Determinism and Obligation

Chapter 2 addresses the deterministic horn. Whether determinism threatens obligation turns partly but pivotally on whether the alternatives obligation requires are of the sort that one can have even if determinism is true (weak alternatives) or of the sort determinism precludes one from having (strong alternatives). A line of reasoning for the view that obligation presupposes only that that agents have weak alternatives is evaluated. The chapter concludes with the argument that even if a teleological account of reasons explanation, according to which actions are to be explained in terms of the goals of agents and not in terms of whether they are caused by appropriate mental items (or their neural realizers), is true, determinism still threatens obligation if obligation requires strong alternatives.

Warrior Masculinity and Female Victimization

This chapter completes the reasons-explanation of the psychological factors making honor killing possible. It shows how violence-prone personality is shaped into warrior masculinity in contexts where functioning as a real, honorable man is believed to require the degradation of femininity and violent responses to alleged female misbehavior. This transition from potential aggression into violent action occurs through a learned process called the shame-to-power conversion. The chapter also investigates the behaviors and traits of potential victims, other female family members, and neighbors as facilitators or supporters of honor killing. Attention is given to conflictual arrangements common in honor–shame communities that serve as sure-fail mechanisms; that is, that generate periodic antagonisms that increase risks that females will be violently victimized.

Reasons, Explanation, and Saramago's Bell

In this essay, I suggest that significant insights of recent feminist philosophy lead, among other things, to the thought that it is not always better to choose than to be compelled to do what one might have done otherwise. However, few feminists, if any, would defend such a suggestion. I ask why it is difficult to consider certain ideas that, while challenging in theory, are, nonetheless, rather unproblematic in practice. I suggest that some questions are not pursued seriously enough by philosophers, because certain popular liberal conceptions of individuality and freedom are taken too much for granted.