Proportionality of response to criminally illegal behavior of minors

Modern international standards indicate that the basis of criminal law policy to prevent juvenile delinquency should be a child-friendly juvenile justice system. This system focuses on the application of alternative and non-criminal sanctions (warning, reprimand, restitution and compensation). Based on international standards of juvenile justice, we can note their focus on ensuring the best interests of the child, the predominance of sanctions and measures that may have an educational impact, compensation for damages, creating conditions for reconciliation of victims and offenders and eliminating the consequences of crime, ensuring a meaningful life of a teenager in society. Juvenile sentencing is more loyal approach and shown in comparison with adults with regard to property penalties (if the minor has income or property) (parts 1, 3 of Article 99 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine), reduced limits of punishment (parts 1, 2 of Article 100, 101, part 1 Article 102 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine), restriction of using of imprisonment depending on the gravity of the crime and the characteristics of the juvenile. It is established that in addition to ensuring the best interests of the child and the use of as many non-punitive measures as possible against juvenile, it is also necessary to pay attention to other circumstances of the case. In particular, a balance must be struck between the best interests of the juvenile and a proportionate response to his or her behavior. In particular, it is necessary to take into account the repeated commission of criminal offenses, as well as the one-time application of incentive rules to juvenile. And pay attention to alternatives to imprisonment that may be more effective. In particular, mediation and rehabilitation practices can be more effective.

About the issue of punishment for juveniles

The article is devoted to the analysis of the institute of criminal liability and punishment for minors under the Ukrainian legislation. Theoretical and practical features of sentencing for criminal offenses are examined and the main tendencies of sentencing at the present stage are determined. It is stated, that certain provisions of the Criminal Code of Ukraine on the sentencing of minors do not correspond to the worldwide practice of humanizing the punishment for juveniles. It is determined that the purpose of criminal punishment for minors is the process of education. Also, it is proved, that this goal should be confirmed in the current Penal Code. Attention is focused on the fact that the backbone of the state strategy on criminal law counteraction to juvenile delinquency should be a child-friendly system of juvenile justice. The necessity of adding new types of punishment into Penal Code of Ukraine which would be applied only for young offenders is defined. Moreover, the expediency of forming a new system of punishment for juveniles, which would take into account more sophisticated and new educational measures is proved. The peculiarities of imposing criminal punishment on minors according to the legislation of other foreign countries are clarified. It is shown that special penalties for minors, which are not connected with isolation, are provided by the criminal legislation of most European countries. Keywords: juvenile, sentencing, criminal liability, sanity, punishment, delinquency, criminal law policy, humanism, condemnation, psychological features

The Legal Context

The chapter begins with a brief introduction, describing the scope and types of evaluations for juvenile sentencing in criminal court, offering the reader relevant terminology and an introduction to the book’s purpose. The primary focus of the chapter is on the relevant law for these evaluations. It describes relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases, especially Miller v. Alabama, which abolished mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles and required developmental analysis to inform juvenile sentencing, as well as Montgomery v. Louisiana, which required resentencing for persons previously receiving mandatory life without parole sentences as juveniles. Miller’s definitions for the standards to be applied in juvenile sentencing and resentencing are then introduced and discussed: the legal concept of “irreparable corruption” and the five “Miller factors” defining characteristics of immaturity relevant for sentencing. Finally, the chapter describes the legal process for juvenile sentencing, identifying the role of Miller evaluations within that process.

Evaluations for Sentencing of Juveniles in Criminal Court

In Miller v. Alabama (2012), the U.S. Supreme Court imposed special requirements for sentencing juveniles who have been transferred to criminal court for conviction and sentencing as adults. Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) also required that all juveniles sentenced to life without parole in the past must be resentenced. For these cases, the Court required that consideration of life without parole and any alternative sentences must include a review of potentially mitigating factors associated with a youth’s developmental immaturity. This is the first book to offer guidance to forensic mental health examiners when performing evaluations to assist attorneys and judges in Miller sentencing and resentencing cases. The first three chapters review relevant legal, conceptual, and research background for examiners. The Court’s specific developmental factors are defined, as well as relevant case law and legal process for juvenile sentencing cases. Then psychological concepts and theory related to those developmental factors are reviewed, and a chapter identifies research that examiners can use to inform their assessment and interpretation process. With that conceptual background, the next four chapters offer recommendations for conducting these evaluations. Preparation for the evaluation is described, including managing the requirements and expectations of referring parties. Then the process of data collection is outlined, including interviews and psychological and developmental testing tailored for this type of evaluation. Final chapters offer guidance for interpreting the data to address the law’s relevant developmental factors, as well as an outline and advice for written reports and oral testimony in juvenile sentencing cases.

Death by Numbers: Why Evolving Standards Compel Extending Roper’s Categorical Ban Against Executing Juveniles From 18 to 21

Texas Law Review, ForthcomingNearly fifteen years ago, the Supreme Court held in Roper v. Simmons that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of people who were under 18 at the time of their offenses. The Court justified the line it drew based on legislative enactments, jury verdicts, and neuroscience. In the intervening years, however, much has changed in juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, the legal treatment of young people, and neuroscience. These changes beg the question: Why 18? Is the bright-line rule that the Court announced in Roper still constitutionally valid or do the changes since 2005 now point to a new cutoff at 21? To answer those questions, this Article considers post-Roper developments in the relevant domains to make the case that the 18-year-old constitutional line should be extended to age 21. It does so by applying the Supreme Court’s evolving-standards-of-decency methodology. Specifically, the Article examines all death sentences and executions imposed in the United States post-Roper and looks at the current state of neuroscientific research that the Court found compelling when it decided Roper. Two predominant trends emerge. First, there is a national consensus against executing people under 21. This consensus comports with what new developments in neuroscience have made clear: people under 21 have brains that look and behave like the brains of younger teenagers, not like adult brains. Second, young people of color are disproportionately sentenced to die — even more so than adult capital defendants. The role of race is amplified when the victim is white. These trends confirm that the logic that compelled the Court to ban executions of people under 18 extends to people under 21.