LEGAL PERSONALITY OF A HABITUAL PENITENTIARY OFFENDER OF THE REGIME OF SERVING A SENTENCE

В статье рассматриваются проблемы изменения правового статуса осужденного в связи с признанием его злостным пенитенциарным нарушителем. Проводится сравнительно-правовой анализ терминов «отрицательно характеризующийся осужденный» и «злостный пенитенциарный нарушитель». Автором отмечается, что понятие исследуемого субъекта встречается в нормативных актах уголовно-исполнительного характера и актах официального судебного толкования, вместе с тем до сих пор не имеет легального закрепления в виде нормы-дефиниции. В статье раскрываются вопросы возникновения правоспособности, дееспособности и деликтоспособности злостного пенитенциарного нарушителя. Формулируется вывод о том, что в ходе признания осужденного злостным пенитенциарным нарушителем он приобретает специфические признаки, которые определяют его особое положение. В заключение автором предлагается доктринальное определение исследуемого субъекта. The article deals with the problems of changing the legal status of a convicted person in connection with the recognition of him as a habitual penitentiary offender. A comparative legal analysis of the terms «negatively characterized convict» and «habitual penitentiary offender» is carried out. The author notes that the concept of the subject under study is found in normative acts of a penal nature and acts of official judicial interpretation, however, it still does not have legal consolidation in the form of a norm-definition. The article deals with the issues of legal capacity, legal capability and tortious capacity of a habitual penitentiary offender. The conclusion is formulated that in the course of recognition of a convicted person as a habitual penitentiary offender, he acquires specific features that determine his special position. In conclusion, the author offers a doctrinal definition of the subject under study.

The procedural problems of the legal capability determining of a person who is in clouded consciousness, into stupor, in coma or vegetative state

The article is devoted to the problematic aspects of recognizing a person as having limited legal capacity. The authors consider the cases, which deal with people who are in clouded consciousness, into stupor, in coma or vegetative state. Depending on the degree of depth of lowering the clarity of consciousness the following stages of switching off consciousness are distinguished: clouded consciousness, stupor, coma and vegetative state. These stages successively replace each other when the condition worsens. The authors conduct a legal analysis of various degrees of disturbance of consciousness, project the results onto the institution of recognizing a person as incompetent and, taking into account international experience, suggest the most relevant ways to improve the Russian legislation. Also it has been determined the significant element of the psycho-physical state of a person, which is the basis for limiting the rights and obligations in accordance with his health.

Legal and Historical Prerequisites for the Transfer (Inheritance) of the Deceased Person Property to Public Legal Entities

The article studies the peculiarities of participation in civil relations of such public legal entities as the state and the territorial community. It is established that according to part 2 of Article 2 of the Civil Code of Ukraine, along with legal persons of public law, they are assigned to subjects of public law. Full determination of the status of public entities in private law remains problematic. This is due to the dual status of these entities: as participants in public and private relations. It is stated that despite the fact that the State and territorial communities are primarily subjects of public law, they take part in civil relations, taking into account the signs of these relations defined in the Civil Code of Ukraine. The classification of public legal entities as special entities leads to their participation in civil relations through state authorities and other entities that are legal persons; representation of their interests by physical persons is not excluded. It is confirmed that the civil legal capability and legal capacity of public legal entities is reduced to the legal capacity of bodies acting in their interests. The acquisition of legal personality by public legal entities is carried out mainly in accordance with the norms of constitutional and administrative law. It is determined that the civil legal capacity of public legal entities is limited in scope. On the basis of the analysis of acts of legislation on inheritance of the Soviet and modern period, it is established that the current legislation provides for the maximum removal of public legal entities from the field of private law. This is manifested in hereditary relationships. Public law entities may acquire ownership of the property of the deceased if: 1) a will is drawn up in their favor; 2) if the property was not inherited by the heirs and by decision of the court is recognized as fictitious and becomes the property of the territorial community. It is confirmed that under Ukrainian law the transfer of fictitious property to communal property is not recognized as inheritance. Separately, it should be noted that before the entry into force of the Civil Code of Ukraine of 2003, fictitious property in Ukraine was inherited by the state, now by territorial communities.

Of Tactics, Illegal Occupation and the Boundaries of Legal Capability: A Reply to Ardi Imseis

This contribution engages with Ardi Imseis’s article ‘Negotiating the Illegal: On the United Nations and the Illegal Occupation of Palestine, 1967–2020’. In reply, I contemplate whether an occupation’s legal status can or should affect the requirement that an occupying power must withdraw from the territory that it controls. I consider Imseis’s claim that it is necessary to declare that an occupation has become illegal to move beyond the tension that exists between the requirements of state responsibility and a political preference for negotiations. I question the effectiveness of Imseis’s proposed approach, argue that the duty to terminate an occupation is a positive legal duty that exists regardless of an occupation’s legal status and suggest that the negotiation process cannot be completely uncoupled from the withdrawal requirement. In conclusion, I suggest that grounding calls to terminate occupation in the principle of temporality and the international consensus prohibiting the acquisition of territory by force better reflects international law’s capacity to contribute to an occupation’s termination.

The United Nation’s Capability to Manage Existential Risks with a Focus on Artificial Intelligence

Human technology develops exponentially, opening up enormous possibilities, but also posing dangers, arguably even so-called “existential risks” for humankind. Artificial general intelligence is a potentially extremely powerful technology, which could also pose an existential risk to humanity. This article assesses the United Nation (UN)’s institutional and legal capability to manage existential risks, with a special focus on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and also analyses the UN’s responsibility and competence to manage existential risks. Shortcomings with regard to the UN’s capability to manage existential risks are being explored as well as several potential options to strengthen this capability, such as an international treaty to regulate AI research and development, an international enforcement agency for safe AI research and development and the use of force as ultima ratio. The UN will have to overhaul its structure and modus operandi to be fit for the challenges posed by the safe development of strong AI.

Justice & the Capability to Function in Society

All over the world, civil legal problems are ubiquitous. But while all groups in every society that has been studied experience civil justice problems, these problems and their consequences do not fall equally. Socially disadvantaged people report more problems, more serious problems, and more negative consequences from them. The lack of legal capability-the lack of the capacity to understand and act on justice problems-plays a key role in creating these inequalities. A growing evidence base should support and enable global, national, and other policy-makers to achieve stated policy goals and enable people to respond effectively to the myriad legal problems that can threaten their aspirations and well-being.