Scientific Evidence and the Internalism–Externalism Distinction

Considerations of scientific evidence are often thought to provide externalism with the dialectical upper hand in the internalism–externalism debate. How so? A couple of reasons are forthcoming in the literature. (1) Williamson (2000) argues that the E = K thesis (in contrast to internalism) provides the best explanation for the fact that scientists appear to argue from premises about true propositions (or facts) that are common knowledge among the members of the scientific community. (2) Kelly (Philosophy Compass, 3 (5), 933–955, 2008; 2016) argues that only externalism is suited to account for the public character of scientific evidence. In this article, I respond to Williamson and Kelly’s arguments. First, I show that the E = K thesis isn’t supported by the way in which we talk about scientific evidence, and that it is unable to account for facts about what has been regarded as scientific evidence and as justified scientific belief in the history of science. Second, I argue that there are internalist views that can account for the publicity of scientific evidence, and that those views indeed do better in that regard than the (externalist) view proposed by Kelly. The upshot is that considerations of scientific evidence do not favor externalism over internalism.

Instant Agents, Minutelings, and Radical Reversals

Thought experiments about three kinds of agent—instant agents, minutelings, and radically reversed agents—are used in developing the book’s argument for an externalist view of moral responsibility. Instant agents come into being all at once as adult agents with full psychological profiles. Minutelings are instant agents who live only for a minute and perform a morally significant action. Radically reversed agents come in two general kinds: morally wonderful agents who are given a despicable collection of values overnight by manipulators, and despicable agents who are given a morally wonderful collection of values overnight by manipulators.

Internalism and Externalism

Two general kinds of view about moral responsibility are discussed—internalism and externalism. An agent’s internal condition at a time may be defined as something specified by the collection of all psychological truths about the agent at the time that are silent on how he came to be as he is at that time. Internalists maintain that—at least in the case of direct moral responsibility—all that is needed to determine whether an agent is morally responsible for a pertinent action is to be found in his internal condition. Externalists disagree; they contend that agents’ personal histories can have a special bearing on moral responsibility. This disagreement is described and discussed. Various thought experiments are used to shed light on the disagreement and to start building a case for an externalist view.

Capacitism and Alternative Views

Chapter 10 discusses the difference between capacitism and relevant alternative views: knowledge-first epistemology, reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. Capacitism is a distinctive externalist view of evidence and knowledge that does not invoke reliability, remains steadfastly naturalistic, and in recognizing a metaphysically substantive common element between perception and hallucination avoids any commitment to disjunctivism.

Justification, Luminosity, and Credences

Chapter 8 discusses the repercussions of capacitism for the justification of beliefs, the credences we should assign to perceptual beliefs, and the luminosity of mental states. In light of this discussion, the chapter explores the consequences of capacitism for various familiar problem cases: speckled hens, identical twins, brains in vats, new evil demon scenarios, matrixes, and Swampman. I show why perceptual capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in perception and their employment in relevant hallucinations and illusions is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by employing such capacities. I show, moreover, why capacitism is compatible with standard Bayesian principles and how it accounts for degrees of justification. Finally, I discuss the relationship between evidence and rational confidence in light of an externalist view of perceptual content.

Perceptual Capacities, Knowledge, and Gettier Cases

I will exploit the basic commitments of capacitivism to develop a distinctive externalist view of perceptual knowledge. The basic idea of capacitivism is that perception is constitutively a matter of employing perceptual capacities that function to discriminate and single out particulars in our environment. It is because a given subject is employing perceptual capacities with a certain function that her mental states have epistemic force. Employing such perceptual capacities constitutes a mental state that provides us with phenomenal evidence, and employing such capacities in the good case also provides us with knowledge-worthy factive evidence. Capacitivism is an externalist view that does not invoke reliability, remains steadfastly naturalistic, and by recognizing a metaphysically substantive common element between perception and hallucination avoids any commitment to disjunctivism.

Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons

This chapter presents two claims. The first is that no fact could give us a reason if we could not possibly be aware of this fact, or our awareness of this fact could not possibly motivate us. Next is that the moral wrongness of an act cannot give us a reason if we could not possibly believe that such acts are wrong. To both these claims, the chapter maintains an externalist view in accepting these claims. However, it also rejects the claim that an act's wrongness cannot give us a reason unless our belief that this act is wrong would actually motivate us. With several more claims regarding moral accountability and blameworthiness, this chapter makes further arguments concerning the true beliefs about reasons that are considered either externalist or objectivist.

THE ORIGINS OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

ABSTRACTI argue that the ground of the epistemic force of perceptual states lies in properties of the perceptual capacities that constitute the relevant perceptual states. I call this view capacitivism, since the notion of a capacity is explanatorily basic: it is because a given subject is employing a mental capacity with a certain nature that her mental states have epistemic force. More specifically, I argue that perceptual states have epistemic force due to being systematically linked to mind-independent, environmental particulars via the perceptual capacities that constitute the perceptual states. Thus, capacitivism shows how the epistemic force of experience is grounded in metaphysical facts about experience. Capacitivism is a distinctive externalist view of evidence and knowledge that does not invoke reliability, remains steadfastly naturalistic, and in recognizing a metaphysically substantive common element between perception and hallucination avoids any commitment to disjunctivism.

The Behavioral Ecology View of Facial Displays, 25 Years Later

This chapter documents the twin origins of the behavioral ecology view (BECV) of human facial expressions, in (1) the empirical weakness and internal contradictions of the accounts proposed by basic emotion theory (BET) and particularly the neurocultural theory of Paul Ekman et al., and (2) newer understandings about the evolution of animal signaling and communication. BET conceives of our facial expressions as quasi-reflexes which are triggered by universal, modular emotion programs but require management in each culture lest they emerge unthrottled. Unlike BET, BECV regards our facial expressions as contingent signals of intent toward interactants within specific contexts of interaction, even when we are alone and our interactants are ourselves, objects, or implicit others. BECV’s functionalist, externalist view does not deny “emotion,” however it is defined, but does not require it to explain human facial displays.