Empirical Evidence of a Changing Operating Cost Structure and Its Impact on Banks’ Operating Profit: The Case of Germany

The financial sector is undergoing extensive changes and challenges that affect the entire market and infrastructure of financial service providers. Technological development leads to increased digitalisation and allows new business models to emerge. With regard to the banking sector, it is evident that this sector is characterized by employees and associated services. However, due to changing conditions, a decline in personnel has been recorded for many years. This raises the question as to what extent—based on contrary assumptions of the principle agency theory and the expense preference hypothesis—personnel changes influence the operational success of banks. On this basis, six hypotheses were formulated and tested. The principal component analysis method was applied to prepare the data. Afterwards, the actual analysis was carried out using a mixed method approach. The results on the basis of the years 2013–2017 showed a negative personnel development, which contributed to the improvement of the operating results of banks. Hereby it becomes evident that the business model design of savings and cooperative banks is of secondary importance.

Foreign directors and corporate governance in Islamic banks

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether foreign directors’ influence on opportunistic behavior among managers varies between Islamic banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs). It also examines how religious ethics and morals guide foreign directors to be better monitors. Design/methodology/approach A panel fixed effects regression is used to analyze the effect of foreign directors on opportunistic behavior among managers in IBs and CBs. The authors use different proxies such as loss avoidance, discretionary loan loss provision and expense preference behavior to measure management opportunistic behavior. Findings Based on sample of 3,758 bank-year observations for 164 banks over the period 1993-2015, the authors show that the presence of foreign directors in IBs increases boards’ effectiveness in impeding management opportunistic behavior, whereas the presence of foreign directors in CBs reduces boards’ effectiveness in curbing management’s unethical acts. The authors also document that IBs (CBs) with foreign directors demonstrate less (more) earnings management and expense-preference behavior among managers. In addition, the authors’ evidence indicates that the existence of the Shari’ah supervisory boards helps foreign directors be more effective monitors. Research limitations/implications The current study focuses on banks only which makes its results subject to sample bias; there are many other forms of financial institutions (e.g. investments, real-estates and mutual funds) complying to the Shari’ah law. Second, owing to the lack of foreign board directors characteristics, the authors cannot investigate the intensity of the specific characteristics that could have specific directions in affecting managerial behavior. Practical implications The findings in this paper may help standards-setters, auditors, investors and regulators take appropriate measures and create better policies that reduce managers’ discretion. This could in turn improve information transparency decision-making, monitoring, advising and accounting quality. Originality/value The authors’ theoretical framework combines the agency, contingency, resource-dependence, stewardship and stakeholders’ theories and applies them to Shari’ah as an alternative ethical and internal governance mechanism. The authors find that the impact of foreign directors on management opportunistic behavior depends on the corporate religious norms within boards of directors, in particular, suggesting that religious values affect how foreign directors influence bank managers’ behavior.