Self-Determination along the Austrian Frontier, 1918-1920: Case Studies of German Bohemia, Vorarlberg, and Carinthia

<p>The First World War led to the collapse of a number of prominent European empires, allowing for the spread of new ideas into Europe. US President Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric of national self-determination attracted particular symbolic importance because it legitimised popular sovereignty through the use of plebiscites. German-Austrians, like other national groups within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, used self-determination to justify establishing independent successor states after the war. The German-Austrian Republic, founded in 1918, claimed all German-speaking regions of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire on the basis of self-determination. This thesis examines claims to self-determination in three different cases: German Bohemia, Vorarlberg, and Carinthia. Representatives from each region took their case to the Paris Peace Conference, appealing to the Allied delegations to grant international recognition. These representatives faced much opposition, both from local non-German populations and occasionally even from the German-Austrian government itself. German-Austrian politicians in the Czech lands opposed the incorporation of German-majority lands into Czechoslovakia, and instead sought to establish an autonomous German Bohemian province as part of German-Austria. In Paris, Allied delegations supported the historic frontier of the Czech lands, and therefore opposed local German self-determination outright, refusing demands for a plebiscite in German Bohemia. Vorarlberg representatives sought Vorarlberg’s secession from German-Austria, hoping instead for union with Switzerland. Vorarlbergers held a plebiscite to join Switzerland on their own initiative, initially with some degree of international support, but ultimately the international community, fearful of the disintegration of Austria, refused to allow Vorarlbergers to realise their wishes. Carinthian German representatives opposed Yugoslav claims to sovereignty over the region, seeking to remain part of German-Austria. Disagreements between and within the Allied delegations over Carinthia resulted in a decision to hold a plebiscite, which showed a majority in favour of remaining part of Austria. The thesis suggests that the implementation of self-determination in the Carinthian case resulted in a more successful resolution of border disputes. Unlike in the other two cases, the new Carinthian border mostly reflected the desires of the local population. Despite idealistic rhetoric, the final Austrian frontier suggested that Allied delegations at the Paris Peace Conference routinely favoured strategic justifications over self-determination.</p>

Self-Determination along the Austrian Frontier, 1918-1920: Case Studies of German Bohemia, Vorarlberg, and Carinthia

<p>The First World War led to the collapse of a number of prominent European empires, allowing for the spread of new ideas into Europe. US President Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric of national self-determination attracted particular symbolic importance because it legitimised popular sovereignty through the use of plebiscites. German-Austrians, like other national groups within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, used self-determination to justify establishing independent successor states after the war. The German-Austrian Republic, founded in 1918, claimed all German-speaking regions of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire on the basis of self-determination. This thesis examines claims to self-determination in three different cases: German Bohemia, Vorarlberg, and Carinthia. Representatives from each region took their case to the Paris Peace Conference, appealing to the Allied delegations to grant international recognition. These representatives faced much opposition, both from local non-German populations and occasionally even from the German-Austrian government itself. German-Austrian politicians in the Czech lands opposed the incorporation of German-majority lands into Czechoslovakia, and instead sought to establish an autonomous German Bohemian province as part of German-Austria. In Paris, Allied delegations supported the historic frontier of the Czech lands, and therefore opposed local German self-determination outright, refusing demands for a plebiscite in German Bohemia. Vorarlberg representatives sought Vorarlberg’s secession from German-Austria, hoping instead for union with Switzerland. Vorarlbergers held a plebiscite to join Switzerland on their own initiative, initially with some degree of international support, but ultimately the international community, fearful of the disintegration of Austria, refused to allow Vorarlbergers to realise their wishes. Carinthian German representatives opposed Yugoslav claims to sovereignty over the region, seeking to remain part of German-Austria. Disagreements between and within the Allied delegations over Carinthia resulted in a decision to hold a plebiscite, which showed a majority in favour of remaining part of Austria. The thesis suggests that the implementation of self-determination in the Carinthian case resulted in a more successful resolution of border disputes. Unlike in the other two cases, the new Carinthian border mostly reflected the desires of the local population. Despite idealistic rhetoric, the final Austrian frontier suggested that Allied delegations at the Paris Peace Conference routinely favoured strategic justifications over self-determination.</p>

The Issues of the Number of Western Armenians and Ethnic Composition of the Population of Western Armenia at Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920)

References to the issues of the number of Western Armenians and the ratio of Armenians to other ethnic groups in Western Armenia on the eve of the Armenian Genocide occupy a special place in the context of processes related to drafting a peace agreement with the Ottoman Empire and Armenia’s delineation after WWI. These issues were tackled by diverse Armenian official and non-official organizations struggling for the formation of an integral Armenian state, as well as Turkish authorities manipulating, inter alia, also demographic arguments against the Armenian claim for Western Armenia and the Entente Powers (particularly the United States of America and Great Britain) needing statistical data for deciding the fate of the Ottoman Empire. In the post-war processes the long-distance controversy of the Armenian and Turkish sides over the issues in question can be figuratively characterized as one of the stages – “battles” of the “statistical war” that emerged after 1878, i.e. following the entry of the Armenian Question into the international diplomatic agenda. This article aims to present and analyse the statistics on the number of Western Armenians and the ratio of Armenians in Western Armenia to other ethnic groups on the eve of the Armenian Genocide presented by Armenian and Turkish delegations at Paris Peace Conference, as well as data circulated by the US and British diplomacy. It will try to explain the connection between the delineation of Armenia and the number of Western Armenians, the demographic composition of Western Armenia on the eve of the Armenian Genocide. The calculations of the number of Western Armenians have had a certain effect on deliberations around demarcation of the border between the Republic of Armenia and the Ottoman Empire in the context of post-war world regulation.

THE ALBANIAN PROBLEM AND THE USA ON THE EVE OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE IN 1919

Nineteen-nineteen was a year of peacemaking and national boundaries were being revised throughout the world. It was also a year of hope, especially for the Albanians, when many people believed that the world could be remade according to Wilson. The year was crucial in the development of Albania. For Albania the story of 1919 is both national and international. On the international scene the problem of what to do with Albania was as always tied to other issues. Albania had been created in 1913 by the Great Powers in an attempt to preserve the stability of the Balkans by preventing the growth of the states which were victorious in the first Balkan War and by maintaining Albania as a foreign dominated balancing factor. This system by which the Great powers maintained their control over the Balkans was broken completely by the First World War. During the peacemaking the Albanian problem became part of both the Adriatic question of Greece and the question of Greek and Italian claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. The aim of this paper is to consider these claims, the influence of Essad Pasha on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference and the American attitude towards the Albanian issue.