Application of Online Transportation Mode Recognition in Games

It is widely accepted that human activities largely contribute to global emissions and thus, greatly impact climate change. Awareness promotion and adoption of green transportation mode could make a difference in the long term. To achieve behavioural change, we investigate the use of a persuasive game utilising online transportation mode recognition to afford bonuses and penalties to users based on their daily choices of transportation mode. To facilitate an easy identification of transportation mode, classification predictive models are built based on accelerometer and gyroscope historical data. Preliminary results show that the classification true-positive rate for recognising 10 different transportation classes can reach up to 95% when using a historical set (66% without). Results also reveal that the random tree classification model is a viable choice compared to random forest in terms of sustainability. Qualitative studies of the trained classifiers and measurements of Android-device gravity also raise several issues that could be addressed in future work. This research work could be enhanced through acceleration normalisation to improve device and user ambiguity.

Hospital Performance in the First 6 Years of Medicare’s Value-Based Purchasing Program

The Medicare value-based purchasing (VBP) program, ongoing since 2013, uses financial bonuses and penalties to incentivize hospital quality improvements. Previous research has identified characteristics of penalized hospitals, but has not examined characteristics of hospitals with improvements in VBP program performance or consistent good performance. We identify five different trajectories of program performance (improvement, decline, consistent good or poor performance, mixed). A total of 11% of hospitals were penalized every year of the program, 24% improved their VBP program performance, 14% of hospitals consistently earned a bonus, while 18% performed well in the program’s early years but experienced declines in performance. In 2013, organizational and community characteristics were associated with higher odds of improving relative to performing poorly every year. Few variables under managers’ control were associated with program improvement, though accountable care organization participation was in some models. We find changes in VBP program metrics may have contributed to improvement in some hospitals’ program scores.

An Empirical Analysis of Employee Responses to Bonuses and Penalties

ABSTRACT We examine how employees respond to bonuses and penalties using a proprietary dataset from an electronic chip manufacturer in China. First, we examine the relative effects of bonuses and penalties and observe a stronger effect on subsequent effort and performance for penalties than for bonuses. Second, we find that the marginal sensitivity of penalties diminishes faster than that of bonuses, indicating that the marginal effect of a bonus may eventually exceed that of a penalty as their value increases. Third, we find an undesirable selection effect of penalties: penalties increase employee turnover, especially for skillful and high-quality workers. These results may help inform our understanding of the observed limited use of penalties in practice due to their bounded effectiveness and possible unintended consequences. Data Availability: The confidentiality agreement with the company that provided data for this study precludes the dissemination of detailed data without the company's consent.

Sticks and Carrots in Procurement: An Experimental Exploration

We test the robustness of recent findings on the benefits of penalty contracts to the environments typical of B2B (and B2G) procurement, where buyers and sellers interact repeatedly, matching is endogenous and competitive, there are contractible and non-contractible tasks, and reputation-based relationships can emerge. Both bonuses and penalties boost efficiency, strongly increasing effort in the contractible task while only mildly crowding it out in the non-contractible one. However, sellers grab a higher fraction of surplus with bonuses, as buyers’ offers become more generous. Consequently, buyers prefer penalties, which may explain why they are so widespread in procurement.

Energy Efficiency in French Social Housing Renovations via Design-Build-Maintain

The renovation of existing building stock is seen as one the most practical ways to achieve the high energy savings targets for the built environment defined by European authorities. In France, the Grenelle environmental legislation addresses the need to renovate the building stock and specifically stresses the key role of social housing organisations. In recent years, French procurement rules have been modified in order to allow social housing organisations to make use of integrated contracts such as Design-Build-Maintain. These contracts have a greater potential to deliver energy savings in renovation projects than do traditional project delivery methods, like Design-bid-Build. This is because they facilitate collaboration between the various actors and boost their commitment to the achievement of project goals. In order to evaluate the estimated potential of such contracts to achieve energy savings, two renovation projects (carried out by two French social housing organisations) were analysed from their inception until the end of construction work. The analysis is based on written tender documents, technical evaluation reports, observations of the negotiation phase (in one of the cases) and interviews with the main actors involved. Findings show that Design-Build-Maintain contracts do indeed offer substantial energy savings. Both projects achieved higher energy targets than those initially required. Furthermore, the energy results are guaranteed by the contractor, through a system of bonuses and penalties. Other results demonstrate that, compared to previous Design-bid-Build renovation projects, these projects were completed in less time (from project inception to completion of the work) and at virtually the same cost. There has also been a substantial improvement in cooperation between the actors involved.

Slavery and Supervision in Comparative Perspective: A Model

The familiar transaction-costs model is extended to allow for the varying costs and benefits of supervision and pain incentives on the one hand, and ordinary rewards on the other, in differentially effort- and care-intensive activities. Applied to unfree labor, this model accounts for the observed patterns of slave governance and manumission in extractive, industrial, agricultural, and service activities in antiquity and in the New World. Applied to free labor, it accounts for wage work on large estates in labor-surplus medieval England or modern Italy, the choice between bonuses and penalties in industrial contracts, and the growing paternalism of our own time.