Employee stock ownership plan and stock price crash risk

This paper examines whether the announcement of an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) affects stock price crash risk and the mechanism by which the ESOP may influence crash risk, using a sample of Chinese A-share firms from the period 2014 to 2017. We provide evidence that an ESOP announcement is significantly and negatively related to a firm’s stock price crash risk. An ESOP announcement sends positive signals to the market that insiders are optimistic about a firm’s future value, which helps enhance investor confidence, resist the pressure for a fire sale caused by negative information disclosure, and reduce stock price crash risk. Further research shows that larger-scale, lower-priced and non-leveraged ESOPs are more helpful in reducing crash risk. This paper sheds lights on the impact of ESOPs in a volatile market environment. It also contributes to firms’ implementation of ESOPs and the development of the legal system in capital markets.

Mixed Ownership Reforms of China’s State-owned Enterprises

SOE mixed ownership reform has gained increasing prominence. In addition to government top-design policies, various pilot experiments have been carried out. Additionally, broader and more sophisticated methods are also employed, including stock market listing, capital and asset restructuring, and employee stock ownership plan. However, issues remain. The role of non-state parties that own part of the state firms is still poorly defined, thus their impact is uncertain. Government efforts to strengthen Party leadership have also dampened confidence of non-state investors.

Employee Stock Ownership Plan, Board Structure, and Firm Value: Evidence from Taiwan

The authors explore the effect of an employee stock ownership plan on firm value and examine the following important findings. First, they reveal that a firm with better corporate governance, such as a higher directors’ holding ratio, higher institutional holding ratio, and small board size will have better stock price performance resulting in the enhancement of firm value. Second, firms with higher institutional holdings that are implementing an ESOP actually might not enhance firm value, compared to firms with higher institutional holdings that do not implement an ESOP; this may be the result of interest and influence by institutional investors who are likely to be affected by the ESOP. The authors explain that understanding these results may be useful for investors in personal financial planning and wealth management in terms of screening investing targets.

ESOP Plus Benefit Corporation: Ownership Culture with Benefit Accountability

Stakeholder capitalism seeks to benefit multiple stakeholders, rather than primarily shareholders. Two increasingly popular forms are the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) and the benefit corporation. But what happens when a company combines these structures? While the benefit corporation’s expanded stakeholder mandate may appear to come at the expense of employee-owner wealth and the potential for shared power, in fact they can complement one another. Being a benefit corporation can strengthen the employee-owned company’s ownership culture through enhanced engagement and creation of a meaningful work environment. And in turn, employee owners can add a layer of accountability to help them meet the benefit corporation’s expanded stakeholder mandate.