Erasmus of Rotterdam on the Religious Schism in Bohemia (1518-1519): concordia vs tolerantia

В статье исследуется переписка Эразма Роттердамского с чешским дворянином Яном Слехтой (1518-1519). Анализ посланий показывает наличие в Богемии трех крупных религиозных партий: католиков, чашников, Общины чешских братьев, именуемых пикартами, и разрозненных нехристианских сообществ: иудейских общин и сект эпикурейского и николаитского (адамитского) толков. Такой религиозный плюрализм Эразм характеризует как аномалию, как болезнь социума, которую необходимо преодолеть. Предлагаемое им средство состоит в возвращении всех в лоно римской церкви при условии согласия в ключевых положениях христианства. Эразм предлагает не закреплять разъединение через признание за некатолическими группами их прав на отличие, а, наоборот, создать условия для ликвидации этого раскола. Такую позицию Эразма не следует трактовать как принятие религиозного плюрализма, как веротерпимость и толерантность в современном понимании слова. The article examines the correspondence of Erasmus of Rotterdam with the Czech nobleman Jan Slechta (1518-1519). The analysis of the epistles shows that there were three major religious parties in Bohemia: Catholics, Chashniki, a Community of Czech brothers called picarts, and some scattered non-Christian communities: Jewish communities and sects of epicurean and nicolaitean (Adamite) followers. Erasmus characterizes such religious pluralism as an anomaly, as a disease of society that must be overcome. The remedy proposed by the humanist is to restore ecclesiastical unity and return all to the bosom of the Roman Church, provided that all agree on the key points of Christianity. Erasmus proposes not to consolidate the division by tolerating this division and recognizing the rights of non-Catholic groups to differ, but, on the contrary, to create conditions for the elimination of this division. Non-Christian movements should be excluded from interfaith dialogue. This position of Erasmus should not be interpreted as acceptance of religious pluralism, as toleration and tolerance in the modern sense of the word.

The Limits of Possibilities of Religious Politics: The Case of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik in Pakistani Punjab

Historically, despite the tremendous influence exerted by Islam on public life, religious parties and organisations have historically failed to do well at the ballot box, receiving an average of only 6% of votes cast in elections since the 1980s. Focusing on the case of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a new Barelvi political party and social movement that has campaigned on the emotive issue of blasphemy since being formed in 2015, this article argues that the clientelistic, patronage-based nature of democratic politics in Punjab, coupled with factionalism and competition within the religious right, continues to play a role in limiting the electoral prospects of religious parties. Nonetheless, as was seen in the General Elections of 2018 in which the TLP outperformed expectations, there are particular circumstances in which the religious parties are able to make electoral breakthroughs. While the TLP was able to make effective use of populist rhetoric to garner some genuine support for itself, this article argues that the organisations sustained campaign of protests over the issue of blasphemy fed into broader efforts by the military establishment and opposition political parties to destabilise and weaken the government of the PML-N prior to the 2018 elections.

Civil Liberties in Muslim-Majority Countries: Statistical Evidence

This chapter presents statistical results from models testing support for Hypothesis 2 and its corollaries. The results show strong and robust support for the second part of the theoretical argument that the presence of religious parties in government leads to a decline in civil liberties only when religious organizations in that country are highly socioeconomically institutionalized. In the absence of highly institutionalized religious organizations, ceteris paribus, religious parties in government are able to moderate their positions on civil liberties with the result that civil liberties do not experience a significant decline in line with a religious agenda. The analysis accounts for various confounding factors, and the potential endogeneity of more moderate regime type to various factors.

Resilience and Decline: Civil Liberties in Pakistan

This chapter continues the analysis of the Pakistani case by testing whether the two conditions stated in Hypothesis 2—religious parties in government, and highly institutionalized religious organizations—predict a decline in civil liberties in Pakistan. It identifies two distinct periods corresponding to the presence of religious parties in government in the (i) absence and (ii) presence of highly institutionalized religious organizations in Pakistan. According to the argument articulated in Hypothesis 2, civil liberties should only decline for religious reasons starting in 2009, when the religious Jamaat-e-Ulema-Fazlur party joined the ruling coalition and religious organizations finally achieved moderate levels of socioeconomic institutionalization. In this context, Hypothesis 2 predicts a moderate decline in de facto civil liberties. The chapter uses additional evidence from the survey of 150 Pakistani politicians, analytical narratives from Pakistani political history, and quantitative data to test support for Hypothesis 2 and its corollaries in Pakistan and finds strong support for them.

