A Critical Analysis of Brentano’s Intentionality in Relation to Meinong’s Object Theory

Our thoughts are certainly about things(objects), however, what kind of things(object) are our thoughts directed at? What is the relationship between mental objects and external world object? What is the nature and character of mental and extra mental objects? An attempt at answering these meta-epistemological questions, brought to light the ideas of Franz Brentano on ‘Intentionality’ and Alexius Meinong’s Theory of object. Through proper method of philosophical analysis, it was discovered that both philosophers agreed that intentionality is a unique character exhibited by the human mind. However, Meinong went further to develop a more comprehensive object theory which attempts at clarifying some of the ontological difficulties associated with Brentano’s notion on intentionality. The research concluded that, though, both philosophers had areas of divergence and convergence in their respective epistemological thoughts, but insisted that the influence of Brentano’s ideas on Meinong cannot be overemphasized, which is to say, Meinong’s object theory, could be said to be a reaction towards the problem of referential opacity present in Brentano’s account of Intentionality.

Using Tangram as a Manipulative Tool for Transition between 2D and 3D Perception in Geometry

Creating a mental image of our spatial environment is a key process for further abstract geometric thinking. Building a mental representation can be understood as a part of the process of visualisation. From the wide concept of visualisation, in this article, we will focus on the part where the mental representation of spatial relations, mental objects and mental constructions are created, and their manifestations as a 3D physical object and its plane representations arise. Our main goal is to follow the transition between 2D and 3D representations of physical objects and also to observe how and when such a transition happens in students’ thinking. For that purpose, we also use Tangram, because manipulation with the Tangram pieces in space and filling out planar figures by them indicates the transition between 3D and 2D. Our research, using an action research methodology, was conducted on the students of three 5th grade primary school classes as a part of a larger long-term project. We pointed out a relationship between spatial abilities and the perception of 2D–3D relationships in students’ mind.

Introduction: Understanding and Studying Meditation

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it explores the different meanings of meditation and its varieties across Eastern and Western traditions, including the more recent therapeutic developments. Using a Meditation Tree image, specifically created for this volume, the chapter gives examples of practices from these traditions that rely on multiple techniques, such as concentration, recitation, breathing, singing, and visualization of physical or mental objects, among others. It highlights the richness of practices but equally of experiences and expected goals, which have led to debates and tensions among meditation experts and movements for over two thousand years. Second, the chapter summarizes the structure of this volume and the major achievements in the study of meditation, as well as current limitations and controversies.

Intersubjective approach to intentionality and internal objects

Intentionality — the orientation of mental states to objects (things, properties, states of things, events) — has been considered a hallmark of the psyche since Brentano’s time. In this article, we consider the problem of intentionality from the second-person approach, or the standpoint of intersubjectivity. Our analysis shows that intentionality is intrinsically projective. The projective nature of intentionality is related to internal objects that play a crucial role in fixing the person’s subjective experience and serve as a fulcrum in the development of the person. The internal object can be treated as a set of properties and tropes. The logic of intentionality proposed by Graham Priest and the theory of primary (that is, belonging to the Freudian system «unconscious») psychological attitudes developed by Linda Brakel created the preconditions for seman- tical analysis of projective intentionality. In the article, we rely on the logic of projective intentionality that reorients the resources of modal logics and semantics of possible worlds to the investigation and formalization of primary thinking. Considering the problem of mental existence within the framework of the second-person approach, we show that Wittgenstein’s reasoning about the «beetle in a box» does not refute the thesis of the privacy of mental meanings. Finally, involving the possible world semantics, we develop a neo-Aristotelian approach to the ontology of mental objects.

An Analytical Study of Ideally Inherent Operative Transformation of the Original Mental Process in Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology

This research paper entitled “An Analytical Study of Ideally inherent Operative Transformations of the Original Mental Process in Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology” has three objectives: 1) to study the mental process of reflection and modification in which that mind is directed towards the intended object including the mental objects regarding Western philosophical thought, Edmund Husserl, 2) to study of the way to operative transformation of original mental process and, 3) to analyze various forms of transformed reproduction and a problem of the reproduction. It is found that the transformation of the original mental process in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is the ideally inherent process of reproduction of mental process in which the mental process passed through the modificative process together with its contents so as to produce a novel knowledge. The transformative process as such is systematically operated with main following aspects: (1) The mode of giveness (the immanent essence of a concrete sensation-content such as a visual sensation-content in the field of visual sensation-Data that is continually adumbrated from the visual physical objects), (2) the temporal mental processes are to be unified as one stream of mental process, (3) the phase or the temporal horizon which is cosmic time in other ways such as horizon of Now, horizon of Before, and horizon of After, and (4) pure ego, the function of which is to direct its regards to the temporal modes of giveness (immanent essences). By its transformative operation, it is effectively proceeded with three steps. The first is a step of a physical perception of the mental process in which the perceived physical things is used as an essential content for all mental process as they are kept in a memory. The second step is succeeded from the first step which is called a retention or a primary memory; the process of a modification using the immanent object kept in a retention as the initial part of the constitution of an identical object. Then, comes the third step which is the step of a recollection or a second memory; it is to recall the remembered or represented for the perception again. After the whole process has fully accomplished, the remembered or represented is afresh reproduced. However, the reproduction of the remembered or the represented can emerge with two possibilities; one is the vague-reproduced information as without repeating while looking at the reproduced flash; other is afresh one as it is repeated resulting in further perception. However, the reproduction of the remembered can be accurate and perfect depending on two conditions; one is the condition of the perception of physical things and the condition of either clarity or obscurity of the whole object that is re-presented with the mode of mental process.

