After summarizing the book’ s alternative recursive analysis of the Athenian politeia, the chapter confronts three possible objections to this new account. First, despite possible appearances to the contrary, this kind of ontological history can in fact accommodate the “messiness” of “real life.” While its primary purpose is to recover the ontological and metaphysical commitments which were presupposed by Athenian demokratia, it is not necessarily contradicted by evidence for conduct that might seem to defy those commitments. Second, nor is this kind of analysis necessarily contradicted by the texts of, say, Plato, Thucydides, or other contemporary intellectuals which seem to offer us very different accounts of Greek “realities.” Such texts represent the thought of only a tiny elite minority, intellectuals who were expressly challenging conventional presuppositions about the givens of existence. And it is those conventional presuppositions which the book is primarily concerned with, since they constituted the “world-making common sense” of the age, the social knowledge that was at once presupposed and reproduced by the most vital life-sustaining practices of the Athenians, the thought which actively helped to make their world whatever it really was at the time. By contrast, elite oppositional claims were merely ideational constructs, mere renegade “worldviews.” Third, while the book’ s ontological history is written in the synchronic mode, treating the classical era as a single extended moment, this does not mean that it is incapable of accounting for change. Indeed, as the chapter shows, it is quite possible to imagine a diachronic ontological history.