The Guerrilla Caliph

Chapter 15 features Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s final speech which appeared in an Islamic State video titled ‘In the Hospitality of Amirul-Mu’minin’ on 29 April 2019. Three features are particularly noteworthy. First, Baghdadi uses the speech to demonstrate that he is closely monitoring not only global events and issues but the fortunes of the personnel within his organization. Second, his physical appearance in the video was markedly different to his last appearance in 2014. He was now the guerrilla caliph managing a global insurgency on the run. Third, Baghdadi was projecting his authority as not just Islamic State’s leader but ‘amirul-mu’minin’ (commander of the faithful). Less than six months later, Baghdadi would be killed in a special forces leadership decapitation raid on his hideout in northern Syria. Under his leadership, the Islamic State had become the flagship of the global jihad with provinces around the world.

Is Leadership Targeting Effective?

The chapter begins by looking at trends in leadership targeting. It then examines the impact of decapitation on organizational activity, organizational existence, attack frequency, and organizational survival. The data shows that organizational size, type, and leadership rank all have an impact on the probability that a group will experience a cessation of organizational activity after leadership decapitation. Large, religious, separatist, and Islamist groups are resilient to decapitation efforts and likely to continue carrying out activity. Targeting the top leader as opposed to members of the upper echelon is more likely to result in a cessation of activity, and groups in countries with a larger population are more likely to withstand leadership attacks. The chapter concludes with an overall assessment of the theoretical implications and policy recommendations regarding the efficacy of leadership targeting.

Conclusion

The book concludes with a discussion of the overall findings and theoretical arguments regarding the efficacy of leadership targeting. It then examines 198 instances of targeting efforts against ISIS leaders. The theory suggests that targeting is not likely to result in the demise or even a significant weakening of ISIS. It is an Islamist organization, bureaucratized, and with considerable amounts of communal support, albeit decentralized and in many cases coerced. Even if Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is captured or killed and the organization undergoes a brief period of disruption, given the group’s hierarchy of authority and chain of command, it should ultimately choose a successor easily and recover quickly. Furthermore, the statistical results regarding the resilience of large and Islamist organization is consistent with ISIS’s resilience. The chapter concludes with policy recommendations regarding the use and impact of leadership decapitation as a counterterrorism policy.