The Clash of Civil Religions in Post-Revolutionary Egypt

The 2013 counter-revolution that led to the removal of President Mohammad Morsi and the election of former military chief, ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, as president indicate that Egypt has chosen the unifying framework of Egyptian nationalism and rejected the Islamic one proposed by the Muslim Brothers. These dichotomous categories obscure more than they reveal, because Egyptian politics after the 2011 revolution is also polarized between different visions of the 'civil state'. The civil religion paradigm and the conception of the clash of civil religions as analytical models will be used to enhance our understanding of the relationships between the religious and the civil models and to identify certain characteristics of one of the most striking outcomes of this revolution: the clash between civil models and, more precisely, the clash of civil religions.

Egypt’s major political forces and their relations with the president M. Mursi in 2012–2013

Political situation in Egypt has been attracting international attention since 2011, when the wave of protests of so-called Arab Spring swept through the region of Middle East and North Africa. Inspired by democratic slogans of political pluralism, freedom of speech, press and religion, Egyptian revolution led to the political success of the Islamist groups, such as An-Nour and Muslim Brotherhood, that came to power in 2012. The representative of Muslim Brotherhood Mohammed Morsi held his position of the head of the state for a critically short term: had been elected in the end of June 2012, he was overthrown in the beginning of July 2013 by military coup supported by all the political forces of Egypt as well as Egyptian people, who gathered again in the Tahrir Square. Eventually, the people who had voted for Morsi a year before turned against him as well as political forces that used to support Muslim Brotherhood. He didn’t manage to prove his consistency as the president of the country. A number of factors led to this result. Economic situation in Egypt didn’t improve, democratically elected president launched totally undemocratic initiatives, etc. All these factors may be considered as obviously objective reasons for loosing the power. But Egyptian political environment has specific features that should be taken into account while investigating the reasons and factors of Morsi overthrow in 2013. Had being shaped through previous 30 years of Hosni Mubarak power and firmly rooted in Egyptian society, they couldn’t be changed simultaneously after the revolution. Two key players have been occupied leading positions in Egyptian politics during all this period: business elites and army. Both of them had financial and social base and influenced public opinion in the country. Political situation turned to be even more complicated with the vast number of new parties arouse after the revolt. All these players had an important part in Egyptian politics and should have been taken into account by the president. Moreover, his ability to form relationship with them and gain their loyalty was an important condition for maintaining power. Instead, M. Morsi started confrontation with the leading political forces of Egypt. Apparently, this wrong tactics resulted in his overthrow from the presidency in 2013.

Egypt’s Military Post-2011

Seven years after the 2011 uprisings, the Egyptian military shows no evident signs of internal cracks. This article argues that the Egyptian army’s unrivalled dominance, both in politics and within the security apparatus, could be explained as the result of three combined factors: substantial economic interests, a long-time legitimacy buttressed by the army’s active involvement in welfare and development initiatives, and the reliance on universal conscription as the main avenue for the successful accommodation of class and social cleavages—key elements underpinning the army’s status of supreme political arbitrator in Egyptian politics.

Religion

What Role Do Coptic Christians Play in Egyptian Politics and Society? Egypt held an important position in the early development of Christianity. In the three centuries after the death of Jesus, Alexandria was one of the primary centers for debate over the doctrine and beliefs...

The Clash of Civil Religions in Post-Revolutionary Egypt

The 2013 counter-revolution that led to the removal of President Mohammad Morsi and the election of former military chief, ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, as president indicate that Egypt has chosen the unifying framework of Egyptian nationalism and rejected the Islamic one proposed by the Muslim Brothers. These dichotomous categories obscure more than they reveal, because Egyptian politics after the 2011 revolution is also polarized between different visions of the 'civil state'. The civil religion paradigm and the conception of the clash of civil religions as analytical models will be used to enhance our understanding of the relationships between the religious and the civil models and to identify certain characteristics of one of the most striking outcomes of this revolution: the clash between civil models and, more precisely, the clash of civil religions.

"A Pragmatic March toward Democracy"?

This book has examined how the Free Officers were able to seize and consolidate power, topple the parliamentary regime, and put in place a new political order with them at the helm. It has shown that the erosion of liberalism in Egypt caused turmoil which in turn sparked clamors for drastic social and political reform. This created a situation that was exploited by the officers to stage a coup d'etat, and the military regime they established received support from the public and the intelligentsia. The officers initially refused to call their movement a revolution, and instead called themselves the “blessed movement.” They eventually declared their movement a revolution in early 1953; it was described by Anwar al-Sadat two years later as a “pragmatic march toward democracy.” This conclusion discusses the legacy of Nasser and Nasserism in Egyptian politics.

COPTS AND THE MILLET PARTNERSHIP: THE INTRA-COMMUNAL DYNAMICS BEHIND EGYPTIAN SECTARIANISM

The sparse scholarship on the political role of Coptic Christians in modern Egypt almost always takes the Coptic Orthodox Church as a point of departure, assuming that the head of the church, the Coptic patriarch, is not only the spiritual leader of the community but its political leader as well. This article argues that the disproportionate attention afforded to the Coptic Orthodox Church in this scholarship has obscured intra-communal dynamics of the Copts that are essential to an understanding of their political role. Through an analysis of historical struggles between the Coptic clergy and the Coptic laity for influence in Egyptian politics, as well as a particular focus on how these struggles have played out in the arena of personal status law, the article demonstrates that Egyptian politics and Coptic communal dynamics are deeply intertwined, to a degree often disregarded both by Copts and by Egypt analysts.

The Idea of jihād and Its Evolution: Ḥasan al-Bannā and the Society of the Muslim Brothers

This article aims to present the evolution of jihād in Ḥasan al-Bannā’s thought and writings throughout the 1930s, the first decade of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. While in the early years of the Society al-Bannā gave jihād a moderate interpretation, the idea assumed a different, more militant one during the latter half of the 1930s. This change corresponded with and reflected a transformation that the Society itself experienced; from a developing socio-religious Society to one that was intertwined with Egyptian politics and won the support of the masses. This analysis revolves around two rasāʾil written by al-Bannā during this formative period of his Society – Daʿwatunā and Risālat al-Jihād.