Relative Performance Evaluation in CEO Compensation: A Talent-Retention Explanation

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation can be used as a commitment device to pay CEOs for their revealed relative talent. We find evidence consistent with the talent-retention hypothesis, using two different approaches. First, we examine the RPE terms in compensation contracts and document features that are consistent with retention motives. Second, using a novel empirical specification for detecting RPE, we find RPE is less prevalent when CEO talent is less transferrable: Among specialist CEOs, founder CEOs, and retirement-age CEOs, as well as in industries and states where the market for CEO talent is more restrictive.

Three essays on inside debt

[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT AUTHOR'S REQUEST.] This dissertation is composed of three essays examining inside debt. The first essay tests the impact of inside debt on security issuance decisions. I find that CEOs with high debt incentives are more likely to issue equity that debt, unlever firm capital structure, and hold debt of longer average maturity. The results indicate that managers with high debt incentives favor financing decisions that decrease firm risk. The second essay examines the determinants of use and magnitude of inside debt. I find a positive association between inside debt and CEO talent. In addition, I find that inside debt affects the likelihood of CEO post-retirement board service and CEO successor characteristics. The third essay examines the impact of inside debt on corporate dividend policy. I find that companies with large CEO holdings of inside debt are more likely to pay and increase dividends, and have larger dividend payouts. The results indicate that inside debt, by reducing firm risk, positively influences corporate dividend policy.