Pengaruh Asimetri Informasi, Karakter Personal, Reputasi, Trust in Superior dan Mutual Monitoring terhadap Budgetary Slack

This study aims to determine the effect of information asymmetry, personal character, reputation, trust in superiority and mutual monitoring of budgetary slack. The sample used was individuals working in the SKPD consisting of 1 City and 4 Regencies in the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY). This research uses purposive sampling. A total of 200 questionnaires were distributed and only 105 questionnaires could be processed. The process of data analysis in this study uses multiple regression analysis with the application of SPSS. The results showed that the information asymmetry variable had a positive and significant effect on budgetary slack, personal character, reputation and trust in superior had a negative and significant effect on budgetary slack. Keywords: Asymmetry Information, Personal Character, Reputation, Trust In Superior, Mutual Monitoring, Budgetary Slack

The Building Blocks of Social Trust: The Role of Customary Mechanisms and Property Relations for the Emergence of Social Trust in the Context of the Commons

This paper argues that social trust is the emergent product of a complex system of property relations, backed up by a sub-system of mutual monitoring. This happens in a context similar to Ostrom’s commons, where cooperation is necessary for the management of resources, in the absence of external authorities to enforce sanctions. I show that social trust emerges in this context because of an institutional structure that enables individuals to develop a generalized disposition to internalize the external effects of their actions. This is made possible by the “patrimonial” nature of this structure.

The influence of compensation interdependence on risk-taking: the role of mutual monitoring

This study investigates if and how the influence of compensation interdependence on risk-taking depends on mutual monitoring of risky investment decisions. We argue that individuals under compensation interdependence have a behavioral incentive for higher risk-taking if mutual monitoring is present. Impression management is hypothesized to be the driving force behind this effect, with the visibility of actions to the peers through mutual monitoring as an important prerequisite. The results of a laboratory experiment support our predictions. Additional analyses reveal that impression management drives our results because participants incorporate their peers’ preferences in their decision process. This reasoning is further substantiated as individuals increase their risk-taking if they took less risk than their peers in previous experimental rounds and thus adjust to their respective peer group. Our findings inform firms about the effect of compensation interdependence in working environments with differing opportunities for mutual monitoring.

The Impact of Mutual Monitoring and Enterprise System Integration on the Empowerment of Managers

Companies are increasingly adopting enterprise systems in order to realize the significant operational advantages they convey. These benefits include reductions in operating costs, improved customer service, and efficiency gains. Using the theoretical lens of Mary Parker Follett, this article explores potential behavioral benefits associated with enterprise systems. Evidence provided by the authors' field survey suggests that enterprise systems empower managers by enhancing both mutual monitoring and social identification among peer managers.

Mutual Monitoring and Team Member Communication in Teams

ABSTRACT This study investigates whether the benefit firms can extract from team member communication to the team manager—who may use such information for rewarding individual team members—is affected by differences in the type of mutual monitoring information available to team members. We predict and find that team performance is higher when team members can observe only each other's effort than when they can observe both each other's effort and output levels; conversely, team performance is lower when team members can observe only each other's output than when they can observe both each other's effort and output levels. The intuition behind these results is that the type of observable mutual monitoring information creates different degrees of ambiguity regarding what should be considered a fair reward allocation for team members' contributions. Such ambiguity reduces the usefulness of team member communication to the manager for allocating rewards, resulting in lower team performance. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.