Sign System Studies and Modern Socio-Anthropomorphism

The article examines the individual and social, practical, and theoretical presumptions (“idols” and “beliefs”) that constitute the conscious and unconscious re-construction of the social reality and reality of different conventional sign systems that represent and are represented by society. It is shown that in everyday life and in theoretical studies, we quite often analyze sign systems as if they were autonomous and empirically “given” realities. The work explains how this “natural belief” originated and developed. It is argued that conventional sign systems cannot be reduced to the reality of material “sign vehicles” because in society, sign systems are both subjective and objective, internal and external, and process and object.

FITRAH-BASED EDUCATION

In the general concept of Islam, it is stated that primordial human nature (Fitrah in Arabic) is that human beings are born with an innate inclination of tawhid (Oneness). Existing creation and the natural structure has the fact that human beings are born with their natural belief of one God which is called tawhid religion. Islam, as a Fitrah religion, fits not only in men’s diversity but also supports their growth and development. This makes their existence completed with perfect personality. The concept of education on the basis of fitrah has two primary goals. Firstly, it is to trigger and encourage the development of good personality rooted from Fitrah of the students. The good personality has two main dimensions, which are social and personal dimension, which lead to self awareness. By having self awareness, students are expected to have fundamental potential which should be developed optimally. Secondly, it is to return back to th concept of Oneness so that the universe becomes a means of Zikr (devotional acts in Islam in which short phrases or prayers, glorifying Allah, are repeatedly recited silently within the mind or aloud) and learning sources for students. In line with the goals of the Fitrah concept in the islamic educational system, students’ Fitrah can be built correctly and perfectly as a moslem. A pious man who has great relationship with Allah SWT, other human beings, and nature positively and constructively is called Manusia yang beriman dan bertaqwa serta memiliki berbagai kemampuan aktualisasi hubungan dengan Allah swt, sesama manusia, dan alam secara positif konstruktif, inilah yang disebut transcedental humanism theocentric

¿Puede la intolerancia religiosa ser justificada? Sensus divinitatis, diversidad

Calvino plantea, a través de la idea de sensus divinitatis (esto es, que hay un conocimiento implantado de Dios), una justificación a favor de la intolerancia religiosa y de la persecución y castigo a los herejes. Pero ¿es válida esta justificación de la intolerancia religiosa, como piensa Calvino? Según Hume, es posible desarrollar argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores en contra de la existencia del sensus divinitatis basados en la explicación naturalista de la creencia en Dios y en la diversidad religiosa. Y según Schellenberg, es posible plantear, además, un argumento basado en el problema del ocultamiento divino. Los argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores establecen que si una creencia es producida por mecanismos no fiables que no rastrean la verdad, entonces dicha creencia carece de justificación epistémica. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar y evaluar los dos argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores de Hume y el argumento de Schellenberg, los cuales intentar socavar la epistemología reformada de Calvino y Plantinga, y su defensa externalista de la racionalidad del teísmo. Mostraré que los tres argumentos son válidos y logran demostrar la falsedad del teísmo externalista. Con ello, espero hacer evidente la importancia de la crítica a la racionalidad del teísmo reformado durante la Ilustración escocesa, pues para Hume, el papel crítico de la filosofía se constituye en un remedio contra el fanatismo religioso, a la vez que promueve la idea de una democracia basada en la tolerancia religiosa y la libertad de conciencia. Palabras clave: sensus divinitatis, epistemología reformada, Calvino, Plantinga, argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores, racionalidad, teísmo, Hume, Schellemberg, Reforma. **************************************************************************************** Can religious intolerance be justified? Sensus divinitatis, religious diversity and the divine occult Hume and Schellenberg against Calvino. AbstractCalvino presents, through the idea of sensus divinitatis (which means, that we have knowledge of God implanted in us), a justification for religious intolerance and persecution and punishment of heretics. But, is religious intolerance a valid justification as Calvino thinks? According to Hume, it is possible to develop evolutionary arguments against the existence of sensus divinitatis based on a natural belief in God and in religious diversification. Additionally, according to Schellenberg, it is possible to state an argument based on the problem of the divine occult. The discrediting evolutionary arguments state that if a believe is produced through unreliable mechanisms that don’t follow reality, then such a believe lacks an epistemic justification. The objective of this work is to analyze and evaluate Hume’s two discrediting evolutionary arguments as well as Schellenberg’s argument, all of which try to undermine the epistemology formulated by Calvino and Plantinga, and their externalist defense of a national theism. I will demonstrate that the three arguments are valid and show how this externalist theism is false. With this, I expect to show the importance of critiquing the theism reasoning as it was reformed during the Scottish Illustration, for Hume the critical role of philosophy constitutes the solution against religious fanaticism, while at the same time, promoting the idea of a democracy based on religious tolerance and freedom of conscience. Key words: Sensus Divinitatis, Reformed Epistemology, Calvino, Plantinga, Discrediting evolutionary Aarguments, reasoning, theism, Hume, Schellenberg, Reformation. **************************************************************************************** Pode a intolerancia religiosa se justificar? Sensus divinitatis, diversidade religiosa e ocultamento divino Hume e Schellenberg contra Calvino ResumoCalvino salienta com a idéia de Sensus Divinitatis, a justificação da intolerância religiosa e a perseguição e castigo dos hereges. Mas é realmente justificada esta ideia? Segundo Hume é possível desenvolver argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores contra a existência do Sensus Divinitatis baseados na explicação naturalista da crença em deus e a diversidade religiosa. Segundo Schellenberg também é possível argumentar o ocultamento divino. Segundo os argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores se uma crença é produzida por mecanismos não fiáveis, ela carece de justificação epistêmica. O objetivo do artigo é analisar e avaliar os argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores de Hume e Schellenberg que tentam detonar a epistemologia de Calvino e Plantinga, baseados na defesa da racionalidade do teísmo. Os três argumentos são validos e conseguem demostrar a falsidade do teísmo externalista, assim no artigo se mostra a importância da crítica à racionalidade do teísmo, pois segundo Hume constitui um remédio contra o fanatismo religioso e promove a ideia democrática da liberdade de consciência. Palavras chave: sensos divinitatis, epistemologia reformada, Calvino, Platinga, argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores, racionalidade, teísmo, Hume, Schellemberg, reforma.

The Potential Use-Value of Hume's ‘True Religion’

Many hold that Hume was an atheist, that he despised the church, and that he was a devastating critic of religion. One cannot deny, however, the references to ‘true religion’ in his work, his sometimes seemingly favorable references to Deity, his call for religion in ‘every civilized community’, and his sense of (what has come to be known as) ‘natural belief’. The following essay describes a speculative Humean ‘true religion’ and discusses its potential use-value for contemporary philosophy of religion. It begins, anecdotally, with a description of Hume's happiness in France, which I attribute to the fact that Hume was not taken to be an atheist by the French reading public. The main argument is that while Hume was critical of ‘vulgar’ and ‘popular’ religion, his philosophical position did not deny our habit to accept a genuine theism that could, if informed by the calm passions, serve to ‘purify our hearts’ and bond us more closely together. Reconceiving Hume's ‘true religion’ in this way allows his insights to be used to support constructive efforts in the philosophy of religion. I conclude with a description of how this might work in light of three debates in religious studies and the philosophy of religion.