Corporate bond spreads and understated pension liabilities

PurposeThe question is whether debt market investors see through managers' attempts to hide their pension obligations. The authors establish a robust relation between understated pension liabilities and corporate bond yield spreads after controlling for factors that have been previously identified as having a significant impact on firms' cost of borrowing. The results support the idea that bond market investors are not being misled by the use of high pension liability discount rates by some companies to lower their reported pension obligations. For a small fraction of debt issuers, the reported pension liabilities are larger than the pension liabilities valued at the stipulated interest rate benchmarks. For these issuers with overstated pension liabilities, bond investors adjust their borrowing costs downward.Design/methodology/approachThe authors investigate the relation between corporate bond yield spreads and understated pension liabilities relative to long-term Treasury and high-grade corporate bond yields. They aim to answer two questions. First, what are the sizes of over or understated pension liabilities relative to guideline benchmarks? Second, do debt market investors see through the potential management manipulation of pension discount rates? The authors find that firms with large understated pension liabilities face higher marginal borrowing costs after taking into account issue-specific features, firm characteristics, macroeconomic conditions and other pension information such as funded status and mandatory contributions.FindingsThe average understated projected benefit obligations (PBOs) are understated by $394.3 and $335.6, equivalent to 3.5 and 3.0% of the beginning of the fiscal year market value, respectively. The average understated accumulated benefit obligations (ABOs) are understated by $359.3 and $305.3 million, equivalent to 3.1 and 2.6%, of the beginning of the fiscal year market value, respectively. Relative to AA-grade corporate bond yields, the average difference between firm pension discount rates and benchmark yields becomes much smaller; the percentage of firm pension discount rates higher than benchmark yields is also much smaller. As a result, understated pension liabilities become negligible. The authors establish a robust relation between corporate bond yield spreads and measures of understated pension liabilities after controlling for issue-specific features, firm characteristics, other pension information (funded status and mandatory contributions), macroeconomic conditions, calendar effects and industry effects.Originality/valueS&P Rating Services recognizes the issue that there is considerably more variability in discount rate assumptions among companies than in workforce demographics or the interest rate environment in which firms operate (Standard and Poor's, 2006). S&P also indicates that it would be desirable to normalize different discount rate assumptions but acknowledges that it is difficult to do so. In practice, S&P Rating Services conducts periodic surveys to see whether firms' assumed discount rates conform to the normal standard. The paper makes an initial attempt to quantify the size of understated pension liabilities and their impact on corporate bond yield spreads. This approach can be extended to study firms' costs of equity capital, the pricing of seasoned equity offerings and the pricing of merger and acquisition transaction deals, among other questions.

Disclosure versus recognition: the value relevance of pensions

This paper compares how pension obligations impact the market value of United States corporations under two accounting regimes. Using a sample of firms that disclosed pension liabilities under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 87 from 2001 to 2005 and recognized them under SFAS No. 158 from 2006 to 2014, I find that equity market participants take into account the net position of the pension fund only if it is recognized on the sponsor's balance sheet, thus mispricing the pension deficit/surplus under the disclosure regime. I also provide evidence suggesting that investors' perception of pension deficits/surpluses changed with the introduction of SFAS No. 158 in 2006.

The Bulgarian Pension System Reform and Implicit Pension Debt

The impact of the Bulgarian pension sys­tem reform, implemented with the 2015 Social Insurance Code amendment act, on the im­plicit pension debt is the main focus of the present article. Holzmann’s methodology for calculation of open group pension liabilities is used (Holzmann et al., 2004). The long term forecasting of public pension fund revenues and expenditures is made possible through Professor John Wilkin’s actuarial model, which has been prepared within the scope of the World Bank’s assistance for Bulgaria in the implementation of the pension reform. The in­put in the model consists of demographic and macroeconomic suggestions as well as social security data for the 40-year period (2015- 2055) after pension reform enactment. The impact of the pension reform’s parameters on the implicit pension debt of the Bulgarian public pension system is elaborated through scenario analysis. Among the key findings of this article are the important role of the in­creasing of retirement age and serving period, as well as the contribution size for pension, for decreasing of implicit pension debt.

Public Pension Governance and Opportunistic Accounting Choice: A Politico-Economic Approach

The selection of actuarial assumptions used to value state and local government pension liabilities is an important culprit of the looming state and local pension crisis in the U.S. Due to the impact these selection choices have on the value of pension liabilities and annual required contributions (ARC), pension plans are often said to make these choices opportunistically for purposes of freeing up budget resources and making pension funding look better. Using empirical data on 114 state-administered pension plans, this research shows that the likelihood of such opportunistic pension accounting choices (OPAC) increases when the plan is underfunded, organized as a cost-sharing plan, governed by a politically embedded fiduciary body, and when the sponsoring government is surrounded by a high degree of unionization, and is divided in terms of partisan control. The results also show that the likelihood of OPAC decreases when a pension plan is subjected to an audit by a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), suggesting that professional gatekeepers can play an important role in limiting the adverse effects of OPAC behavior, including insufficient ARC payments and reduced transparency of governmental financial reports.

A New Approach for Proper Reporting of Pension Benefit Obligations in the Financial Statements of “Old Funds” for Professionals

In this paper, we focus on the disclosure of pension liabilities for entities referred to in Italian Legislative Decree 30 June 1994 no. 509 (also called “old funds” for professionals), which is crucial for a suitable communication. After illustrating the limits of current statutory financial statements’ in relation to the information they provide on pension benefit obligations, we propose three potential solutions to bridge the gap. Each of these proposals helps ensure the completeness and clarity of financial reporting and improves upon the informational capacity and quality of disclosure. In our opinion, one of these approaches, in particular, would be preferred because of its ease of adoption. Indeed, the disclosure in the explanatory notes allows for the quantification of pension benefit obligations, and hence a more proper evaluation of entities in the medium/long- term, with no impact on annual economic-financial results as reported in the balance sheet and the income statement.

Public Sector Balance Sheet Database

This paper provides an overview of the Public Sector Balance Sheet (PSBS) Database, a dataset developed in the context of the October 2018 Fiscal Monitor. The dataset provides a comprehensive picture of public wealth for 38 countries, and a narrower picture for further 37 countries and territories. Comprehensive PSBSs bring together all the accumulated assets and liabilities that governments control, including public corporations, natural resources, and pension liabilities. They therefore account for the entirety of what the state owns and owes, offering a broader fiscal picture beyond debt and deficits. This is particularly relevant in the current context of record and still rising debts and heightened risks to the balance sheet of the public sector. PSBSs bring about greater transparency and allow closer scrutiny of government’s financial position. They also allow better balance sheet management, thereby potentially increasing return on assets, reducing risks and the costs of borrowing, and improving fiscal policymaking. The paper also elaborates on the conceptual framework and methodology used in compiling the data, and provides some practical guidelines on the compilation, validation, and dissemination of such data.