Out of Chaos—Meaning Arises: The Lived Experience of Re-Habituating the Habitual Body When Suffering From Burnout

Sufferers from burnout might experience a sincere bonding to their lost lifeworld, which can result in their holding on to their previous worlds while simultaneously trying to unleash themselves. In this article, four experiential dimensions are presented in discussion with the phenomenological insights provided by Merleau-Ponty. These dimensions are “Trapped in the present body,” “the balancing act,” “precious moments of joy,” and “this is my Lifeworld now.” In the rehabilitation process, the participants demonstrated deliberate choices and reflective self-cultivation to adjust to their present situation. The illness seemed to promote a search for meaning—and out of the existential chaos, a “new” habitual body might appear. The study provides invaluable information about the rehabilitation process and the need for humanistic interventions.

The Normative Body and the Embodiment of Norms

Phenomenologically speaking, one can consider the experiencing body as normative insofar as it generates norms through repeated actions and interactions, crystallizing into habits. On the other hand according to Foucauldian approaches, the subjective body does not generate norms but is itself produced by norms: Dominant social norms are incorporated via repeated practices of discipline. How is the individual level of habit formation in phenomenology related to this embodiment of supra-individual norms? In what sense can we differentiate between a habit formation that results in a skill and one that disciplines a body? To address these questions the paper will analyze examples of the embodiment of norms in Foucault and feminist philosophy and show how they rely on the phenomenological concept of the actual and habitual body.

The Problem of Habitual Body and Memory in Hegel and Merleau-Ponty

In this paper, I shall focus on the relation between habitual body and memory in Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. Both Hegel and Merleau-Ponty defend a view of the self that is centred on the role of habituality as embodied activity situated in a context. However, both philosophers avoid committing to what Edward Casey has defined habitual body memory, i.e., an active immanence of the past in the body that informs present bodily actions in an efficacious, orienting and regular manner. I shall explore the reasons why neither Hegel nor Merleau-Ponty develops an explicit account of habitual body memory. This will shed light not only on Hegel’s account of lived experience, but also on Hegel and Merleau-Ponty’s common concern with the habitual body.

Testing a Culture-Specific Extension of Objectification Theory Regarding African American Women's Body Image

Objectification theory has emphasized objectification in terms of body shape and size. African American women may expect to be evaluated on additional physical attributes such as skin tone. Therefore, we extended previous research on objectification theory by adding separate measures of skin-tone concerns in a survey of 117 African American women. Results from a series of path analyses revealed that as hypothesized, habitual body monitoring of skin tone predicted specific skin-tone dissatisfaction as well as general shame regarding body shape and size. Contrary to theoretical predictions, self-objectification did not mediate links between habitual monitoring (of skin tone or of body size and shape) and body dissatisfaction. In terms of objectification theory, results suggest that skin tone is a relevant dimension of habitual body monitoring and dissatisfaction for some African American women.