ANALYSIS VALUE CHAIN GOVERNANCE DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL OF VANNAMEI SHRIMP FARMERS IN MRANDUNG BANGKALAN

The people of Mrandung has plunged into of business shrimp farmer, mostly the type of shrimp chosen is vannamei shrimp ( Litopenaeus vannamei ), the aim of this study is to find out and to analysis of the distribution channel governance chain value in Mrandung, the method that used in this study is a qualitative research, and the conclusion in this study is that indigenous people lack of knowledge in governance and the value chain of the vannamei shrimp distribution channel so that many farmers suffer losses due to unknowledgeable. But on the other hand there is a company namely PT. TBAI (Tanjung Bumi Indonesian Aquaculture) that engaged in vannamei shrimp farming and the company has been already using good corporate governance and the distribution channel value chain, making it is quite maximum for the company's value. The results of this study show governance on company farms vannamei shrimp was very good, the value chain of distribution channels has been using are already managed well with using three distribution channels more widely, while the governance from distribution channels chain vannamei shrimp farmer I use two distribution channels more simple than others and shrimp vannamei farmer II uses one distribution channel chain more complexly than I.

Learn to be good or bad? Revisited observer effects of punishment: curvilinear relationship and network contingencies

Purpose Although supplier-initiated punishment is widely used to manage distributors’ opportunism, its spillover effect on unpunished distributors (i.e. observers) within the same distribution network remains under-researched. Specifically, this paper aims to investigate the curvilinear effect of punishment severity on an observer’s opportunism, and how such an effect is contingent on the observer’s network position. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses regression analysis with survey data gathered from 218 distributors in China’s automobile industry. Findings Punishment severity has an inverted U-shaped effect on the observers’ opportunism, and such effect is weakened by both the observers’ network centrality and their degree of dependence on the supplier. Practical implications The findings should encourage suppliers to focus more on the spillover effects of punishment on observers. To this end, the supplier must deliberately initiate the appropriate level of punishment severity against its distributors because an inappropriate level of punishment severity (e.g. too lenient) may unexpectedly raise the unpunished observers’ level of opportunism. Moreover, the supplier should be fully aware that observers’ specific network positions may produce varying spillover effects of the punishment. Originality/value This study enriches the literature on channel governance by revealing the curvilinear mechanism through which punishment severity influences observers’ opportunism. By applying social learning theory to channel punishment research, this study unveils both the inhibitive learning and the imitative learning forces inherent in a single punishment event, and it delineates their joint effect on an observer’s opportunism. In addition, this study outlines the observer’s vertical and horizontal relationships within the distribution network and explores their contingent roles in determining the spillover effects of punishment.

The Influence of External Channel Environment on Channel Governance

External environment has a vital impact on channel operation, but it remains unclear how task and institutional environment influence channel members’ governance behavior. With data collected from distributors of a large-scale petrochemical enterprise, this study builds a structural equation model to analyze the influence of channel institutional and task environment on channel members’ governance behavior. The empirical results suggest that, both task and institutional environments are influential to channel governance: when the environment is dynamic and complex, channel partners tend to use relational governance mechanism. When the regulatory environment is influential, contractual mechanism is widely used, while relational mechanism is preferred when cognitive environment is sufficiently powerful. This paper provides new insights into research of channel environment, and also provides practical guidance for channel members.

Boosting the effectiveness of channel governance options

Purpose – The aim of this study is to explore possible contingent variables that might explain these twin contradictory effects of marketing channel governance. Franchisors govern their systems to limit opportunism and enhance performance. However, the exact opposite often occurs. Design/methodology/approach – This paper develops an integrative conceptual model of franchisor governance of its franchisees. This model is tested empirically with data collected from 197 Australian franchisees. Findings – Under strong relational norms, goal congruence and outcome monitoring limit franchisee opportunism; compliance enhances franchisee performance, while opportunism reduces it. With weaker norms, outcome monitoring facilitates compliance, and goal congruence boosts franchisee performance, as does franchisee opportunism. However, norms fail to mitigate behavioral monitoring’s negative impact on opportunism. Research limitations/implications – This research confirms the positive and negative effects of franchisor governance. It also shows that norms can reverse the positive link between franchisee opportunism and performance. It additionally illustrates how goal congruence and compliance can limit opportunism and boost performance. Future research should refine this study’s measures, incorporate additional constructs into the conceptual model and test the generalizability of these findings in lesser-developed economies. Practical implications – This research shows that monitoring has both positive and negative effects on franchisee opportunism and performance. To avoid monitoring’s adverse effects, franchisors are advised to enhance goal congruence, boost franchisee compliance and develop strong relational norms. Originality/value – This paper shows that goal congruence, as well as franchisor outcome monitoring, can mitigate the negative effects of franchisor behavioral monitoring on franchisee opportunism, as do relational norms.