Leveraging Publicly Available Information to Analyze Information Operations

Traditionally, a significant part of assessing information operations (IO) relies on subject matter experts’ time- intensive study of publicly available information (PAI). Now, with massive amounts PAI made available via the Internet, analysts are faced with the challenge of effectively leveraging massive quantities of PAI to draw meaningful conclusions. This paper presents an automated method for collecting and analyzing large amounts of PAI from China that could better inform assessments of IO campaigns. We implement a multi-model system that involves data acquisition via web scraping and analysis using natural language processing (NLP) techniques with a focus on topic modeling and sentiment analysis. After conducting a case study on China’s current relationship with Taiwan and comparing the results to validated research by a subject matter expert, it is clear that our methodology is valuable for drawing general conclusions and pinpointing important dialogue over a massive amount of PAI.

Mapping Nefarious Social Media Actors to Speed-up Covid-19 Fact-checking

This report presents the outcomes of a project aimed at developing and testing a prototype tool that supports and speeds-up the work of fact-checkers and de-bunkers by surfacing and ranking potentially problematic information circulated on social media with a content-agnostic approach. The tool itself is the result of a multi-year research activity carried on within the Mapping Italian News Research Program of the University of Urbino Carlo Bo to study the strategies, tactics and goals of information operations aimed at manipulating the Italian public opinion by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the contemporary media ecosystem. This research activity led to developing original studies, public reports, new methods, maps and tools employed to study the activity of Italian nefarious social media actors aimed at amplifying the reach and impact of problematic information by coordinating their efforts. Tracking these actors proved instrumental to observe the “infodemic” unraveling during the early days of COVID-19 outbreak in Italy. Combining this existing knowledge with a range of original tools and data sources provided by Meta’s Facebook Open Research Initiative (Fort) and by The International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) at Poynter, the report: documents those early days by highlighting a list of widely viewed and interacted links circulated on Facebook; traces the establishment, growth and evolution of Italian covid-skeptic coordinated networks on Facebook; presents a comprehensive and updated map of the activities performed by these networks of nefarious social media actors; unveils a set of original tactics and strategies employed by these actors to adjust their operations to the mitigation efforts adopted by social media platforms to reduce the spread of problematic information; describes the circulation of three specific piece of problematic information; provides an overview of the outcomes of the testing phase (carried out in collaboration with Facta.news) of a prototype tool that surfaces and ranks potentially problematic information circulated on social media with a content-agnostic approach.

Information Operations Increase Civilian Security Cooperation

Information operations are considered a central element of modern warfare and counterinsurgency, yet there remains little systematic evidence of their effectiveness. Using a geographic quasi-experiment conducted during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, we demonstrate that civilians exposed to the government’s information campaign resulted in more civilian security cooperation, which in turn increased bomb neutralisations. These results are robust to a number of alternative model specifications that account for troop presence, patrol-based operations, and local military aid allocation. The paper demonstrates that information campaigns can lead to substantive attitudinal and behavioural changes in an adversarial environment and substantially improve battlefield outcomes.

“The Other/Alien” Image in the Russian Federation Strategic Communications During the Russian-Ukrainian Confrontation (2014–2021)

The purpose of the study is to investigate what communication and media technologies and information operations are used by the mass media of the Russian Federation in relation to Ukraine to propagate the image of the “other/alien”. The methodology chosen for the work combines the application of the following methods and approaches: network analysis, SWOT-analysis, system, integrated and civilization approaches, system analysis, method of systematization and classification, methods of analysis, synthesis, objectivity, generalizations, analogies, case study, etc. The article explores the use of communication, media and information-psychological technologies by the Russian mass media to create and effectively promote the image of an enemy, alien, the other during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which began in 2014. The authors insist that the “Russkiy Mir” idea is promoted through the propaganda and manipulation resulting in the image of the adversary of this idea – “the other.” The “Russkiy Mir” foe does not perceive everything with the designation “Russian” as a priori positive and better, doubt the correctness of such a position, and therefore wishes evil to the supporters of the “Russkiy Mir”. Information operations and the most widespread media technologies in the Russian-Ukrainian information warfare are analyzed to model the image of “the other” as a threat. Prospects for further scientific researches are connected with the study of new scientific concepts that is some network-centric warfare, hybrid warfare, cyberwarfare, asymmetric warfare, undeclared information warfare, and others.

