industry engineer-turned entrepreneur regarding the evolution, commercialization, and challenges of bringing a technological invention to market. Design/methodology/approach – The interviewee is Dr Rodney Brooks, the Panasonic Professor of Robotics (emeritus), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab; Founder, Chief Technical Officer (CTO) and Chairman of Rethink Robotics. Dr Brooks shares some of his underlying principles in technology, academia and business, as well as past and future challenges. Findings – Dr Brooks received degrees in pure mathematics from the Flinders University of South Australia and a PhD in computer science from Stanford University in 1981. He held research positions at Carnegie Mellon University and MIT, and a faculty position at Stanford before joining the faculty of MIT in 1984. He is also a Founder, Board Member and former CTO (1991-2008) of iRobot Corp (Nasdaq: IRBT). Dr Brooks is the former Director (1997-2007) of the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory and then the MIT Computer Science & Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. He founded Rethink Robotics (formerly Heartland Robotics) in 2008. Originality/value – While at MIT, in 1988, Dr Brooks built Genghis, a hexapodal walker, designed for space exploration (which was on display for ten years in the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C.). Genghis was one of the first robots that utilized Brooks’ pioneering subsumption architecture. Dr Brooks’ revolutionary behavior-based approach underlies the autonomous robots of iRobot, which has sold more than 12 million home robots worldwide, and has deployed more than 5,000 defense and security robots; and Rethink Robotics’ Baxter, the world’s first interactive production robot. Dr Brooks has won the Computers and Thought Award at the 1991 International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, the 2008 IEEE Inaba Technical Award for Innovation Leading to Production, the 2014 Robotics Industry Association’s Engelberger Robotics Award for Leadership and the 2015 IEEE Robotics and Automation Award.

Debunking enactivism: a critical notice of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism

In this review of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice and action.

Beyond Science Fiction Tales

We have already argued that an automated archaeologist cannot understand past social actions by enumerating every possible outcome of every possible social action. The need to insert all the world within the automated archaeologist’s brain and then maintain every change about is impossible. However, if we cannot introduce the world inside the robot, we may introduce the robot inside the world. What the automated archaeologist would need then is to be situated in the past, and then using observation and attention to learn from human action, because of the complexities of the past, which resist modeling. It leads to a modification of the aphorism espoused by Rodney Brooks (1989): “the past itself should be its own best model.” Consequently, the automated archaeologist must travel to the past to be able to understand why it happened. Only by being situated directly in the past, the automated archaeologist would understand what someone did and why she did it there or elsewhere.