Linkage Sharia Banking and Sharia Fintech to Support Halal Industry in Indonesia

The purpose of this study is to describe the development financing of sharia banking, the development of sharia fintech, the development of the halal industry, and the concepts offered in the form of linkage between sharia banking and sharia fintech to support the halal industry in Indonesia. Research uses qualitative method library research. Data sources used are secondary, including Financial Services Authority, Bank Indonesia, LPPOM MUI, and other sources. Data collection technique used library relevant sources theme. Analytical technique used descriptive qualitative, describes development financing sharia banking, sharia fintech, halal industry, and forms linked them for halal industry. Results show growt financing sharia banking December 2020 to August 2021 BUS working capital SMEs grew 4.81 percent. UUS investment SMEs grew 0.86, and investment BPRS grew 5.96 percent. Sharia fintech assets fell -0.42 percent, and players fell 10 percent. Certified halal products 2021 grew 2,531.49 percent. Spending on halal industry food sector is 77.23 total other. Linked between sharia banking and sharia fintech support halal industry, funding business development is provided. Payment instruments can synergize requiring use sharia bank account. Sharia banking and sharia fintech synergize in assisting and marketing products for industry get financing.

The Foreclosed Collaterals As A Resolution For Bad Credit In Indonesia Banking System

This research aim to understand the condition when a customer is no longer able to pay or repay a loan is called bad credit. This condition can actually cause many problems, ranging from difficulties in obtaining credit approvals to blacklisting by the bank. Collaterals are one of the requirements from the Bank when giving credit loans so that those collaterals can guarantee the credit’s acquittal should the debtor be breached. If there is a case of bad debts, banks have the option to solve the credit loan through the process of Foreclosed Collaterals. This journal is written on a legal and juridical-normative research, emphasizing the usage of written documents as the main sources of law. The collateral purchases are written in Article 12A Number 10 of 1998 of the Constitution on how banks may purchase the collaterals with or without auctions to solve bad credits even faster. Considering that Article 20 of the Constitution on Mortgage Rights has already written ways on collateral executions, therefore the warrant payment will follow the option of Foreclosed Collaterals. Reporting from the official website of Bank Indonesia (BI), to minimize the risk of increasing bad loans, BI issued PBI (Bank Indonesia Regulation) No. 14/2/PBI/2012 concerning APMK (Card-Based Payment Instruments). The regulation was made to reduce the risk of negative impacts from using credit cards as debt instruments to the extent that they reach excessive limits. Using statute and conceptual approaches, it is inferred that Foreclosed Collateral purchase procedures can be done in 3 (three) different ways, followed through the Settlement Efforts, where the ownership of the collaterals must be switched to another in 1 (one) year time.

Development of Retail Payment Systems Since 1949

<p>Starting with the introduction of the Diner's Club payment card in 1949, the means of exchange have progressed well beyond traditional instruments such as notes, coins and cheques. I use institutional economics to analyse historical data on the evolution of recently-developed retail payment systems in Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. The framework I create yields insights into the incentives faced by the users of payment instruments and the payment networks that provide them. It also provides a means to assess the role of government in the evolution of retail payment systems. Ceteris paribus, consumers and merchants will prefer low transaction cost payment instruments. In order to complete a transaction, a consumer will proffer an instrument that may or may not be accepted by the merchant. Together, merchants and consumers will choose the payment instrument that generally reduces demand-side – i.e. consumer and merchant – transaction costs, relative to other available instruments. Consumer irreversible costs of adoption enhance the importance of network effects. To help overcome these, I argue payment networks need to make acceptance of their instrument attractive to merchants, which I find to be supported by analysis of the pricing of payment instruments. It distinguishes recently-developed payment instruments from other new technologies – the most technologically advanced instrument will not likely be adopted unless it is first acceptable to merchants. In workably competitive conditions, profit-seeking payment networks will attempt to provide an instrument that gets used while it at least recoups its costs of supply from fees paid by users. I argue this suggests a process of institutional adaption for profit-seeking payment networks. Network effects mean the use of an instrument grows disproportionately faster, the greater the number of people using it. For instrument supply, this means profit-seeking payment networks have an incentive to increase participation. In the presence of potential inter-network competition, a payment network will likely experience greater participation if, ceteris paribus, it offers an instrument that generally reduces demand-side transaction costs to a greater degree than competing networks' instruments and provides it with lower costs of supply. Governments play two key roles in retail payment system development. First, they can affect the development of systems by how well they protect property rights and enforce contracts. Although this role is performed relatively well in my sample countries, my analysis suggests that the use of recently-developed retail payment systems would fall, substantially, were it not so. Second and more importantly in my sample countries, governments impose restrictions on the freedom of contract for payment networks. If restrictions on this freedom are such that they prevent the trading of property rights, they risk reducing either the demand or the supply of payment instruments. Such restrictions might reduce demand if the instrument that would have been used no longer generally reduces demand-side transaction costs. They might reduce supply in two ways: by impeding payment networks' attempts to offer instruments that reduce these transaction costs or by reducing inter-network competition. In summary, I find that it is government restrictions on the freedom of contract that cause the substantial differences in the use of newly-developed retail payment systems between my sample countries. By risking reducing the supply and demand of retail payment systems, these restrictions may diminish innovation in payments, thereby harming dynamic efficiency.</p>

