Ironic Effects of Thought Suppression: A Meta-Analysis

The ironic effect of thought suppression refers to the phenomenon in which individuals trying to rid their mind of a target thought ironically experience greater levels of occurrence and accessibility of the thought compared with individuals who deliberately concentrate on the thought (Wegner, 1994, doi:10.1037/0033-295X.101.1.34). Ironic effects occurring after thought suppression, also known as rebound effects, were consistently detected by previous meta-analyses. However, ironic effects that occur during thought suppression, also known as immediate enhancement effects, were found to be largely absent. In this meta-analysis, we test Wegner’s original proposition that detection of immediate enhancement effects depends on the cognitive load experienced by individuals when enacting thought suppression. Given that thought suppression is an effortful cognitive process, we propose that the introduction of additional cognitive load would compete for the allocation of existing cognitive resources and impair capacity for thought suppression. Studies ( k = 31) consistent with Wegner’s original thought-suppression paradigm were analyzed. Consistent with our predictions, rebound effects were observed regardless of cognitive load, whereas immediate enhancement effects were observed only in the presence of cognitive load. We discuss implications in light of ironic-process theory and suggest future thought-suppression research.

Ironic Effects of Thought Suppression: A Meta-Analysis

The ironic effect of thought suppression refers to the phenomenon in which individuals trying to rid their mind of a target thought ironically experience greater levels of occurrence and accessibility of the thought compared to individuals that deliberately concentrate on the thought (Wegner, 1994). Ironic effects occurring after thought suppression, also known as rebound effects, have been consistently detected by previous meta-analyses. However, ironic effects that occur during thought suppression, also known as immediate enhancement effects, have been found to be largely absent. In the current meta-analysis, we test Wegner’s original proposition that detection of immediate enhancement effects is dependent on the cognitive load experienced by individuals when enacting thought suppression. Given that thought suppression is an effortful cognitive process, it is proposed that the introduction of additional cognitive load would compete for the allocation of existing cognitive resources and impair capacity for thought suppression. Studies (k = 31) consistent with Wegner’s original thought suppression paradigm were analysed. Consistent with our predictions, rebound effects were observed regardless of cognitive load while immediate enhancement effects were only observed in the presence of cognitive load. Implications are discussed in light of ironic process theory and suggestions for future thought suppression research provided.

Mechanisms underlying effective thought suppression using focused-distraction strategies: A self-determination theory approach

Research has shown that thought suppression is not an ideal mental control strategy as it can ironically increase intrusions and accessibility of unwanted thought. Although focused-distraction has been shown as an effective strategy in mitigating such ironic effects, mixed findings have rendered this evidence inconclusive. In the present study, we sought to resolve this inconsistency by examining variables related to distractor content as mechanisms for effective thought suppression, an aspect yet to be examined. Building on ironic process theory and self-determination theory, the current study predicted that distractors associated with fulfilment of the psychological need for competence would improve thought suppression outcomes because they would be satisfying and immersive to think about. We asked 93 undergraduate students to engage in a thought suppression task and examined the influence of perceived satisfaction and immersion of distractors as mechanisms mitigating ironic effects of thought suppression. Results supported our predictions. In addition, they suggested that our predicted relationships persisted after controlling for effects of focused-distraction strategies that focused participants’ attention on a neutral object and distractors reflecting the attainment of the extrinsic goal of financial success. This allows us to eliminate the alternative explanations that need-supportive distractors are effective as a result of the focused-distraction strategy in general, or due to its pleasant and personally relevant content. Findings suggest that effectiveness of focused-distraction in thought suppression can be augmented by using satisfying and immersive distractors, such as those with need-supportive content.

Does Cognitive Distraction Lead to Overeating in Restrained Eaters?

Restrained eaters have been found to overeat after various events or so-called disinhibitors, such as eating a preload or strong emotional states. Little research has focused on why such events lead to a break of the restrained eaters' control and to overeating. The present study examines the role of cognitive distraction as a possible mechanism underlying these effects. Two experiments were conducted, both designed to test hypotheses derived from Wegner's Ironic Process Theory and focusing on the behavioural consequences of cognitive control over eating. In both experiments subjects were tested in a 2 (restrained/unrestrained) by 2 (distraction/no distraction) design. The results do not confirm the prediction flowing from the Ironic Process Theory: cognitive distraction does not lead to overeating in restrained eaters. Implications of these findings for the Boundary Model are also discussed.