How do scientists criticize the computer metaphor of the brain?

The central metaphor in cognitive science is the computer metaphor of the brain. In previous work, we reconstructed the metaphor in a novel way, guided by the assumption that it functions as an explanatory hypothesis. We developed an argumentative pattern for justifying scientific explanations in which this metaphor functions as a standpoint supported by argumentation containing abduction and analogy. In this paper, we use the argumentative pattern as a heuristic to reconstruct recent scientific criticisms against the computer metaphor. The pattern generates expectations about the nature of these criticisms, and we show those expectations to be met in most respects. We then discuss the extent to which our findings render the reconstruction offered by the argumentative pattern feasible. A central question emerging from our analysis is whether the computer metaphor can be adequately characterized as an explanatory hypothesis based on abduction. We suggest some possibilities for future lines of inquiry in this respect.

From Metaphor in Humanitarian Paradigm to Computer Metaphor in Cognitive Science

The article presents an analysis of metaphor in the humanities and computer metaphor in cognitive psychology and cognitive science in general. Issues related to the emergence and role of computer metaphor in the development of cognitive psychology are discussed. The emphasis is placed on the symbolic approach, which was of paramount importance at the initial stage of the development of cognitive psychology. Particular attention is paid to the computer metaphor in solving urgent problems of modeling the brain and cognitive abilities in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). It is concluded that the appeal to metaphors located at the intersection of the humanities and cognitive sciences and denoting various issues of AI modeling are due to the historical contexts of the development of modern science focused on the integration of knowledge of various orientations.

An argumentative reconstruction of the computer metaphor of the brain

The computer metaphor of the brain is frequently criticized by scientists and philosophers outside the computational paradigm. Proponents of the metaphor may then seek to defend its explanatory merits, in which case the metaphor functions as a standpoint. Insofar as previous research in argumentation theory has treated metaphors either as presentational devices or arguments by analogy, this points to hitherto unexplored aspects of how metaphors may function in argumentative discourse. We start from the assumption that the computer metaphor of the brain constitutes an explanatory hypothesis and set out to reconstruct it as a standpoint defended by a complex argumentation structure: abduction supported by analogy. We then provide three examples of real arguments conforming to our theoretically motivated construction. We conclude that our study obtains proof-of-concept but that more research is needed in order to further clarify the relationship between our theoretical construct and the complexities of empirical reality.

The large-scale structure of software-intensive systems

The computer metaphor is dominant in most discussions of neuroscience, but the semantics attached to that metaphor are often quite naive. Herein, we examine the ontology of software-intensive systems, the nature of their structure and the application of the computer metaphor to the metaphysical questions of self and causation.