Executive Power Sharing in the Face of Civil War

Scholars have debated whether executive power sharing can secure peace in multiethnic states, but concerns about endogeneity due to reverse causation render this a difficult problem for empirical analyses. In the absence of a suitable instrumental variable, I explore an actor-based approach by studying a simple formal model. This highlights the conditions under which governments are likely to share power with a domestic challenger depending on the threat of violence. I then formulate a statistical “strategic selection” model that closely mirrors the theoretical model, thereby directly incorporating endogeneity. Applied to data at the level of ethnic groups, the estimation results indicate that power sharing is indeed enacted strategically by governments in anticipation of the risk of conflict. However, shedding new light on an ongoing debate, I find that the critics have overstated the case against power sharing: rather than spurring it, power sharing robustly reduces civil conflict. Expertos han debatido si el reparto del poder ejecutivo puede garantizar la paz en los estados multiétnicos, pero las inquietudes sobre la endogeneidad debido a la causalidad inversa hacen que este sea un problema difícil para aplicar métodos de análisis empírico. A falta de una variable instrumental apropiada, exploro un enfoque basado en los actores aplicando un modelo formal simple. Esto pone de manifiesto las condiciones en las que es probable que los gobiernos compartan el poder con un adversario local en función de la amenaza de violencia. A continuación, formulo un modelo estadístico de “selección estratégica” que refleja fielmente el modelo teórico, incorporando así, de forma directa, la endogeneidad. Al aplicar los datos de acuerdo con los grupos étnicos, los resultados de la estimación indican que el reparto de poder es, en efecto, una práctica estratégica de los gobiernos en previsión del riesgo de conflicto. Sin embargo, al arrojar nueva luz sobre un debate en curso, descubro que los críticos han sobredimensionado los argumentos contra el reparto de poder: en lugar de estimular el conflicto, el reparto de poder reduce considerablemente los conflictos civiles. Des chercheurs ont débattu pour savoir si le partage du pouvoir exécutif pouvait garantir la paix dans les États multiethniques, mais les préoccupations liées à l'endogénéité résultant de la causalité inverse compliquent cette problématique pour les analyses empiriques. En l'absence d'une variable instrumentale adaptée, j'explore une approche basée sur les acteurs en étudiant un modèle formel simple. Cela me permet de mettre en évidence les conditions dans lesquelles les gouvernements sont susceptibles de partager le pouvoir avec un opposant national en fonction de la menace de violence. Je formule ensuite un modèle statistique de « sélection stratégique » qui reflète fidèlement le modèle théorique en intégrant directement l'endogénéité. Appliqués à des données au niveau des groupes ethniques, les résultats de l'estimation indiquent que le partage du pouvoir est effectivement adopté de manière stratégique par les gouvernements en anticipation du risque de conflit. Cependant, en apportant un nouvel éclairage sur le débat actuel, je constate que les critiques ont exagéré les arguments contre le partage du pouvoir: plutôt que d'encourager les conflits civils, le partage du pouvoir les réduit fortement.

PROGNOSTIC METHODS IN SOCIOLINGUISTICS

Language policy in multiethnic states includes prognostic aspect as a necessary component for making better decisions within a changing language situation. At present, when the speed of decision-making in all spheres of human activity has significantly increased, there is a need for additional involvement of forecasting methods from the sciences related to sociolinguistics. The article provides an overview of forecasting methods traditionally used in Russian sociolinguistics. In order to increase interest in this aspect, sociolinguists analyze the possibility of introducing key methods from other interdisciplinary sciences to predict language development in sociolinguistic studies.

