Unravelling the interplay of primary school teachers’ topic-specific epistemic beliefs and their conceptions of inquiry-based learning in history and science

Inquiry-based learning remains both an important goal and challenge for primary school teachers within and across different subjects, such as history and science. By addressing primary school teachers, for the first time, as both learners who deal with controversial topics and teachers who have significant teaching experience, this study aims to unravel the interplay between teachers’ topic-specific epistemic beliefs and their conceptions of inquiry-based learning in history and science. Fifteen primary school teachers from Greece participated in this exploratory study through scenario-based semi-structured interviews. Data were analysed through a qualitative content analysis by applying both deductive and inductive approaches. The results of this study revealed the complex nature of teachers’ epistemic beliefs and the necessity of using a nuanced approach to elicit their epistemic belief patterns in the context of working on a task. Further, this study revealed an overview of teachers’ conceptions of inquiry-based learning in both history and science, by giving voice to teachers’ thoughts and reasoning. But most importantly, the interplay between the two constructs was unravelled, indicating a complex connection between teachers’ epistemic belief patterns and their conceptions of inquiry-based learning. Overall, it could be argued that the more availing the teachers’ epistemic beliefs, the more thoroughly they conceive inquiry-based learning. Similarities and differences between history and science were also detected. Theoretical, empirical, and educational implications are discussed in an attempt to support primary school teachers involve themselves, and then their students, in an active process of knowing by applying helpful epistemic criteria.

Belief and pluralistic ignorance

Pluralistic ignorance is usually analyzed in terms of social norms. Recently, Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) describe and define this phenomenon in terms of beliefs, actions and evidence. Here I apply a basic epistemic approach to belief – believers consider their beliefs to be true –, a basic pragmatic approach to belief – beliefs are useful for believers – and a mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach – believers consider their believes to be true and such considerations are useful – to pluralistic ignorance phenomena. For that, I take the definition given by Bjerring et al. (2014).Keywords: Truth, pragmatism, epistemic belief, pragmatic belief.