Simplicity and the form of grammars

The goal of theory construction is explanation: for language, theory for particular languages (grammar) and for the faculty of language FoL (the innate endowment for language acquisition). A primitive notion of simplicity of grammars is number of symbols, but this is too crude. An improved measure distinguishes grammars that capture genuine properties of language from those that do not. The theory of FoL must meet the empirical conditions of learnability (under extreme poverty of stimulus), and evolvability (given the limited but not insignificant evidence available). Recent work provides promising insights into how these twin conditions may be satisfied.

Acquisition without evidence: English infinitives and poverty of stimulus in adult second language acquisition

This article provides a Poverty of Stimulus argument for the participation of a dedicated linguistic module in second language acquisition. We study the second language (L2) acquisition of a subset of English infinitive complements that exhibit the following properties: (a) they present an intricate web of grammatical constraints while (b) they are highly infrequent in corpora, (c) they lack visible features that would make them salient, and (d) they are communicatively superfluous. We report on an experiment testing the knowledge of some infinitival constructions by near-native adult first language (L1) Spanish / L2 English speakers. Learners demonstrated a linguistic system that includes contrasts based on subtle restrictions in the L2, including aspect restrictions in Raising to Object. These results provide evidence that frequency and other cognitive or environmental factors are insufficient to account for the acquisition of the full spectrum of English infinitivals. This leads us to the conclusion that a domain-specific linguistic faculty is required.

Distinguishing knowledge from belief in understanding the logic of the poverty of stimulus argument

Além da tese de que a gramática das línguas naturais inclui um nível transformacional, o que distingue o programa Chomskyano de investigação em Teoria da Gramática das outras abordagens é a tese de que o conhecimento gramatical internalizado por todo o ser humano é parcialmente inato (i.e.parcialmente dado a priori por um sistema de viéses cognitivos tarefa-específicos da Gramática Universal), e não um subproduto de mecanismos auto-organizáveis de ‘inteligência geral’. Esta tese científica pode, em princípio, estar certa ou errada, e só pode ser questionada levando-se em conta a sua cobertura empírica e a lógica dos seus argumentos. No cerne desta questão está o Argumento de Pobreza de Estímulo (APS), cuja lógica tem sido alvo de inúmeros mal-entendidos por parte dos anti-inatistas, a exemplo de Geurts (2000), que deixa de reconhecer as distinções entre ‘conhecimento’ e ‘crença’, e entre cognição ‘consciente’ e ‘não-consciente’, as quais são cruciais para a compreensão da lógica do APS. O objetivo deste artigo é desfazer esse mal-entendido.

Apresentação

É com prazer que apresentamos, neste volume do CEL, os trabalhos selecionados referentes ao encontro do GT de Teoria da Gramática na ANPOLL, realizado na PUCSP em julho de 2006. Temos aqui um conjunto exemplar de cinco trabalhos que refletem a dinâmica do grupo. Dois deles A interface lingüística-neurociência da linguagem e Computação lingüística no processamento on-line: soluções formais para a incorporação de uma derivação minimalista em modelos de processamento foram apresentados na mesa inter-GTs – Teoria da Gramática e Psicolingüística. O texto Distinguishing Knowledge from Belief in Understanding The Logic of the Poverty of Stimulus Argument foi apresentado em uma das mesas do GT. Os textos Dissociação entre movimento de XP e de X0: sem evidências do agramatismo e Elipse do VP e variação paramétrica fizeram parte da apresentação de posteres que o GT sempre incentiva.

Poverty of stimulus and absence of cause: some questions for Felin and Foss

We examine an aspect of the argument of Teppo Felin and Nicolai Foss (‘The Endogenous Origins of Experience, Routines, and Organizational Capabilities: The Poverty of Stimulus’; 2011) where they reject the claim of Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen (‘Darwinism, Causality and the Social Sciences’; 2004) that habits depend crucially on stimuli from the social environment. We argue that while rightly stressing human agency they also create a false dichotomy between agential and environmental factors in the explanation. Felin and Foss create further confusion by hinting – without adequate clarification – at an untenable notion of human agency as an uncaused cause. We raise several questions of clarification for these authors.

Problems at the Foundation? Comments on Felin and Foss

This paper reviews the assessment of the routines and capabilities literature provided by T. Felin and N. J. Foss, ‘The Endogenous Origins of Experience, Routines and Organizational Capabilities: The Poverty of Stimulus’, published by theJournal of Institutional Economics. Although valuable points are raised, the assessment is largely off target because it is fixated on the implausible view that the literature assessed is strongly shaped by the tradition of behavioral psychology (B. F. Skinner and others). At the same time, important portions of the routines and capabilities literature that are highly relevant to the authors’ substantive concerns, and which are plainly inconsistent with the main interpretive claim, are not considered.

The foundation is solid, if you know where to look: comment on Felin and Foss

This paper offers an alternative to the view of the routines literature provided by T. Felin and N. J. Foss, ‘The Endogenous Origins of Experience, Routines and Organizational Capabilities: The Poverty of Stimulus’, published by theJournal of Institutional Economics. The emphasis here is on practice-based theories of organizational routines that are grounded in close, ethnographic observation of real routines. While this literature may be unfamiliar to some readers, it is relevant here because it specifically contradicts the core assertions made by Felin and Foss. Further, this literature provides a clear theoretical foundation for subsequent research on problems such as stability and change in routines, the nature of capabilities and dynamic capabilities, and complex ecologies of routines.

The endogenous origins of experience, routines, and organizational capabilities: the poverty of stimulus

In this paper we discuss the origins and emergence of organizational routines and capabilities. We first argue that there are theoretical and endogeneity-related concerns associated with the key antecedents and mechanisms specified by the extant routines and capabilities literature. Specifically, we explicate the behaviorist and empiricist foundations of the organizational routines and capabilities literature and the extant emphasis placed on experience, repetition, and observation as the key antecedents and mechanisms of routines and capabilities. Based on this discussion we highlight several, endogeneity-related concerns, namely: (1) the problem of origins and causation, (2) the problem of extremes, (3) the problem of intentionality, (4) the problem of new knowledge, and (5) the problem of the environment. We introduce the ‘poverty of stimulus’ argument and discuss how an internalist or rationalist, choice-based approach can provide a more fruitful (though preliminary) foundation for understanding organizational behavior and capabilities.