Schematic information influences memory and generalisation behaviour for schema-relevant and -irrelevant information

Schemas modulate memory performance for schema-congruent and -incongruent information. However, it is typically assumed they do not influence behaviour for information irrelevant to themselves. We assessed memory and generalisation behaviour for information related to an underlying pattern, where a schema could be extracted (schema-relevant), and information that was unrelated and therefore irrelevant to the extracted schema (schema-irrelevant). Using precision measures of long-term memory, where participants learnt associations between words and locations around a circle, we assessed memory and generalisation for schema-relevant and -irrelevant information. Words belonged to two semantic categories: human-made and natural. For one category, word-locations were clustered around one point on the circle (clustered condition), while the other category had word-locations randomly distributed (non-clustered condition). The presence of an underlying pattern in the clustered condition allows for the extraction of a schema that can support both memory and generalisation. At test, participants were presented with old (memory) and new (generalisation) words, requiring them to identify a remembered location or make a best guess. The presence of the clustered pattern modulated memory and generalisation. In the clustered condition, participants placed old and new words in locations consistent with the underlying pattern. In contrast, for the non-clustered condition, participants were less likely to place old and new non-clustered words in locations consistent with the clustered condition. We therefore provide evidence that the presence of schematic information modulates memory and generalisation for schema-relevant and -irrelevant information. Our results highlight the need to carefully construct appropriate schema-irrelevant control conditions such that behaviour in these conditions is not modulated by the presence of a schema. Theoretically, models of schema processing need to account for how the presence of schematic information can have consequences for information that is technically irrelevant to itself.

Resistance to Persuasion and Memory for Attitude-Congruent and Attitude-Incongruent Information in Political Advertisements

Across three studies, we tested competing hypotheses about how individual differences in social vigilantism and need for cognition relate to levels of attitude change, intentions to resist attitude change, and memory for political advertisements concerning a highly polarized issue. In Experiments 1 and 2, we examined participants’ intentions to use resistance strategies to preserve their pre-existing attitudes about abortion, by either engaging against opposing opinions or disengaging from them. In Experiment 3, we examined participants’ memory for information about both sides of the controversy presented in political advertisements. Our results suggest higher levels of social vigilantism are related to greater intentions to counterargue and better memory for attitude incongruent information. These findings extend our understanding of individual differences in how people process and respond to controversial social and political discourse.

Complex Thinking as a Result of Incongruent Information Exposure

In this article, we explore whether incongruent information influences what people recall to mind about a presidential candidate’s policy statements. We investigate whether the volume of people’s political thoughts, their ability to produce arguments, the affective valence of these thoughts, and their integrative complexity are influenced by the congruency between new political information and prior political convictions. We conducted an experiment via MTurk manipulating the congruency of information with respect to ideology. Our results show that incongruency significantly alters how people think about politics. Incongruent information increases integrative complexity of the opposing thoughts, becomes more voluminous, and includes more rationales. Moreover, these defensive thoughts are significantly more negative and less positive about the incongruent information. Parallel to what studies on motivated reasoning demonstrated, we also find that politically knowledgeable people in particular seem to strengthen their thoughts’ cognitive structure while defending their priors against information counter to their political views. We further discuss the general effects of these results and the importance of challenges to existing beliefs in generating complex thought systems.

Linguistic Bias

Social categorization and stereotypes play a pervasive and fundamental role in social perception, judgment, and interaction. Although stereotypes are functional by allowing us to make sense of our complex social environment, their use can promote prejudice and discrimination when individuals are treated based on generic stereotypic expectancies, rather than on available individuating information. Prejudice and discrimination emerge from generalized (negative) stereotypic associations that people hold about social categories. These stereotypes become socially shared within (sub)cultures through communications about categorized people and their behavior. Research on biased language use reveals the communicative and linguistic processes through which stereotypes are formed and maintained. When communicating about other people and their behavior, our language echoes the existing stereotypic expectancies we have with categorized individuals (often without our conscious awareness). A linguistic bias is defined as a systematic asymmetry in word choice that reflects the social-category cognitions that are applied to the described group or individual(s). Three types of biases are distinguished in the literature that reveal, and thereby maintain, social-category cognitions and stereotypes. First, when labeling individuals, the types of category labels that we choose reflect existing social category cognitions. Second, once target individuals are labeled as members of a category, people tend to communicate predominantly stereotype-congruent information (rather than incongruent information). Third, research has revealed several biases in how we formulate information about categorized individuals. These formulation differences (e.g., in language abstraction, explanations, use of negations, irony) subtly reveal whether a target’s behavior was stereotypically expected or not. Behavioral information that is in line with social-category knowledge (i.e., stereotype-consistent) is formulated differently compared to incongruent information (i.e., stereotype-inconsistent). In addition, when communicating with individuals we have categorized in a given social category, our language may subtly reveal the stereotypic expectancies we have about our conversation partners. It is important to be aware of these stereotype maintaining biases as they play an important role in consensualizing both benevolent and harmful stereotypes about social categories.