The Two Truths that Descartes Discovers in His Meditations on First Philosophy that Do Not Require the Divine Guarantee

In my paper, I show that there are two truths in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy that do not require the divine guarantee, despite Descartes’ claim in the last sentence of the fourth paragraph in the third meditation that he cannot be certain of anything unless he knows that God exists as Descartes’ creator and that God is not a deceiver.

Filosofia e dibattito. Le Meditazioni Cartesiane come esempio di deliberazione filosofica

This essay relates the content of an educational experience that applies the methodology of debate to the closer examination of an argumentative philosophical text, in the form of a deliberation with oneself. The text in question is Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, specifically the first, the second, the sixth meditation and respective Objections. The class involved in the activity is the IV B of the Liceo classico Alessandro Manzoni in Lecco.

Ego Between Ethics and Cybernetics

The article attempts to clarify the problem of defining an action through ethical optics. Ethics is understood as a system of principles relevant to action. As Agamben has shown, the rules permit objectifying the ego and neutralizing the flow of life as forma vitae. From this perspective, the pragmatics of the subject is not merely a set of practices for self-management, where the most important task is complete control; it is instead strategies for the self-organization of a form of life through a rule which makes sustainability the main goal. The main difficulty in the pragmatics of the subject in this connection is dealing with akrasia. Akrasia is understood not as weakness of will but as heterogeneity in it, a lacuna or violation of the intentional structure of action in which the subject can both want and not want to act, or want to act in several directions at the same time in the sense introduced by Jon Elster. The article argues that the adaptation model of subject pragmatics, understood as a system of auto-references mediated by a rule is very similar to a cybernetic approach. If we compare Gregory Bateson’s The Cybernetics of “Self”: A Theory of Alcoholism and René Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, an unexpected convergence appears. Bateson explains the effectiveness and sustainability of self-management in Alcoholics Anonymous groups by their use of the cybernetic principles of feedback, complementarity, and communication with the external. The rules for guiding the mind that Descartes introduces in his Meditations can be seen as principles for the subject’s self-government that enable escape from akrasia between doubt and faith not as modes of thought but as modes of will. Cartesian deduction and justification of rules follow the path outlined by Bateson: complementarity, feedback, and establishing a relationship with the external. The concept of akrasia can elucidate the way in which self-management and Descartes’ cogito ethics in a sense anticipate cybernetic governance models. This connection also explains why the ethics of the cogito and the pragmatics of the subject have been the most enduring features in the theory of the subject and are still standing after the onslaught of intense criticism from its opponents.

Al-Ghazālī and Descartes on Defeating Skepticism

Commentators have noticed the striking similarities between the skep­tical arguments of al-Ghazālī’s Deliverance from Error and Descartes’ Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. However, commentators agree that their solutions to skepticism are radically different. Al-Ghazālī does not use rational proofs to defeat skepticism; rather, he relies on a supernatural light [nūr] sent by God to rescue him from skepticism. Descartes, on the other hand, relies on the natural light of reason [lumen naturale] to prove the existence of God, mind, and body. In this paper, I argue that Descartes’ solution is closer to al-Ghazālī’s than commentators have allowed. A close reading of the cosmological argument of the Third Meditation reveals that there is also a type of divine intervention em­ployed in the Meditations, which helps Descartes defeat skepticism. This reading may buttress the case made by some that al-Ghazālī influenced Descartes; but more importantly, it requires us to rethink key features of Descartes’ epistemology.

Santa Rosa de Lima y Descartes

Comparando las vías hacia la contemplación y el amor de Dios del meditador de las Meditaciones de Descartes y de la santa limeña, el artículo revela una dimensión central pero no reconocida de la obra del filósofo francés, lo que le permite al autor articular interesantes problemas relativos a la concepción misma de la filosofía y a las relaciones entre conocimiento, entendimiento y vida. Abstract Through a comparison between the roads to the contemplation and love of God of the cartesian meditator and of Saint Rose of Lima, the paper reveals an essential but ignored aspect of Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy. This leads the author to the formulation of interesting problems relating to the very nature of philosophy and the relations between knowledge, understanding, and life.

A Critique of Volition: An Alternative Doctrine of the Will and Intellect Reconciling That of 17th-Century Rationalist Philosophers Descartes and Spinoza

The will and intellect have been debated philosophically without resolution for centuries. It is for this reason that this article considers doctrines of the will and intellect of two 17th-century rationalist philosophers, Rene Descartes, and Baruch Spinoza, both of whom were chosen as the focus for analysis because of their prominence and contrasting views. Our objective was to critique the doctrine of the will and intellect to develop an alternate theory that expounds on their previous work. A qualitative exploration was undertaken that compared their respective belief systems of Dualism and Monism. Despite the strengths of their arguments, an analysis of Part V of Spinoza’s Ethics and Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy by Descartes led the author to determine that both were partially correct in their positions yet consistent with one another. From this conclusion and building upon their work, this article presents the synthesis of the author’s alternate theory regarding the qualitative characteristics of both the will and intellect. An ontological argument against the existence of infinite entities as a corollary with the implication that neither the will, intellect, nor God can be infinite. While the limitation of the conclusions drawn is that they are dependent on the author’s philosophical framework, the originality of this paper is based on the author’s synthesis of one coherent theory from two philosophers espousing contrasting theistic systems and should serve as the foundation for future exploration and debate.

RENÉ DESCARTES AND CHRISTINA OF SWEDEN: OBSESSION WITH REASON AND PASSION FOR SOVEREIGNTY

The article describes and comments on a number of epistolary documents pertaining to the last journey of René Descartes and specifically to his enigmatic relations with Queen Christina. Those relations were conducted at first as a kind of “epistolary novel” and may be regarded as one of the examples of a dialogue between a thinker and a ruler. As the historical tradition clearly indicates, the relationship ended in a radical rift between power and philosophy. It is important for us to understand why Descartes, who had shunned all the temptations of power throughout his life, so recklessly succumbed to the charms of the “northern Minerva” and agreed to assume the role of court philosopher even though his whole way of life, as well as his philosophy, argued against such a choice. The author traces out a series of hypotheses. First, what was dominant in the relationship between Descartes and Christina was not so much the mostly rational framework of a “philosopher” encountering a “sovereign” but a sort of confrontation between two obsessions: the thinker’s arrogant trust in the omnipotence of an absolute reason that nevertheless had its blind spots, and the untrammelled will of sovereign power on which the young queen based her existence. Second, turning to some of the themes in Descartes’ own philosophical thought and in particular to the “malin génie” from Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), one may infer that this rather literary or even poetic figure at some point took the form of a kind of “femme fatale” that preoccupied the philosopher’s thinking and filled his life with an existential turmoil which contributed to his fatal decision to go to Sweden. The ultimate conclusion is that the “Souverain Bien” for the philosopher was the rare opportunity for his thinking to reign supreme; but by succumbing to the temptation to serve the Empress, he betrayed himself. The “souverain Bien” for the ruler lay in autocracy as such, and specifically in a devotion to herself as the embodiment of the administration of power.

Auf der Suche nach Erkenntnis zwischen Asien und Europa: al-Ġazālī, Descartes und die moderne Forschungswissenschaft

The quest for an indisputable foundation of all knowledge has been one of the driving forces behind intellectual history. In the European tradition it is mainly connected to René Descartes (1596–1650) and his Meditations on First Philosophy whereas in the Islamic world it was already expressed in a brilliant manner by Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī (1058–1111) in his book entitled Deliverance from Error. The article investigates both these texts by contextualizing them within the long history of intellectual autobiographies, which stretches from antiquity to the present and comprises many exciting examples from Asia and Europe.