Assessment resistance: using Kubler-Ross to understand and respond

Purpose Faculty participation in the assurance of learning (AoL) is requisite both for the effective operation of the system and for accreditation compliance, but faculty often resist engaging in AoL tasks. The purpose of this paper is to provide specific recommendations to address faculty concerns and to guide AoL systems toward maturity. Design/methodology/approach This paper provides a comprehensive model of faculty resistance perspectives aligned to AoL maturity, provides specific responses to faculty resistance and introduces success markers of progress toward maturity. Findings Specifically, a three-stage model of AoL system maturity is presented and aligned with five faculty perspectives. For each faculty perspective, responses targeting causal factors are proposed and signs of progress toward the next level of faculty engagement are highlighted. Practical implications Faculty and AoL leaders will be able to identify their current stage of AoL system maturity and implement practical solutions to move to the next stage of system maturity. Social implications Understanding the motivations for faculty resistance will facilitate more meaningful and effective internal interactions as a school seeks to improve its AoL system. In turn, a more effective AoL system will promote better learning experiences for students; and better learning allows students to become productive in their chosen careers more quickly, thus improving society as a whole. Originality/value To the knowledge, no prior paper has organized faculty resistance along a maturity continuum, provided targeted responses based on the level of maturity or included signs that indicate growth toward the next level of maturity.

A Survey on the Safety System Maturity Levels of Electronics Manufacturers in South Korea

The main objective is to identify the level of advancement of safety systems in various levels of smart factories. Smart level verification systems are being implemented in Korea, but safety systems are not paying much attention to smart factory level checks. Using the checklist, nine Korean electronics manufacturing enterprises checked the level of safety system. The checklist consists of 142 items, can be divided into four dimensions (laws and certifications, safety designs and configurations at the facilities, safety devices and guards, and maintenance and training). As a result, a high-ranked enterprise in smart factory level showed excellence in the safety system maturity level as well. Compared to the level of the company's smart factory, the level of advancement of safety systems has been confirmed to be lower.

Assessment Standards for 5S Implementation on SMEs of Ship Component

This article describes a new idea in applying the 5S concept (Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu, Shitsuke) to create a quality work environment for small and medium-sized enterprises of ship components. The success rate of implementing the 5S concept must be known based on assessing the effectiveness of the 5S concept application. Assessment of the effectiveness of the application of the 5S concept requires measurement indicators that are with the characteristics work environment of small and medium-sized enterprises of ship components. Determination of standard indicators for the implementation of 5S enabling to assessing the effectiveness of the implementation of 5S repeatedly and consistently. Indicators for the assessment of 5S effectiveness are obtained using the Delphi method. The results showed that the Delphi method obtained 37 indicators that can be used to assess the effectiveness of the implementation of 5S on small and medium-sized enterprises of ship components with an agreement of 75% to 100%. This assessment standard can be used in every phase of the 5S implementation, namely the initial implementation stage up to the system maturity stage. This assessment standard can also be used in similar small and medium-sized enterprises implementing 5S.

Introducing the Extended Safety Fractal: Reusing the Concept of Safety Management Systems to Organize Resilient Organizations

Although mandatory in most high-risk industries, the safety management system (SMS) is often criticized as burdensome and complex. Through its requirement to formalize all main activities, the SMS is perceived as bureaucratic and a vehicle for pure compliance and Safety I (one). Furthermore, the SMS is often detached from an organization’s core activities, goes against local practice and does not deliver the safe performance that was hoped for. By comparing the model behind SMS with specific requirements for process capability, this paper identifies a safety fractal that reflects the basic requirements that are needed to control safety related activities at all levels within an organization. It is further argued that the constituent elements of this safety fractal are particularly suitable to organize resilient performance, provided that resilience is explicitly identified as the safety strategy to follow and, as such, consequently implemented. This approach is then positioned against common safety management concepts as management system maturity, leadership and safety culture, leading to a systematic and a more comprehensive view on how to measure safety performance and resilience.

Project System Maturity Evaluation

The purpose of this chapter is to combine the two frameworks developed for the project structure subsystem (PSS) and the project delivery subsystem (PDS). When the three PSS categories (simple, complicated, and complex) are combined with the three PDS categories (robust, passable, and weak), the project system maturity evaluation framework emerges. As a result, project system maturity gets three categories: mature, ordinary, and immature. This framework is developed at the project level to characterize the project system at large based on the high-level PSS–PDS mismatch. In practice this framework and the maturity characterization can be applied ‘locally’ for particular project disciplines or even individual project risks. As the nature of PSS–PDS mismatches could be either static (due to ‘chronic’ project system issues) or dynamic (due to occurred risks and their interactions), the project system maturity evaluation framework can be used to distinguish the nature of the mismatches too.