Akibat Hukum Dari Pemutusan Kontrak Secara Sepihak

This study aims to determine how the arrangements for the unilateral termination of the contract/agreement and what are the legal consequences arising from the unilateral termination of the contract. The research method used is normative juridical. The approach used in this research is the statute approach and the case approach, and the conceptual approach. The conclusion of the research results is that; contract termination arrangements and legal consequences are regulated in Articles 1266, 1267, 1243 and 1365 of the Civil Code. The conditions for an agreement to be canceled unilaterally are that the agreement must be reciprocal, there is default, and the cancellation must be requested from the judge. Unilateral termination of the agreement due to default without going through the court is an act against the law. The legal consequence of the unilateral termination of the agreement due to default is a claim for compensation from the party who feels aggrieved. The Civil Code does not explicitly regulate the differentiation of compensation as a result of default with compensation as a result of an act against the law. Based on the research results, it is found that compensation as a result of default is compensation in the form of material, while compensation for an illegal act is compensation in the form of material and immaterial. It is hoped that in the future there will be clear regulations regarding compensation as a result of default and compensation as a result of acts against the law.

Government choice between contract termination and contract expiration in re-municipalization: a case of historical recurrence?

Since the early 2000s, the terms ‘re-municipalization’ and ‘reverse privatization’ entered the lexicon as several examples emerged of governments taking ownership of assets and services that had previously been privatized or outsourced. Various methods are used to implement re-municipalization decisions and differences are observed across countries and sectors. The approaches most frequently adopted are re-municipalization through contract termination and contract expiration. We utilize a wide database of re-municipalizations worldwide to analyse the factors that influence governments’ choice between these two approaches. The results from our multivariate analysis find a pattern of historical recurrence in the characteristics of the current re-municipalization process. Points for practitioners Most governments wait for contracts to expire but the number of contract terminations is sizeable. Re-municipalization in larger cities, network sectors (particularly water) and implemented by municipal governments have a positive association with termination. Re-municipalization of energy utilities and conducted in countries of French legal origin is positively associated with contract expiration. Patterns of contemporary re-municipalization closely resemble those witnessed in the ‘Progressive Era’.

Collateralized Networks

This paper studies the spread of losses and defaults in financial networks with two interrelated features: collateral requirements and alternative contract termination rules. When collateral is committed to a firm’s counterparties, a solvent firm may default if it lacks sufficient liquid assets to meet its payment obligations. Collateral requirements can, thus, increase defaults and payment shortfalls. Moreover, one firm may benefit from the failure of another if the failure frees collateral committed by the surviving firm, giving it additional resources to make other payments. Contract termination at default may also improve the ability of other firms to meet their obligations through access to collateral. As a consequence of these features, the timing of payments and collateral liquidation must be carefully specified to establish the existence of payments that clear the network. Using this framework, we show that dedicated collateral may lead to more defaults than pooled collateral, we study the consequences of illiquid collateral for the spread of losses through fire sales, we compare networks with and without selective contract termination, and we analyze the impact of alternative resolution and bankruptcy stay rules that limit the seizure of collateral at default. Under an upper bound on derivatives leverage, full termination reduces payment shortfalls compared with selective termination. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance.

Exclusion of a contractor from participation in a public procurement procedure as a result of contract termination for reasons attributable to them

The article describes obligatory and optional grounds for excluding a contractor on the basis of Polish Public Procurement Law, taking into account the jurisprudence and views of the doctrine. The attention is paid to the optional ground based on art. 24 sec. 5 point 4 of the Polish Act of January 29, 2004, Public Procurement Law, according to which the contracting authority may exclude from the procurement procedure contractors who, for reasons attributable to them, failed to perform or to a significant extent improperly performed a prior public procurement contract or concession contract concluded with the contracting authority, which led to termination or awarding compensation. In order to be able to use the institution, the contracting party must include an appropriate clause in the contract, providing for the possibility of terminating the contract or awarding damages due to contractor’s non- performance or improper performance of the contract, which is a common practice on the Polish public procurement market. However, in the event of such a clause, the contracting authority is obliged to apply it if the condition is met. The article also describes the self- cleaning institution, derived from art. 57 sec. 6 of Directive 2014/24/EU. The self-cleaning procedure can protect the contractor from being excluded from future tenders. However, In order to take advantage of self-cleaning, the contractor has to admit that non-performance or improper performance of the contract is their fault. Keywords: Exclusion; Contractor; Agreement

An Internet Service Provider’s Right of Discount Reimbursement Provided for the Customer in Case of Early Contract Termination

The paper analyses the discounts offered to consumers in the agreements of Lithuanian Internet access service providers and the legal qualification of these discounts in the practice of the Communications Regulatory Authority and courts. The article raises the question of whether such discounts are not hidden penalties.

CEO Employment Contract Horizon and Financial Reporting Discretion

We examine the effect of employment contract horizon on managers' discretion in financial reporting. During the contract horizon, the board learns about a new CEO's ability from realized firm performance and uses this information to determine whether to renew or terminate the CEO's contract. Economic theory suggests that the informational value of firm performance to the board's learning declines over time as the board's estimate of the CEO's ability becomes more precise; this motivates a CEO to overstate earnings more aggressively during the earlier stage of the contract horizon. Consistently, we find more (less) aggressive earnings overstatement during the earlier (later) stage of the first contract horizon. This finding is stronger for CEOs who have greater concerns over contract termination and CEOs who have greater flexibility to manipulate earnings. Our evidence suggests that the CEO employment contract horizon has a significant impact on managerial discretion in financial reporting.