An Analysis on the Control of Administrative Discretion

Administrative discretion means that administrative agencies can exercise their rights based on their own judgment and actual conditions when dealing with matters that are not authorized by the law or have not made detailed provisions.The existence of administrative discretion is not only the result of the expansion of administrative power,but also to adapt to administrative differences in different regions and departments,and to maintain social fairness and justice.However,the existence of rights leads to abuse and corruption,which requires the legislature to control the problem of excessive discretionary power from the source. The administrative law enforcement agency further improves the administrative reconsideration,strengthens the selection and supervision of the staff of the administrative agency,and the judicial agency improves the judicial review.

Administrative Law and Regulation of Business

This chapter discusses the development of administrative law in the in the second half of the nineteenth century covering the coming of bureaucrats, infrastructure regulation, occupational licensing, and the Sherman Antitrust Act. The administrative agency was the child of necessity. Government was growing, at all levels, and this created a need for specialists and specialized bodies. The period between 1850 and 1900 sometimes looks as if this was a kind of climax of laissez-faire—the age of Social Darwinism, the businessman’s earthly kingdom in the United States. Obviously, there is some truth to this idea. It was a period in which businessmen made loud noises, and won some great victories, at all levels of government. But some of this was defensive, a response to movement on the other side.

Negotiating for Knowledge: Administrative Responses to Congressional Demands for Information

Congressional requests for administrative agency information could be handled in a less confrontational manner by negotiation. Instead of negotiations occurring ad hoc as they currently do, Congress and the executive branch could have a written agreement to structure negotiations regarding inter branch sharing of sensitive information. Analyses of this issue tend to argue that Congress's right to information varies with executive and independent agencies, but Supreme Court decisions show that the division of agencies into these two categories has no basis in the Constitution.

Chevron Deference, Presidential Influence, and the Rule of Law in the Administrative State

This paper, prepared for a symposium marking the thirtieth anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron v NRDC, argues that, despite the doctrine's acquiescence in broad administrative discretion, so-called Chevron deference is reconcilable with a conventional account of what the rule of law entails in the modern administrative state. In all but the rarest of cases, however, rule of law values imply that deference should be accorded or not entirely on the basis of the legal interpretation proffered by the administrative agency that is Congress’s designated administrative decision maker, which is typically not the White House. White House involvement in persuading an agency to adopt a non-arbitrary interpretation that the agency embraces and can defend based on reasons rooted in law obviously should not count against that interpretation. But White House involvement should not be thought to earn deference for a proffered legal interpretation, whether originally preferred by an agency or not, that otherwise appears unjustified under “hard look” review. If the White House steers the agency away from an earlier preferred, but less sound interpretation of law, then the negotiated view, if non-arbitrary, may be given deference. But if the White House steers an agency away from an earlier preferred agency interpretation that would have been deference-worthy and at least as sound (in the eyes of the court) as the White House view now being offered as the agency’s own, the court should remand for agency reconsideration unless the White House-preferred interpretation can be shown to reflect exceptional problems of agency coordination.