Development of Retail Payment Systems Since 1949

<p>Starting with the introduction of the Diner's Club payment card in 1949, the means of exchange have progressed well beyond traditional instruments such as notes, coins and cheques. I use institutional economics to analyse historical data on the evolution of recently-developed retail payment systems in Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. The framework I create yields insights into the incentives faced by the users of payment instruments and the payment networks that provide them. It also provides a means to assess the role of government in the evolution of retail payment systems. Ceteris paribus, consumers and merchants will prefer low transaction cost payment instruments. In order to complete a transaction, a consumer will proffer an instrument that may or may not be accepted by the merchant. Together, merchants and consumers will choose the payment instrument that generally reduces demand-side – i.e. consumer and merchant – transaction costs, relative to other available instruments. Consumer irreversible costs of adoption enhance the importance of network effects. To help overcome these, I argue payment networks need to make acceptance of their instrument attractive to merchants, which I find to be supported by analysis of the pricing of payment instruments. It distinguishes recently-developed payment instruments from other new technologies – the most technologically advanced instrument will not likely be adopted unless it is first acceptable to merchants. In workably competitive conditions, profit-seeking payment networks will attempt to provide an instrument that gets used while it at least recoups its costs of supply from fees paid by users. I argue this suggests a process of institutional adaption for profit-seeking payment networks. Network effects mean the use of an instrument grows disproportionately faster, the greater the number of people using it. For instrument supply, this means profit-seeking payment networks have an incentive to increase participation. In the presence of potential inter-network competition, a payment network will likely experience greater participation if, ceteris paribus, it offers an instrument that generally reduces demand-side transaction costs to a greater degree than competing networks' instruments and provides it with lower costs of supply. Governments play two key roles in retail payment system development. First, they can affect the development of systems by how well they protect property rights and enforce contracts. Although this role is performed relatively well in my sample countries, my analysis suggests that the use of recently-developed retail payment systems would fall, substantially, were it not so. Second and more importantly in my sample countries, governments impose restrictions on the freedom of contract for payment networks. If restrictions on this freedom are such that they prevent the trading of property rights, they risk reducing either the demand or the supply of payment instruments. Such restrictions might reduce demand if the instrument that would have been used no longer generally reduces demand-side transaction costs. They might reduce supply in two ways: by impeding payment networks' attempts to offer instruments that reduce these transaction costs or by reducing inter-network competition. In summary, I find that it is government restrictions on the freedom of contract that cause the substantial differences in the use of newly-developed retail payment systems between my sample countries. By risking reducing the supply and demand of retail payment systems, these restrictions may diminish innovation in payments, thereby harming dynamic efficiency.</p>

Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) Sebagai Alat Pembayaran di Indonesia

