"I don't do systems": An interview with Clifford Geertz

I had the honor of interviewing Clifford Geertz at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton, USA, on October 18, 2000. The interview focused on Geertz's theoretical conceptions, the tradition on which he draws, the critique he has encountered, and on interpretive anthropology's future development. Of particular interest was the clarification of his much-debated method, his definition of symbol and his famous definition of religion as a cultural system. Geertz emphasizes his attempt to exercise an applied pragmatic phenomenological and hermeneutical method without any general theory (or philosophy) of meaning, phenomenology, or culture. He maintains that he only has a conceptual framework inspired by different scholars, which nevertheless has consistent focus and perspective, i.e., meaning and symbol. In relationship to this, Geertz defines his symbol within the Peircean semiotic tradition. Therefore, the term symbol is understood as a sign (an index for example), which becomes a symbol via a cultural interpretation. Furthermore, his definition of religion as a cultural system is, in his view, a nonessentialistic definition and therefore is not—as Talal Asad claims—ethnocentric. Although it is Geertz's opinion that interpretive anthropology has been influenced by postmodernism, he predicts that interpretive anthropology's future development will be in reasonable continuity with its past. In my closing comments I tentatively suggest that Geertz may have a theory of interpretation because of his definition of the symbol, his unavoidable assumptions, and his unique method, which has the capacity of grasping the cultural specific in a general way.

Interview med professor Clifford Geertz

I had the honour of interviewing Professor Clifford Geertz at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, USA on 18 October 2000. The interview focused on Geertz’ theore­tical conceptions, the tradition which he draws on, the critique he has encountered, and interpretive anthropology’s future development. Of particular interest was the clarification of his much debated method, his definition of symbol and his famous definition of religion as a cultural system. Geertz emphasizes that he attempts to exercise an applied pragmatic phenomenological and hermeneutical method without any general theory (or philosophy) of meaning, phenomenology, or culture. He maintains that he only has a con­ceptual frame­work inspired by different scholars, who nevertheless have a similar focus and perspective, i.e., meaning and symbol. In relationship to this, Geertz defines his symbol within the Peircian semiotic tradition. Therefore, the term symbol is understood as a sign (an index for example), which becomes a symbol via a cultural interpretation. Furthermore, his definition of religion as a cultural system is, in his view, a non-essentialistic definition and therefore not - as Talal Asad claims - ethnocentric. Although it is Geertz’ opinion that interpretiveanthropology has been influenced by postmodernism, he predicts that inter­pretive anthropology’s future development will be in reasonable continuity with its past.

The Rhetoric of Religion Within 'the Ruins of the University'

The objective of the article is to legitimise studies concerned with religion within a radically changed perspective on the university. It is argued that if studies concerning religion are located in an interactional philosophy of meaning instead of continuing in an objectivistic philosophy of meaning, they participate naturally in disciplinary conversations conducted in a university set upon social engagement. Both the field ofreligion and the university have been approached from the theoretical perspective of rhetoric. The first part of the article explores the 'symbolic construction of social reality', and functions as a theoretical point of departure on which the argumentation of the following two sections, entitled 'From a "Uni"-versity to a "Multi"-versity' and 'The study of Religion in the university of dissensus', elaborates. It is indicated that the demise ofa unifying principle emanating from the modern university requires a shift from constative structures of meaning to performative structures of meaning, enabling the university to be yet another locus in a heterogeneous society where discourses of knowledge can be produced and exchanged. The final section argues that if the rhetoricity of religious discourses is recognised and acknowledged, the field of study not only expands, but the university of dissensus becomes the appropriate site for this exchange of knowledge.

Gruesome Arithmetic: Kripke's Sceptic Replies

Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language has enlivened recent discussion of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Yet it is quite possible to disengage his interpretive thesis from its supporting argumentation. Doing so leaves one with an intriguing sceptical argument which Kripke first powerfully advances, then tries to halt. But contrary to the impression his argument may leave, Kripke's solution and the position it concedes to the Sceptic are deeply allied. Here I shall demonstrate their common assumption, and on that basis argue that Kripke's solution begs the Sceptic's question. Furthermore, I believe we can live with the Sceptic. The sceptical argument can be turned into a reasonable contribution to a kind of nominalism in the philosophy of meaning and truth.