Corporate Stakeholders

Chapter 5 echoes the growing sentiment that corporations need to take into account other interests besides that of their shareholders. It traces the origins of the idea that corporations exist solely to increase the wealth of their shareholders and explains how this belief in shareholder primacy came to be accepted as a truism by many scholars, judges, and commentators. When Milton Friedman originally popularized this idea in 1962, he wrote that corporations should serve shareholder interest “within the rules of the game.” These days the rules of the game are influenced tremendously by business lobbying. The chapter explains how the political influence of labor waned and was replaced by business influence in the 1970s. Since that time, Congress has done very little to protect labor because business interests have become extremely powerful lobbyists and substantial donors to political campaigns.

Corporate Elites and American Politics

The book begins by introducing the Silicon Valley 150+, the 175 biggest public and private firms in Silicon Valley, and discusses the intent of the book: to examine the political engagement of those individuals who founded and are CEOs of the SV150+ firms. This chapter introduces the main themes of the book, positioning the book against literatures covering business lobbying, political donations by firms, philanthropy and public policy, and the formation of new advocacy organizations. The chapter also includes three important lists: (1) the SV150+ firm list—the list of Silicon Valley firms the book studies; (2) the SV150+ CEO list—the list of CEOs the book studies; and (3) the SV150+ founder list—the list of founders the book studies. The chapter concludes with an overview of the chapters to come.

Business Lobbying in the European Union

At a time when Europe and business stand at crossroads, this study provides a perspective into how business representation in the EU has evolved and valuable insights into how to organize lobbying strategies and influence policy-making. Uniquely, the study analyses business lobbying in Brussels by drawing on insights from political science, public management, and business studies. At the macro-level, we explore over thirty years of increasing business lobbying and explore the emergence of a distinct European business-government relations style. At the meso-level, we assess how the role of EU institutions, policy types, and the policy cycle shape the density and diversity of business activity. Finally, at the micro-level we seek to explore how firms organize their political affairs functions and mobilized strategic political responses. The study utilizes a variety of methods to analyse business-government relations drawing on unique company and policy-maker surveys; in-depth case studies and elite interviews; large statistical analysis of lobbying registers to examine business the density and diversity; and managerial career path and organizational analyses to assess corporate political capabilities. In doing so, this study contributes to discussions on corporate political strategy and interest groups activity. This monograph should be of interest to public policy scholars, policy-makers, and businesses managers seeking to understand EU government affair and political representation.

The Evolving Nature of EU Business Lobbying

This chapter examines business lobbying in the EU from a historical perspective. Conceptually, it discusses how the EU’s evolution has influenced interest intermediation in Brussels. In doing so, it addresses the increasing authority handed to the European Commission, the growth of European regulatory networks, and multi-level governance; and their influence on business and the strategic choices it makes. From the opposite perspective, it examines the impact that business has had on the EU’s integration, and its policy-making procedures. Empirically, the chapter draws on unique business surveys spanning from the mid-1990s up until today, and a large-N analysis of 12,000 registered organizations on the EU’s transparency register. It also provides a case study on business strategies, focused on the directive on tobacco control. Theoretically, this chapter contributes to discussions on European integration, interest group activity, business lobbying, and governance in the EU.,

The Nature of the Policy Field and Business-Government Relations

This chapter studies the nature of the policy field and its impact on business-lobbying in the EU. Drawing from theories on institutional legitimacy and information-access it observes the variation in density and diversity across regulatory and (re)distributive policy fields, and committee hearings. Empirically, the chapter employs business group surveys, conducts meticulous analysis of a population of 12,000 interest groups lobbying preferences across multiple policy fields assessing their density and diversity as well as their clustering. It includes a case study on business diverse coalition building focusing on net neutrality. Finally, the chapter observes the distribution of business interests across the European Parliament’s committee hearings. In doing so, this chapter contributes to discussions on legitimacy and public policy, chameleon pluralism, business mobilization, and the nature of the policy good.