Technological developments encourage innovation in various sectors, including banking. The widespread use of digital currencies is an impetus for central banks to create an alternative to replace ungoverned digital currencies. Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is the alternative chosen by various central banks in the world. Various countries have conducted research related to the implementation in terms of design and risk in the financial, operational, and legal fields. Bank Indonesia plans to develop a CBDC as part of national economy and finance digitalization. Indonesia does not yet have a strong legal framework to underlie the implementation of CBDC, especially in the cyber security sector, The role of the central bank becomes very important in CBDC’s issuance and implementation as the only party that has the right to determine, issue, and regulate legal payment instruments in Indonesia.Keywords: Central Bank Digital Currency; Digital Money; Central Bank; Cybersecurity.AbstrakPerkembangan teknologi mendorong inovasi dalam berbagai sektor, termasuk perbankan. Maraknya penggunaan digital currency menjadi dorongan bagi bank sentral untuk menciptakan mata uang digital yang dapat menggantikan digital currency tanpa pihak berwenang. Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) menjadi alternatif yang dipilih oleh berbagai bank sentral di dunia, dan berbagai negara telah melakukan riset terkait penerapan CBDC dari sisi desain dan risiko di bidang finansial, operasional, dan legal. Bank Indonesia berencana untuk mengembangkan CBDC di Indonesia sebagai bagian dari digitalisasi ekonomi dan keuangan nasional. Indonesia belum memiliki kerangka hukum yang kuat untuk mendasari penerapan CBDC, terutama dalam bidang keamanan siber, mengingat banyaknya ancaman keamanan siber canggih yang terus berkembang. Peran bank sentral menjadi sangat penting dalam penerbitan dan penerapannya sebagai satu-satunya pihak yang berhak menentukan, menetapkan, menerbitkan, dan meregulasi alat pembayaran sah di Indonesia.Kata Kunci: Central Bank Digital Currency; Uang Digital; Bank Sentral; Cybersecurity.

CURRENT TRENDS IN PRICE POLICY AND METHODS OF PAYMENT IN THE HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY

In the hospitality industry, pricing policies and payment methods are and have always been common in the tourism market for organizing a safe, successful, and revenue-generating activity. The wish of being the best on the market is always actual, so the entrepreneur wants to use various strategies to promote their product by applying a convenient price but also to meet customer preferences the way that the applied pricing policy applied guarantee the success of the hotel business. Identifying and researching the pricing policy within the hotel industry but also highlighting the most modern payment methods used between customer-enterprise that ensures data confidentiality and fast, secure payment of services consumed remotely without direct interaction has become a well-defined goal in this article. The main objective of this article is to analyze the strategies for creating price offers, as well as to analyze the importance of reservation systems (IDS) in creating the discounts that will form the individualized pricing policy of the hotel enterprise. Determining all payment instruments and their characteristics in hotel enterprises has become another well-defined goal. The price policy is one of the most important elements of the overall business strategy, being one of the mechanisms by which decisions are made on the main types of markets to achieve the stability objectives of economic activity.

Debit and Credit Cards: Money Velocity Risks

Payment system innovations as the efforts to meet the people’s needs have recently risen several new non-cash-based payment instruments, such as card-based payment transactions. The upheaval of card-based non-cash transactions has indirectly shifted the role of cash in the society. This research aims to see the effect of cards as payment instruments represented by both debit and credit cards on money velocity in Indonesia within the period of 2016M1 to 2020M6 using the VECM (Vector Error Correction Model) analysis method. The research findings show that long-run card-based payment instrument has a significant effect on money circulation in Indonesia. It means that money velocity in Indonesia is not constant. Money velocity is a key concept in monetary theories and an important element for monetary analysis. Therefore, it is important for central bank to monitor and understand the money velocity trends to provide long-term benefits. The research findings are also expected to provide an additional insight to policymakers, especially central bank as monetary authority doe to the possibly occurring risks caused by the money circulation instability in economy.

CONSUMER PROTECTION MEASURES FOR ERRONEOUS OR UNAUTHORIZED INTERNET PAYMENTS: SOME LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION?

The increase in cyber malls or internet shops presents consumers with a magnitude of goods, including digitized goods and information to choose from. In purchasing these commodities, the internet, in particular, offers the consumer various payment possibilities, such as credit card and online fund transfers to third parties. However, these payment instruments are not flawless. Errors may occur whilst the consumer is making such payment, the system may malfunction or unauthorized payments may be made.The aim of this analysis is to ascertain whether the existing law has measures that would be wide enough to protect a consumer in these instances. The position in South Africa is evaluated against this background and compared with the position in the European Union.

Analysis of Factors Affecting Community on the Use of Non-Cash Payment Tools in Taman District, Sidoarjo Regency

The purpose of the study was to examine the effect of perceived benefits, convenience, trustworthiness, and risk on the use of non-cash payment instruments in Taman Sub-district, Sidoarjo Regency. The Theory Acceptance Model (TAM) is used as the theoretical basis for the research. The research sample is people who transact at Alfamart, Indomaret, McDonald's Geluran, and Alfamidi in Taman sub-district, Sidoarjo district. Multilevel random sampling method. The questionnaires distributed were 100 respondents. The results showed that trust had no effect, while the benefits, convenience, and risk had an effect on noncash payment instruments.