Contemporary Constitution Making in Asia-Pacific

This special issue features a curated set of contextualized case studies that interrogate how six Asian countries have calibrated global imperatives with domestic desires and concerns during the drafting of their latest constitution. Read together, the accounts demonstrate that the impact of globalization on what has long been thought of as a quintessential exercise of national sovereignty is ubiquitous, yet that the precise combination of the global and the local is unique to each country, determined as it is by the strength of domestic interests and factions. Taking contextualized functionalism as its premise, this introduction sketches the contours of an analytical framework to study constitution-making processes in a globalized environment. By implication, this framework is conceived in a neutral fashion and cast in functional terminology that extrapolates from the circumstances of the countries featured in this Special Issue. This, we hope, will make it a helpful toolbox to make sense of the global-local interplay in constitution-making in any country, whether located in Asia or further afield.

Glocalised constitution-making in the twenty-first century: Evidence from Asia

How have Asian nations conducted, or how are they conducting, constitution-making in the face of pressures associated with globalisation, and how do they balance those forces with domestic interests and realities? This article aims to develop an analytical framework that can capture this global–local interplay. It introduces the concept of ‘glocalised constitution-making’ to denote the co-existence and relationship between the two governance levels as manifested in the forces, actors and norms pertaining to the process of drafting a new constitution as well as its substance. Glocalisation permeates the entirety of a constitution-making episode, from the impetus to initiate the process, to its design and inclusiveness of interests featured, and the scope of topics considered. The effects of glocalised constitution-making for domestic drafters are arranged along a continuum with approbation and aversion as the polar opposites. The precise location on the continuum will depend on the value preferences of the domestic stakeholders and the matters under consideration. The application of this analytical framework is illustrated with reference to recent constitution-making exercises in Bhutan, Nepal, Thailand, East Timor and Sri Lanka.

The Paris Agreement and its Rulebook in a Problem-Solving Perspective

The aim of this article is to assess and explain the effectiveness of the international climate regime in a problem-solving perspective, with a focus on mitigation. As CO2 emissions have increased by more than 60 per cent since the start of the climate negotiations, effectiveness is exceedingly low. In explaining the performance of the regime, the main focus is on its problem-solving ability, defined as a function of power, leadership, and institutional design. ‘Negative’ power and a lack of leadership constitute important reasons for low effectiveness. In this broader perspective, the role of institutional design, exemplified by the Paris Agreement and its Rulebook, is fairly modest, and its significance should not be exaggerated. The Agreement and Rulebook score high in terms of ambition, but whether the rules will ever realize those ambitions remains to be seen. Domestic interests and priorities of the most important emitting countries will be decisive in this regard.

The Norwegian Petroleum Administration

This chapter establishes the broad parameters for oil management. It considers the threat of the Resource Curse, and what can be done to address the challenges of corruption, and the imbalance of power between states, international oil companies, and domestic interests (including national oil companies). In particular, the chapter begins by discussing the relationship between politics and economics and between states and firms (including the Obsolescing Bargaining Mechanism), and the utility of separating responsibility for policymaking, regulation, and operational or commercial activities. The latter part of the chapter introduces Norway’s unique institutional solutions to these challenges, that is, the three-part division of administrative responsibility that is central to the Norwegian model, and the institutions where they reside (e.g., the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, and Statoil).