An Interpretation of Weights in Linear Opinion Pooling

This paper explores the fact that linear opinion pooling can be represented as a Bayesian update on the opinions of others. It uses this fact to propose a new interpretation of the pooling weights. Relative to certain modelling assumptions the weights can be equated with the so-called truth-conduciveness known from the context of Condorcet's jury theorem. This suggests a novel way to elicit the weights.

Is an Appeal to Popularity a Fallacy of Popularity?

It is common to view appeals to popularity as fallacious. We argue this is a mistake and that Condorcet’s jury theorem can be used to justify at least some appeals to popularity as legitimate inferences. More importantly, the conditions for the application of Condorcet’s theorem (binary claim, competent judge, epistemic independence) can be used as critical tools when evaluating appeals to popularity. The application of these three concepts to appeals to popularity provide a more fine-grained critical strategy for argument evaluation and, also, allow us to see the real problems that often arise with such appeals more clearly.

Introduction

If it lacks minimal competence to track the truth, good government is impossible. Even though a lot of dispersed information is available that would help to make competent decisions, governments can fail to collect and aggregate this information. ‘Wisdom of crowds’ arguments appeal to the idea that random noise cancels so that the aggregation of many opinions leads to elimination of errors, which is epistemically valuable. This insight is formalized in Condorcet’s jury theorem. Many objections have been levelled against the theorem or its limited applicability, but we argue that the objections are often exaggerated and the usefulness of the theorem underappreciated.

Independence Revisited

The Independence Assumption is the most misunderstood premise of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. This chapter shows, first, that absence of direct voter interaction is neither necessary nor sufficient for Independence. Second, we explain that the statistical independence required is conditional: in Condorcet’s jury theorem, conditional on the state of the world; in other jury theorems, conditional on the evidence, on common causes, or on the whole decision situation. This insight leads, third, to the ‘Best Responder Corollary’, a jury theorem that is better suited to dealing with the inevitable interdependence of votes caused by common causes. In the final section, we discuss epistemic implications.

Condorcet’s jury theorem: General will and epistemic democracy

My aim in this paper is to explain what Condorcet?s jury theorem is, and to examine its central assumptions, its significance to the epistemic theory of democracy and its connection with Rousseau?s theory of general will. In the first part of the paper I will analyze an epistemic theory of democracy and explain how its connection with Condorcet?s jury theorem is twofold: the theorem is at the same time a contributing historical source, and the model used by the authors to this day. In the second part I will specify the purposes of the theorem itself, and examine its underlying assumptions. Third part will be about an interpretation of Rousseau?s theory, which is given by Grofman and Feld relying on Condorcet?s jury theorem, and about criticisms of such interpretation. In the fourth, and last, part I will focus on one particular assumption of Condorcet?s theorem, which proves to be especially problematic if we would like to apply the theorem under real-life conditions; namely, the assumption that voters choose between two options only.

Epistemic democracy and political legitimacy

My dissertation aims to answer two questions: (1) Is democracy epistemically valuable? (2) Is the epistemic value of democracy, if it has any, necessary for justifying its legitimacy? I argue that democracy in certain form can be epistemically valuable. However, I also argue that the epistemic value of democracy is not necessary for justifying its legitimacy. To defend the epistemic value of democracy, I propose a postdeliberation version of Condorcet's jury theorem. I argue that this version of the jury theorem can avoid the common challenges against the classic version. To reject the necessity of epistemic value for democratic legitimacy, I argue that, given that the epistemic value of democracy is subject to disagreement, it cannot be used to justify legitimacy. In addition, I provide a purely proceduralist argument for democratic legitimacy, which appeals to the egalitarian principle that every citizens ought to be equally respected by the state. This argument, if succeeds, shows that the epistemic value of democracy is not necessary for justifying democratic legitimacy.