KARL KERÉNYI ON THE ARCHETYPE OF THE ACADEMIC AND THE PRIEST

В статье обсуждается эссе Карла Кереньи «Religio academici» (1938), которое интерпретируется в надлежащем историко-философском и культурном контексте. Рассматриваются высказанные в этом эссе филологические установки и философские воззрения Кереньи. Особое внимание уделяется тому, каким образом Кереньи истолковывает понятие religio: используя «Учение академиков» и «О природе богов» Цицерона, он пытается истолковать religio эпохи Цицерона в духе скептической Академии и на примере понтифика Гая Аврелия Котты доказывает, что поведенческие характеристики ученого и жреца совпадают. Обращено внимание на то, что академики Котта и Цицерон признают существование богов, в чем схожи с Аркесилаем и Карнеадом, которые полемизировали только с theologia naturalis и rationalis стоиков, тогда как транслируемая традицией религия сомнению не подвергалась. Обсуждается термин «открытость» (das Offene), используемый Кереньи. Указывается, что некоторые положения Кереньи предвосхищают позднейшие высказывания Хайдеггера в статье «Нужны ли поэты?» (1946), посвященной Рильке и Гёльдерлину, что может быть связано с общим источником — опубликованными письмами Рильке. В заключение указано, что сопоставления модусов существования академического ученого и религиозного жреца, которые на первый взгляд могут показаться экстравагантными и произвольными, в полной мере задействованы современными историками науки. The article discusses Karl Kerényi’s essay “Religio academici” (1938), which is interpreted in a proper historical, philosophical and cultural context. The philological attitudes and philosophical views of Kerényi expressed in this essay are considered. Particular attention is paid to how Kerényi interprets the concept of religio: using Cicero’s “Academica priora” and “De natura deorum”, he tries to interpret religio of the Cicero era in the spirit of the skeptical Academy and, using the example of the Roman ponifex and Academic Sceptic Gaius Aurelius Cotta, proves that the behavioral characteristics of an academic and a priest coincide. Attention is drawn to the fact that Academics Cotta and Cicero recognize the existence of gods, in which they are similar to Arcesilaus and Carneades, who polemicized only with the theologia naturalis and rationalis of the Stoics, while the religion transmitted by tradition was not questioned. The term “openness” (das Offene) used by Kerényi is discussed. It is pointed out that some of Kerényi’s propositions anticipate the later statements of Heidegger in the article “Wozu Dichter?” (1946) dedicated to Rilke and Hölderlin, which can be explained by the presence of a common source — Rilke’s published letters. In conclusion, it is indicated that the comparisons made between the modes of existence of an academic and a priest, which at first glance may seem extravagant and arbitrary, are engaged by contemporary historians of science.

Cicero’s Philosophical Works

Cicero (106–43 bce) was a Roman statesman, orator, and philosopher. As well as speeches, letters, and rhetorical treatises, Cicero wrote numerous philosophical works. These can be divided into two periods—those written before the civil war between Julius Caesar and Pompey the Great (pre-49 bce), and those written during and after it (46 bce onward). Those written before are in dialogue form and the central topics are political: the ideal orator (De Oratore), the best citizen and the best state (De Re Publica), the best laws (De Legibus). Those following are predominately part of an ambitious project to bring philosophy to Rome in a systematic fashion; they are also mainly in dialogue form. Cicero composed an exhortation to philosophy (Hortensius), followed by books on epistemology (Academica, Lucullus) and works on broadly ethical concerns—the nature of good and evil (De Finibus); honor and glory (De Gloria); old age and friendship (De Senectute, De Amicitia); the soul, death, and suffering (Tusculans); consolation (Consolatio); the nature of the gods, divination, and providence (De Natura Deorum, De Divinatione, De Fato). Cicero’s final philosophical work is the De Officiis, presented as a letter to his son. Philosophy also figures prominently throughout Cicero’s letters, speeches, and rhetorical works. Indeed, it should be noted that Cicero felt his rhetorical works Orator and Brutus should be included in his philosophical corpus (Div. 2.4). There are two schools of thought on the novelty and value of Cicero’s philosophical works: (1) he is essentially just repackaging Greek material in Latin, offering renditions of existing ideas that are invaluable for saving much of the lost tradition of Hellenistic philosophy; (2) he is doing something more than that, developing distinctive philosophical contributions of his own. Most recent studies stress the innovative elements of Cicero’s philosophical thinking. Cicero’s own philosophical convictions are varied. Stoicism figures largely, as does his sympathy with Plato, Aristotle, and the Academic and Peripatetic traditions that follow them. He is strongly anti-Epicurean in both periods of his philosophical activity. Most scholars maintain that he is a pragmatic and flexible Academic skeptic, who weighs both sides of every argument and gives his assent to whatever he finds most compelling given the particular circumstances. Ostensibly a lack of political opportunity motivated Cicero to write philosophy. In the prefaces to his philosophical works he insists that it is not an escape from politics, but an intervention in it by other means.

