Metacognitive Awareness of Difficulty in Action Selection: The Role of the Cingulo-opercular Network

The question whether and how we are able to monitor our own cognitive states (metacognition) has been a matter of debate for decades. Do we have direct access to our cognitive processes, or can we only infer them indirectly based on their consequences? In the current study, we wanted to investigate the brain circuits that underlie the metacognitive experience of fluency in action selection. To manipulate action-selection fluency, we used a subliminal response priming paradigm. On each trial, both male and female human participants additionally engaged in the metacognitive process of rating how hard they felt it was to respond to the target stimulus. Despite having no conscious awareness of the prime, results showed that participants rated incompatible trials (during which subliminal primes interfered with the required response) to be more difficult than compatible trials (where primes facilitated the required response), reflecting metacognitive awareness of difficulty. This increased sense of subjective difficulty was mirrored by increased activity in the rostral cingulate zone and the anterior insula, two regions that are functionally closely connected. Importantly, this reflected activations that were unique to subjective difficulty ratings and were not explained by RTs or prime–response compatibility. We interpret these findings in light of a possible grounding of the metacognitive judgment of fluency in action selection in interoceptive signals resulting from increased effort.

The effect of metacognitive training on confidence and strategic reminder setting

Individuals often choose between remembering information using their own memory ability versus using external resources to reduce cognitive demand (i.e. ‘cognitive offloading’). For example, to remember a future appointment an individual could choose to set a smartphone reminder or depend on their unaided memory ability. Previous studies investigating strategic reminder setting found that participants set more reminders than would be optimal, and this bias towards reminder-setting was predicted by metacognitive underconfidence in unaided memory ability. Due to the link between underconfidence in memory ability and excessive reminder setting, the aim of the current study was to investigate whether metacognitive training is an effective intervention to a) improve metacognitive judgment accuracy, and b) reduce bias in strategic offloading behaviour. Participants either received metacognitive training which involved making performance predictions and receiving feedback on judgment accuracy, or were part of a control group. As predicted, metacognitive training increased judgment accuracy: participants in the control group were significantly underconfident in their memory ability, whereas the experimental group showed no significant metacognitive bias. However, contrary to predictions, both experimental and control groups were significantly biased toward reminder-setting, and did not differ significantly. Therefore, reducing metacognitive bias was not sufficient to eliminate the bias towards reminders. We suggest that the reminder bias likely results in part from erroneous metacognitive evaluations, but that other factors such as a preference to avoid cognitive effort may also be relevant. Finding interventions to mitigate these factors could improve the adaptive use of external resources.

Making Retrospective Confidence Judgments Improves Learners’ Ability to Decide What Not to Study

Predictions about future retrieval success, known as judgments of learning (JOLs), are often viewed as important for effective control over learning. However, much less is known about how retrospective confidence judgments (RCJs), evaluations of past retrieval success, may affect control over learning. We compared participants’ ability to identify items that would benefit from additional study after making either a JOL or an RCJ. Participants completed a cued-recall task in which they made a metacognitive judgment after an initial recall attempt and before making a restudy decision. Participants who made RCJs prior to their restudy decisions were more accurate at identifying items in need of being restudied, relative to participants who made JOLs. The results indicate that having participants assess their confidence in past retrieval success can nudge them toward better utilizing of valid information when deciding which items are in need of further study.

Subjective Learning Discounts Test Type

We evaluated the extent to which memory test format and test transfer influence the dynamics of metacognitive judgments. Participants completed two study-test phases for paired-associates, with or without transferring test type, in one of four conditions: (1) recognition then recall, (2) recall then recognition, (3) recognition throughout, or (4) recall throughout. Global judgments were made prestudy, poststudy, and posttest for each phase; judgments of learning (JOLs) following item study were also collected. Results suggest that metacognitive judgment accuracy varies substantially by memory test type. Whereas underconfidence in JOLs and global predictions increases with recall practice (Koriat’s underconfidence-with-practice effect), underconfidence decreases with recognition practice. Moreover, performance changes when transferring test type were not fully anticipated by pretest judgments.