The Fall of an Icon: The Decline in Civil Liberties in Turkey

This chapter continues the analysis of the Turkish case by testing whether the two conditions stated in Hypothesis 2—religious parties in government, and highly institutionalized religious organizations—predict a decline in civil liberties in Turkey. It identifies two distinct periods corresponding to the presence of highly institutionalized religious organizations in the (i) absence and (ii) presence of religious parties in government. According to the argument articulated in Hypothesis 2, civil liberties should only decline for religious reasons starting in 2003 when the religious AKP came to power in the context of highly institutionalized religious organizations and both conditions were satisfied in Turkey. The chapter uses additional evidence from the survey of 200 Turkish politicians, analytical narratives from Turkish political history, and quantitative data to test support for Hypothesis 2 and its corollaries in Turkey and finds strong support for them.

Religious Parties, Religious Organizations, and the Decline of Civil Liberties

Chapter 3 presents a theoretical argument that explains when and how religious parties and religious organizations coevolve and the consequences of their relationship for civil liberties in a country. First, the chapter argues that religious organizations undergo a significant increase in their socioeconomic institutionalization only when a country is experiencing an inflation crisis and there is a concentrated bloc of religious parties in the legislature. Next, it explains why religious parties are compelled to curb civil liberties when they are in government in the context of highly socioeconomically institutionalized religious organizations, and why the absence of institutionalized religious organizations allows religious parties to moderate their positions on civil liberties. Thus, the presence of religious parties leads to religiously derived declines in civil liberties only in the presence of highly institutionalized religious organizations. These arguments lead to two testable hypotheses that are subjected to empirical tests in the rest of the book.

Introduction

Many people believe that if religious parties come to power, they will inevitably proceed to curb the civil liberties of their citizens in order to realize their religious vision, particularly in Muslim-majority countries. Academic research on religious parties, on the other hand, claims that the need to compete in elections always incentivizes religious parties to moderate their behaviors and policies, including those on civil liberties. Neither of these assertions has been systematically tested across all Muslim countries. This book is the first to adjudicate this debate based on systematic data covering all Muslim-majority countries for a period of almost forty years. It highlights the role that religious lobbies play on this issue and identifies the specific conditions under which religious parties do moderate their religious positions and don’t curb civil liberties, and the conditions under which they do so.

The Fall of an Icon: Institutionalization of Religious Organizations in Turkey

This chapter introduces and analyses the case of Turkey. First, it identifies the theoretically appropriate religious groups and organizations that are active in Turkey, then discusses their institutional interests and policy preferences, particularly regarding civil liberties, and their lobbying capacity. Using data on religious parties’ parliamentary concentration and on inflation rates, the chapter identifies three theoretically distinct periods that correspond to different outcomes for religious organizations’ institutionalization. Based on Hypothesis 1, these conditions predict that religious parties finally found conditions conducive to strengthening Turkish religious organizations starting in 1996. Therefore, it is only after this period that Turkish religious organizations established a formidable institutional presence in the for-profit education, welfare, media, and business sectors. The chapter then uses evidence from an original survey of more than 200 Turkish politicians, analytical narratives from Turkish political history, and quantitative data to test support for Hypothesis 1 and its corollaries in Turkey and finds strong support for them.

Religious Parties and Religious Organizations: The Fruits of Partnership

This chapter discusses the strategic challenges that religious parties face as they look to survive and succeed politically in Muslim-majority countries. It identifies national, private, da ‘wa organizations and Sufi orders as the religious lobbies of interest in these countries. It discusses the institutional interests and policy preferences of these religious lobbies and how they strategize to achieve them. It introduces the concept of socioeconomic institutionalization of religious organizations, discusses why these organizations want to increase it, and how higher socioeconomic institutionalization translates into increased capacity and effectiveness in lobbying for religious organizations. Finally, it argues that given their mutual ideological and policy interests, religious parties and religious organizations are natural partners in politics. It also discusses why secular parties and nonreligious organizations are unreliable partners for religious organizations and religious parties respectively.

Religious Parties and the Politics of Civil Liberties

Religious parties are increasingly common in all parts of the world. Their rise in Muslim-majority countries has been particularly prominent, as they increasingly participate in elections, win legislative seats, and join governments. Since they are often founded on orthodox principles that are inconsistent with liberal democracy, the consequences of their rise and success for the prospects of liberal democratic values and practices have inspired much heated debate and discussion. This book considers a question that has been central in these debates: will the rise and success of religious parties lead to declines in the civil liberties of their citizens? This book addresses this question by focusing on a relationship that is central for understanding the politics of religious parties—their relationship with religious lobbies. It identifies the religious organizations that are actively involved in lobbying on these issues in Muslim-majority countries and outlines the policy preferences and institutional interests that motivate them. It then identifies the political and economic conditions that shape how their relationship with religious parties evolves and, when religious lobbies are able to or unable constrain the actions of religious parties. The book explains when the rise of religious parties leads to a significant decline in civil liberties and when it does not. To test its claims, it leverages original data on religious parties, religious party governments, and religious lobbies for all Muslim-majority countries for almost 40 years and uses original surveys of political elites in Turkey and Pakistan for a thorough and original analysis.