Does Auditor Industry Expertise Improve Audit Quality In Complex Business Environments?

This study examines the role of specialist auditors in enhancing the quality of financial statements by taking into account industry complexity. The test of hypotheses are conducted in two steps. The first step is to provide evidence that earnings quality, measured by earnings persistent, of firms operating in the complex and non-complex industry are different. The second step is to compare the absolute abnormal accruals of companies engaged in the complex industry with those from non-complex industry audited by non-specialist and specialists auditors. Results show: 1) earnings persistence of firms in complex industries are lower than those in non-complex industries. 2) absolute abnormal accruals of firms operating in complex industries are higher than those in non-complex industries regardless industry specialization. Overall, the results suggest that auditor industry expertise does not play a significant role in improving the quality of audited earnings in complex business environ­ment.

Does auditor industry expertise affect bank loan costs?

Purpose This paper aims to examine whether firms retaining industry-specialist auditors receive better price and non-price terms for bank loans. Design/methodology/approach Based on a sample of companies retaining big N auditors during the 2000-2010 period, this paper constructed six proxies for auditor industry expertise and tested three major loan terms: loan spreads, number of general and financial covenants and requirements for collateral. Findings It was found that companies retaining industry-specialist auditors receive lower interest rates and fewer covenants. Banks are also less likely to demand secured collateral. These findings are supported by several sensitivity tests. Research limitations/implications The findings suggest that auditor industry expertise provides incremental value to creditors and that bank loan cost is one economic benefit for companies hiring specialist auditors. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the impact of auditor industry expertise on the cost of private debts.

Auditor Industry Expertise and Cost of Equity

SYNOPSIS We examine the association between auditor industry expertise and clients' cost of equity. Prior research suggests that industry experts are associated with higher earnings quality than non-experts. If such improved earnings quality were recognized by investors, we would expect it to be reflected in a lower cost of equity. Following recent research in this area, we distinguish between national-only, city-only, and joint city-national industry-expert auditors. Our results suggest that clients audited by city-only or joint city-national industry experts have a lower cost of equity. We also examine whether changing from non-expert (expert) to expert (non-expert) auditors result in a decrease (increase) in cost of equity. We find that when firms change from non-experts to city-only or joint city-national experts, their cost of equity is significantly decreased.

Firm versus Partner Measures of Auditor Industry Expertise and Effects on Auditor Quality

SUMMARY This paper first examines whether the Big 4 audit quality is associated with auditor industry expertise, measured as both individual partner- and audit firm-level leadership. We focus on a sample of listed firms in Taiwan, where audit reports must be audited and signed by the two signing auditors as well as by an audit firm. For accruals analyses, we find that differential discretionary accruals due to industry expertise are driven by a combination of firm and partner expertise. For audit opinion analyses, we find that differential likelihood of a modified audit opinion (hereafter, MAO) is primarily attributable to signing auditor specialists. We also find that firm-level specialists alone are not associated with a higher likelihood of issuing a MAO. However, firm-level specialists, in combination with signing auditor specialists, can add something over and above the effects of the signing auditor specialists alone. Second, we further examine whether there is differential audit quality between signing auditors (i.e., lead and concurring auditors). We find that clients of lead signing auditor specialists, either alone or in conjunction with concurring auditor specialists, have smaller accruals and are more likely to receive a MAO compared to those of nonspecialists. However, concurring auditor specialists alone are not associated with higher audit quality, in terms of either smaller accruals or a higher MAO likelihood. Thus, we conclude that industry expertise is not homogeneous across individual auditors within the same audit firm in Taiwan. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources identified in the text.