Influence Operations: Conceptual Dimension

The article focuses on the meaning and features of influence operations. It is shown that this term does not have precise and widely accepted definition. The researchers tend to consider influence operations as general term for any activities of international actors in information environment, or as a modern form of information operations that exceed military campaigns. The analysis of researchers’ publications made it possible to highlight some features of influence operations. The core of influence operations is perception management. The success of such operations depends largely on understanding vulnerabilities and adaptation to the specifics of target audiences. One of key features of influence operations is synchronization and coordination of activities in information and physical environment. The idea is that communication activities should be reinforced by appropriateactions that also aim to affect perceptions, opinions, and behavior of target audiences and not to obtain advantages in physical environment. Influence operations are also characterized by the use of various combinations of “soft” and “hard”, legitimate and partly legitimate influence techniques. The scenarios of influence operations are long lasting and may take different formsthat involve the participation of state and non-state agents of influence. Influence operations cover all aspects of information operations and strategic communication, but they are used in more complicated and subtle way. So, it makes sense to regard influence operations as long-term and advanced form of information operations. The emergence of this term may mark the necessity torevise and updateexisting terminology in the field of information warfare,taking into account moderntrends in the development of international relations.

Detecting computer-generated disinformation

Modern neural language models can be used by malicious actors to automatically produce textual content looking as it has been written by genuine human users. Due to progress in the controllability of computer-generated text, there is a risk that state-sponsored actors may start using such methods for conducting large-scale information operations. Various detection algorithms have been suggested in the research literature to identify texts produced by language model-based generators, but these are often mainly evaluated on test data from the same distribution as they have been trained on. We evaluate promising Transformer-based detection algorithms in a large variety of experiments involving both in-distribution and out-of-distribution test data, as well as evaluation on more realistic in-the-wild data. It is shown that the generalizability of the detectors can be questioned, especially when applied to short social media posts. Moreover, the best performing (RoBERTa-based) detector is shown to be non-robust also to basic adversarial attacks, illustrating how easy it is for malicious actors to avoid detection by the current state-of-the-art detection algorithms.

The ‘Infodemic’: Is International Law Ready to Combat Fake News in the Age of Information Disorder?

This article considers the readiness of international law to protect States from information operations that are launched as the means of disrupting government response to the spread of infectious diseases, such as COVID-19. It examines both the external- and internal-facing dynamics for international regulation of misinformation, with the focus on the principle of non-intervention as an external regulation of misinformation under general international law and freedom of expression guaranteed under human rights treaties for internal regulation.

Information disorder, the Triumvirate, and COVID-19: How media outlets, foreign state intrusion, and the far-right diaspora drive the COVID-19 anti-vaccination movement

Information disorder has become an increasing concern in the wake of the 2016 US presidential election. With the state of the COVID-19 pandemic rapidly evolving in all facets, the vaccination debate has become increasingly polarized and subjected to a form of politics based around identity markers such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, and ideology. At the forefront of this is the COVID-19 anti-vaccination movement that has gained mainstream attention, leading to conflict with pro-vaccinationists. This has paved the way for exploitation by subversive elements such as, foreign state-backed disinformation campaigns, alternative news outlets, and right-wing influencers who spread false and misleading information, or disinformation, on COVID-19 in order to promote polarization of the vaccine debate through identity politics. Disinformation spread sows confusion and disorder, leading to the erosion of social cohesion as well as the potential for real-world conflict and violence. As a result, the article below will generate further understanding of the modern-day spread of disinformation, the strategies and tactics utilized by state and non-state actors, the effects of its exposure, and the social-psychological processes involved in its spread and resonance. Furthermore, in countering this phenomenon, this article recommends a collaborative framework involving emphasis on critical media literacy skills, citizen participation, and development of counter-offensive capabilities towards state-backed information operations.

LANDMARKS OF RUSSIA’S USE OF INFORMATION WARFARE

Russian Information warfare represents an extended concept that covers a wider and more diverse range of actions when compared to NATO's approach on information operations. Russian techniques, tactics and procedures in the field of information warfare do not differ much from those used in the Soviet period but are adapted to the new technological achievements. The specific means of use the information warfare are acquired by the future politico-military leaders of the Russian state starting with their preparation period at an age of accumulation. On short and medium term, it is likely that Moscow’s activities specific to the information warfare will increase being favored by the limitations imposed by the Covid 19 pandemic.