Conclusion: Intentionality and Other Related Phenomena

This concluding chapter reviews the view of intentionality argued for in this book, which is an aspect-theoretic version of strong identity PIT. On this view, roughly, every intentional state is identical to some non-relational phenomenal state. Chapter 1 rejected various ways of fixing reference on intentionality via its role in folk psychological or scientific theories, helping us navigate the world, or securing conditions of truth and reference, arguing that it might turn out that something other than intentionality plays these roles. This chapter returns to these ways of fixing reference on intentionality and argues that the arguments presented in this book suggest that what plays these roles is either intentionality together with further ingredients or something else entirely. The chapter closes by articulating a core intuition behind internalism and suggesting that the view developed in this book, despite being compatible with externalism, is radically internalistic.

The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory

This chapter introduces the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), on which all original intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness. It argues that PIT succeeds precisely where its main competitors, the tracking and functional role theories discussed in previous chapters, fail. The version of PIT that this chapter and the remainder of the book defends is strong identity PIT, on which all intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness (strong PIT), and (roughly) phenomenal states give rise to intentional states simply by being identical to them (identity PIT). In short, according to strong identity PIT, every intentional state is identical to a phenomenal state. This chapter closes by previewing how later chapters handle certain challenging cases for PIT, including those of thoughts, states with broad or object-involving contents, standing states, and nonconscious occurrent states. The recommended treatment rejects derived intentionality and so qualifies as a version of strong PIT.

Access to phenomenality: A necessary condition of phenomenality?

Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience show that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I argue that while Block's thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of the second notion that is not touched by Block's argument.

The soap bubble: Phenomenal state or perceptual system dynamics?

The Gestalt Bubble model describes a subjective phenomenal experience (what is seen) without taking into account the extraphenomenal constraints of perceptual experience (why it is seen as it is). If it intends to be an explanatory model, then it has to include either stimulus or neural constraints, or both.

Perception and content

It is argued that to have an experience is to be in a phenomenal state with A-conscious content. Perceptual contents are always both P-conscious and A-conscious.