Sócrates de Xenofonte e o estoicismo (Memoráveis 1.4)

Esta pesquisa se insere no contexto maior de um estudo sobre os Contra os físicos de Sexto Empírico. Procuramos compreender, neste artigo, a citação das Memoráveis de Xenofonte ali presente e sua relação com a teologia estoica, uma vez que esta é o alvo principal da crítica de Sexto. Para isso, abordamos o próprio texto de Contra os físicos, de Sexto Empírico; algumas anedotas em Diógenes Laércio e em Themistius (SVF 1.9); De natura deorum, de Cícero; e os Discursos de Epiteto.

Retórica e teônimos em De Natura Deorum, II

Em De Natura Deorum, livro II, o autor Cícero promove, através do personagem Balbo, os preceitos vigentes da escola filosófica estoica em Roma, sobretudo no que tange à natureza, forma física e nomes dos deuses, que são explicados em se considerando os aspectos filológicos e semânticos das palavras que lhes são atribuídas. É notória a tentativa de argumentação através de um discurso amplamente baseado em preceitos retóricos vigentes dos quais se utiliza o personagem Balbo para o convencimento dos seus interlocutores Veleio e Cota, representantes da escola epicurista e do academicismo, respectivamente. Com vista a verificar os argumentos utilizados, o presente trabalho, primeiramente, demonstra a estruturação retórica de que se utiliza o estoico em seu discurso ao longo do segundo livro: proêmio, narratio e conclusio; em seguida, analisam-se parágrafos importantes da narratio para a compreensão do ideal estoico acerca dos nomes atribuídos aos deuses.

Metaphysics in Cicero’s “De natura deorum”

At first sight, in Cicero’s treatise «De natura deorum», written in the form of a dialogue, metaphysical ideas are expressed only by a stoic participant, Balbus, who cannot argue them convincingly enough in the face of criticism from Cotta, a representative of the academic tradition, to which, in epistemology at least, the author considers himself to belong. However, the situation looks like this only if you read the treatise in isolation from other works of Cicero and taking into account what is stated, but not what is hidden. Meanwhile, there is every reason to consider this treatise as the central one in the group of works of the second half of the 40s, which is why the omissions in it are no less important than the direct text. From the comparison of various statements of Cicero about the divine, scattered in different works, it turns out that there undoubtedly was some metaphysical content in them, and it was built with an appeal to Plato, reinterpreted in the context of academic skepticism. And the key to understand the treatise «De natura deorum» is to be found in its composition, built on the opposition of the exoteric religiosity of the epicurean and stoic participants to the unspoken ideas of both their academic critics.

O lugar da adivinhação nas reflexões de Cícero sobre a religião romana: 'divinatio' entre 'religio' e 'superstitio'

Como já se observou, nos textos de Cícero se registra pela primeira vez o emprego da palavra divinatio como termo que se refere ao conjunto de rituais adivinhatórios. Neste trabalho, indagaremos qual é o seu emprego e que valoração recebe em De natura deorum, em De fato e em De divinatione. Desse modo, analisaremos em particular que lugar ocupa na oposição entre religio (entendida como o conjunto de práticas adequadas para levar adiante o cultus deorum) e superstitio (sua contraparte negativa, caracterizada por uma crença desmedida e irracional).

Cicero

This chapter investigates Cicero’s desire to enshrine himself as a classic from a different perspective than the rest of the book. It analyses Cicero’s appropriation not of a classical Greek figure but of himself, by examining his self-quotation of his earlier poetry (primarily the Aratea) within his late philosophical dialogues De Natura Deorum and De Divinatione. While Cicero likely found the Greek source for his poem, Aratus, quoted within the Greek philosophical works he used as sources for these dialogues, quoting his own poetry obviously carried a different charge. The chapter concludes that by staging the reading of his earlier works within these dialogues, Cicero was modelling the proper way to read his corpus: namely, as a set of works every bit as authoritative as the Greek classics he had adapted throughout his literary career.