Concept-less Schemata: The Reciprocity of Imagination and Understanding in Kant’s Aesthetics

In this paper, I discuss Kant’s concept-less schematism (KU, 5: 287) in the third Critique1 and make three claims: 1) concept-less schematism is entirely consistent with the schematism in the first Critique; 2) concept-less schematism is schematism with no empirical concept as an outcome; and 3) in accordance with 1) and 2), the imagination is free to synthesize the given manifold and leads to judgements of taste without this meaning either that the categories play no role at all or that these judgements are full-fledged cognitive determining judgements. While most commentators read the freedom of the imagination as its independence from the understanding, I argue that the freedom of the imagination is based on a non-determining employment of the pure concepts of the understanding. The freedom of the aesthetic imagination consists in the temporal schematization of the categories without any complementary determination of the empirical concept.

Kant on the Formation of Empirical Concepts

According to Kant’s lectures on logic, the formation of empirical concepts consists in the logical acts of comparison, reflection, and abstraction. This paper defends the tenability of Kant’s account by solving two prominent difficulties identified by commentators. Firstly, I justify Kant’s chronological presentation of the three acts by clarifying two meanings of ‘comparison’ in his writings: while comparison-1 refers to apprehension in relation to apperception and precedes reflection, comparison-2 refers to a twofold operation comprising both comparison-1 and reflection, such that its completion presupposes reflection. Secondly, to unravel an alleged ‘circularity’ in Kant’s account, I propose multiple interactions between comparison-1, which can be entirely arbitrary, and reflection, which examines the compared representations according to the imagination’s free agreement with the understanding, namely, a lawfulness without law. By means of such interactions, we experiment back and forth and lawfully generate an empirical concept without relying on conceptual guidance.

The social construction of everyday concepts. Constructing the ”tween”

This paper discusses the social construction of the concept tween and whether this concept can beuseful when engaging in research with children in the ages of 8–12. The paper will start by describingsocial construction, from there, the paper will move on to everyday concepts, before discussing the concept tweens as a theoretical and empirical concept. A question to be asked is: is the tween an everydayconcept? Who or what constructs tweens? As the concept derived from marketing efforts (Cook andKaiser 2004; Sørenssen 2014) another question becomes: should we use it as academics and generalpublic? And if we do use the concept, what do we gain or possibly lose when using the term? What arethe possible limits or benefits tied to engaging with this concept?

Unpacking the Concept of Bioeconomy: Problems of Definition, Measurement, and Value

In this paper, we critically explore the evolution and impact of the concept ‘bioeconomy’ as a descriptor and driver of diff erent scientific, technological, and policy initiatives in the life sciences. We unpack the different ways bioeconomy has been framed – as an emergent, present, or sometimes promissory economic regime underpinned by particular socio-technical practices - by tracing how its use has evolved in different disciplinary field and sectors. We also critically analyse three key reports that attempt to measure the size and contribution of the bioeconomy at regional levels. Our overarching questions are: What is the bioeconomy, how has it been used in different fields, and how might it be best understood and valued both economically and politically? In answering these questions, we build on and contribute to critical scholarship in science and technology studies, particularly theoretical work on biovalue, commodification, and assetisation; using this in conjunction with our empirical concept search and document analysis to contribute new knowledge and understanding of the bioeconomy’s past, present, and future.

“Real Museum Work” and Information Technology – Does not Compute!

The Finnish museum field transformed in many ways in the latter half of the 20th century: administrative structures were reorganised, new professional titles emerged and museological and conservational education was developed. These changes and their effects have been addressed in research (see e.g. Pet- tersson & Kinanen 2010), but there is one practical change that has remained understudied: the computerisation of museums’ day-to-day work. The empirical material for this paper consists of oral interviews with Finn- ish museum professionals, produced as part of a national museum history project in 2005–2011, and writings in the Finnish museological journal Mu- seopolitiikka. Based on the material, I analyse the empirical concept of “real museum work” as a social practice that is understood through certain material elements, competences and shared meanings, and ask how the introduction of information technology has affected it. How is “real museum work” under- stood in the interviews, and how do computers relate to it?

Understanding and Evaluating Research and Scholarly Publishing in the Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH)

Internationalization is important for research quality and for specialization on new themes in the social sciences and humanities (SSH). Interaction with society, however, is just as important in these areas of research for realizing the ultimate aims of knowledge creation. This article demonstrates how the heterogenous publishing patterns of the SSH may reflect and fulfill both purposes. The limited coverage of the SSH in Scopus and Web of Science is discussed along with ideas about how to achieve a more complete representation of all the languages and publication types that are actually used in the SSH. A dynamic and empirical concept of balanced multilingualism is introduced to support combined strategies for internationalization and societal interaction. The argument is that all the communication purposes in all different areas of research, and all the languages and publication types needed to fulfill these purposes, should be considered in a holistic manner without exclusions or priorities whenever research in the SSH is evaluated.

Kant and Abstractionism about Concept Formation

This chapter outlines Kant’s account of empirical concept formation and discusses two objections that have been advanced against it. Kant holds that we form empirical concepts, such as color concepts, by comparing sensory representations of individuals, identifying shared features, and abstracting from the differences between them. According to the first objection, we cannot acquire color concepts in this way because there is no feature that all and only the instances of a given color share, and because the boundary between colors is conventional. According to the second objection, assuming that all instances of a given color share certain features, we can identify them only if we already possess a concept of that color. Neither of the objections is convincing as it stands. Kant can offer replies to both objections that are consistent with his views and with empirical evidence concerning the perception and representation of colors.