Being Realistic about Kant’s Idealism (Translated by M. Rouba)

This paper deals with the question of whether Kant's transcendental idealism allows for an explanation of the a posteriori aspects of mental content by the properties of empirical objects. I first show that a phenomenalist interpretation has severe problems with assuming that we perceive an object as being red or as being cubical partly because the perceived object is red and cubical, and then present an interpretation that allows us to save the realistic intuition behind these claims. According to this interpretation, Kantian phenomenal properties are understood as response-dependent properties of extra-mental objects that also have to have some response-independent (in-itself-) properties. I show that this interpretation is well supported by Kant's remarks about the transcendental object in the A-edition of the first Critique and that it also makes intelligible why Kant took explanations of mental content by means of empirical properties to imply an explanation by means of noumenal properties without thereby violating his own doctrine of noumenal ignorance. This not only allows us to establish a realistic reading of Kant idealism but also to discern the true kernel in Adickes’ infamous talk about Kant's theory of double affection.

The so-called paradox of fiction and transcendental ontology

While the phenomenon of our feeling of empathy for literary characters has escorted the history of imaginative writing from the very beginning, its ontological foundations have been investigated only from 1970s. The question is about different theories of “the paradox of fiction” which was introduced by Colin Redford. The basic idea behind the paradox is that empathy for the nonexistent characters of fiction and their interrela­tions as real is paradoxical and so demands explanation. Having presented the main doc­trines related to the subject matter, the author of the article comes to the conclusion that there is no such thing as a paradox in this case. What there is is a single-level reductionist naturalistic worldview which comes into collision with both the phenomenology of the relevant feeling of empathy and the definitions of existence offered by the history of European philosophy as well as their reliable counterparts outside it. According to these definitions, to exist is to be perceptible and have causality, the latter “index” being em­phasized in the article to the result that the activity of literary characters provides them with a higher ontological status compared to some other classes of mental objects. All this justifies the author in advancing the conception of heterogeneity of existence and his attempts to use quantifiers in relation to it.

Creative Labor, Mental Objects and the Modern Theory of Production

Recent decades have seen a proliferation of literature on creativity, with no consensus about what it consists of. Chinese and Russian contributions throw new light on these debates because of their concern with economic and human development. By integrating this with the widely-used concept of the “creative industries,” a rigorous concept of creativity rooted in the notion of creative labor is proposed. This can be defined as non-mechanical labor which, in conjunction with Information and Communication Technology (ICT), has produced a mass market in products embodying the use-value of distinctness. The creative industries then emerge as a branch of the division of labor making intensive use of creative labor in combination with mental objects, such as scientific and artistic products. Software, itself a mental object, is an “instrument of mental production” in these industries, helping explain their potential contribution to human development, and the obstacles to this potential imposed by the commodity form.

Voluntary and Involuntary Imagination: Neurological Mechanisms, Developmental Path, Clinical Implications, and Evolutionary Trajectory

A vivid and bizarre dream conjures up a myriad of novel mental images. The same exact images can be created volitionally when awake. The neurological mechanisms of these two processes are different. The voluntary combination of mental objects is mediated by the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) and patients with damage to the LPFC often lose this ability. Conversely, the combination of mental objects into novel images during dreaming does not depend on the LPFC; LPFC is inactive during sleep and patients whose LPFC is damaged do not notice a change in their dreams. Neither colloquial English nor scientific jargon has an established way to report on the origin of a conjured up mental image; the term “imagination” is regularly used to describe any experience generated internally whether voluntarily (in waking) or involuntarily (in dreaming). Failing to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary imagination leads to confusion in developmental psychology, neurolinguistics, and paleoanthropology. A comprehensive understanding of the distinction between voluntary and involuntary imagination will help develop better therapy for children with language delay, contribute to a clearer understanding of the uniqueness of human language, and enable a more productive discussion of the evolutionary origin of human language.

Action

Actions can be either physical, virtual, or mental and act on either physical, virtual, or mental objects. For instance, Maria Montessori constructed educational materials that enabled students to learn by manipulation. The materials required physical actions on physical objects, such as combining beads to depict operations on numbers. Nintendo’s Wii video game supported physical actions on virtual objects. Gestures are actions that often apply to imaginary objects. Virtual actions involve manipulating computer consoles such as those used in robotic surgery to operate on physical objects. Virtual actions on virtual objects occur in many video games and instructional software. Virtual actions on mental objects occur in computer systems that use audio feedback to help the blind learn to navigate. Mental actions can be captured in brain–computer interfaces to control both physical robots and information on a computer screen. Mental actions on mental objects produce mental simulations. The increasing popularity of augmented reality will require more research on the pairing of physical, virtual, and mental actions and objects.