Implications of Labor Market Frictions for Risk Aversion and Risk Premia

A flexible labor margin allows households to absorb asset value shocks with changes in hours worked, altering the households’ attitudes toward risk (Swanson 2012). This paper analyzes how frictional labor markets affect that analysis. Risk aversion is higher (i) in countries with more frictional labor markets, (ii ) in recessions, and (iii ) for households that have more difficulty finding a job. Labor market frictions in Europe are large enough to raise risk aversion in those countries. Nevertheless, risk aversion in the United States and Europe is much closer to the frictionless benchmark in Swanson (2012) than to traditional, fixed-labor measures. (JEL D11, D81, E24, E32, J22)

EFFICIENT SORTING IN FRICTIONAL LABOR MARKETS WITH TWO-SIDED HETEROGENEITY

This paper studies how search externalities and wage bargaining distort vacancy creation and the allocation of workers to jobs in markets with two-sided heterogeneity. To do so, I propose a model of a frictional labor market where heterogeneous workers decide which job to look for and firms decide which technology to adopt. At equilibrium, there is perfect segmentation across sectors, which is determined by a unique threshold of workers' productivity. This threshold is inefficient because of participation and composition externalities. The Pigouvian tax scheme that decentralizes optimal sorting shows that these externalities have opposite signs. Furthermore, their relative strength depends on the distribution of workers' skills, so that when there are many (few) skilled workers, too many (few) high-technology jobs are created.

RETHINKING OPTIMAL EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES WITH FRICTIONAL LABOR MARKETS

Currency fluctuations are an important determinant of labor market dynamics. Vice versa, relative labor costs affect real exchange rate dynamics. The optimal choice of exchange rate regimes cannot neglect this nexus. We assess such a choice using a two-country model with frictional labor markets. The monetary authority faces a tension between the classical insulating property of floating exchange rates and the destabilizing effects of currency fluctuations on (relative) job flows. Results show that the second motive is important: optimal monetary policy prescribes (some) response to the exchange rate. We also reexamine the conditions for optimal policy in a currency area whose members experience asymmetries in labor market institutions.