Definitions of Separatism in the Scientific Discourse

The separatist movements have significantly intensified in many European states, most notably in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Spain, which were empires before the collapse of colonialism in the 20th century and expanded their territories by conquering the neighboring countries. Today, within the majority of multiethnic states, there are historical and geographical regions where indigenous ethnic communities seek to secede and gain independence. The economic factors and identity based on common language, culture and history usually play a significant role in the development of separatist movements. It should be noted that the activities of the separatist movements threaten the sustainable development and functioning of the system of international relations. Since the international law does not specify which social groups can exercise their right to self-determination, the following dilemma often arises: should the principle of territorial integrity of states prevail over the right of the nation to self-determination, or vice versa? Nowadays, the problem of separatism has gone beyond the internal politics of the state and has gained the international importance. First of all, this is due to the fact that the third parties intervene in the conflicts in order to destabilize the situation in certain countries and to strengthen their influence in a particular region. Trying to avoid criminal responsibility and imposition of international sanctions, separatists do not resort to open armed attacks on neighboring countries, which is a clear act of aggression, and use hybrid warfare techniques instead. Taking into consideration the current Ukrainian statehood challenge and the real threat to our country’s territorial integrity, the study of separatism as an actual threat to national security is essential. Despite the large number of scientific works devoted to this phenomenon, it is necessary to continue the comprehensive research of separatism. That is why the scientific approaches to the definition of separatism are analyzed in this article, and its nature is investigated. Key words: separatism; separatist movement; secession; irredentism; nationalism; ethnopolitical conflict.

Cleavage Types and Conflict in Multiethnic States

This chapter tests the structural part of the book’s theory from a global perspective. It analyzes the relationship between ethnic cleavage types and the prevalence of different forms of ethnopolitical contention. Relying on large-n statistical analyses, it shows, first, that the extremely unequal colonial settler states experience fewer and less lethal ethnic civil conflicts but higher levels of peaceful ethnopolitical contention than the decolonized states and other multiethnic countries. These results are robust when considering the immediate postindependence period of the settler states and when testing for the possible endogeneity of cleavage types. Second, the chapter confirms that the theorized effects of hierarchization and social integration apply to all multiethnic states in general. Ethnic civil conflict is generally more likely the more segmented and less hierarchically structured multiethnic states are. Specifically, stable between-group hierarchies reduce the risk of governmental conflict, whereas segmentation only affects secessionist conflicts.

Inside Ethnic Movements

This chapter looks inside ethnic movements to shed light on the role of ethnic organizations as agents of collective action. It theorizes the three causal mechanisms through which ethnic organizations influence outcomes of equality or inequality, and peace or violence in multiethnic states: the “aggregating and institutionalizing,” the “power seizing,” and the “mobilizing” mechanisms. The outcomes of these mechanisms differ as a consequence of countries’ ethnic cleavage types. In segmented unranked societies, ethnic organizations exacerbate existing intergroup competition, undermining ethnic equality and increasing the risk of civil conflict. In contrast, in stratified societies, ethnic organizations assume an emancipatory function, fostering the political inclusion of historically marginalized groups and, thus, enhancing ethnic equality while promoting nonviolent contentious action.

Two Logics of Ethnic Mobilization

This chapter first summarizes the main empirical findings of the foregoing chapters. It then elaborates on their theoretical and practical implications, describing how they contribute to a number of central debates in recent conflict research and related fields of political science. In particular, the chapter discusses how the book’s theory and empirical results relate to other types of political contention and violence, such as ethnonationalist terrorism, ethnic cleansing, and state repression, and what they imply for the study of conflict outcomes and diffusion. The chapter concludes by elaborating the adequate political responses to ethnic mobilization in different types of multiethnic states. Specifically, stratified societies require political institutions that permit the collective mobilization of historically discriminated groups in order to rectify the existing inequalities. In contrast, the decolonized states and other segmented unranked societies need institutions that promote strong transethnic organizations to counter the threat of violent conflict.

A Theory of Ethnic Cleavages, Group Mobilization, and Conflict in Multiethnic States

This chapter argues that the consequences of ethnic group mobilization depend on countries’ ethnic cleavage types. It introduces two ideal types of multiethnic societies: segmented unranked and stratified societies. The chapter traces the origins of these cleavage types back to the legacies of European overseas colonialism. It explains why the colonial settler states and the decolonized states constitute archetypical cases of stratified and segmented unranked societies, respectively. It then theorizes how these ethnic cleavage types affect the prevalence of different forms of conflict in multiethnic states today. In stratified societies, stable between-group hierarchies and a high degree of social integration deprive the marginalized groups of the capacity for armed rebellion and make the relative opportunity structure more conducive to peaceful direct action than to violence. In contrast, unstable group hierarchies and high social segmentation stimulate the capacity for violence and increase the relative opportunities for armed revolt compared to nonviolent strategies.