Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of the Indeterminacy of Law and the Rationality of Adjudication

Every theory of legal argumentation has to determine the relation between legal certainty and correctness, which essentially includes justice. This, in turn, requires that the specific character of legal argumentation be expounded. The special case thesis, developed in A Theory of Legal Argumentation (1989), is an attempt to achieve both. The thesis says that legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse. Habermas criticizes the special case thesis in his book Between Facts and Norms (1996). Counterarguments against four of his objections are presented in this chapter. They concern the relation between legal and moral discourse, the rules and forms of legal discourse, the problem of unjust law, and the question of whether general practical arguments acquire a specific legal nature in legal discourse.

Cycle events as a promising direction of the literary museum

A long-term, mutually interesting relationship with the public is the goal of most of the world’s museums. The author of the article suggests that a promising form of organizing museum events are programs of a regular type, formed into thematic cycles. The study explains both theoretical grounds and practical arguments emphasizing the relevance of the application of this form of events in the practice of museums. The study was based on the experience of The National Pushkin Museum, which demonstrated the possibility of multifaceted coverage of a given topic within thematic cycles, synthesizing in one event different forms of impact on the visitor. Review of cycle-type programs of two other museums – The Pushkin Museum and The State Literature Museum, confirms the conclusions that this form of organizing events contributes to the development of the cultural and educational aspect of museum activities, an increase in the number of regular visitors, an increase in the professional motivation of museum staff, and forms a favorable image of the museum, increasing its competitiveness. The prospect of cyclical events is reflected in modern trends in society towards self-education.

Presumptions, and How They Relate to Arguments from Ignorance

By explaining the argument from ignorance in terms of the presumption of innocence, many textbooks in argumentation theory suggest that some arguments from ignorance might share essential features with some types of presumptive reasoning. The stronger version of this view, suggesting that arguments from ignorance and presumptive reasoning are almost indistinguishable, is occasionally proposed by Douglas Walton. This paper explores the nature and limits of the stronger proposal and argues that initial presumptions and arguments from ignorance are not closely connected. There are three main reasons. First, the argument from ignorance, unlike typical presumptive reasoning, is a negative kind of inference. Second, the typical initial presumption is sensitive to a broader set of defeaters and thus assumes a higher (negative) standard of acceptability. Third, in dialectical terms, initial presumption and argument from ignorance bring different attacking rights and obligations. I conclude that Waltonian intuition is unsupported or, at best, is limited only to practical presumptions and practical arguments from ignorance.

The 2015 Paris Climate Conference

The paper applies argumentative discourse analysis to a corpus of official statements made by key players (USA, EU, China, India, etc.) at the opening of the 2015 Paris Climate Conference. The chief goal is to reveal the underlying structure of practical arguments and values legitimising the global climate change policy-making. The paper investigates which of the elements of practical arguments were common and which were contested by various players. One important conclusion is that a complex, multilateral deal such as the 2015 Paris Agreement is based on a fragile consensus. This consensus can be precisely described in terms of the key premises of practical arguments that various players share (mostly: description of current circumstances and future goals) and the premises they still discuss but prefer not to prioritise (value hierarchies or precise measures). It thus provides an insight into how a fragile consensus over goals may lead to a multilateral agreement through argumentative processes.

Holm Tetens on the Moral-Existential Argument for Theism: Reasonable Hope and Wishful Thinking

SummaryHolm Tetens develops in his book „Gott denken. Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie“ theoretical and practical arguments against a naturalistic and in favour of a theistic understanding of reality. In my paper I focus on Teten’s claim that we are rationally justified to hope for the truth of classical theism. I distinguish between rationally justified and unjustified forms of hope and argue that we are rationally justified to hope for the redemption of reality as promised by classical theism. However, this hope has a weaker basis of justification than Tetens seems to assume because serious objections to classical theism ought to be taken into consideration as well.