Accelerator or Brake? Cash for Clunkers, Household Liquidity, and Aggregate Demand

This paper evaluates the Car Allowance Rebate System (CARS ) by comparing the vehicle purchases and disposals of households with eligible “clunkers” to those of households with similar but ineligible vehicles. CARS caused roughly 500,000 purchases during the program period. The provision of liquidity, through a rebate usable as a down payment, was critical in generating this large response. Participation was rare among households that owned clunkers with outstanding loans, which required loan repayment. This decline in participation is attributed to households’ preference for lower down payments and distinguished from the effects of income, other indebtedness, and the program subsidy. (JEL E23, E62, G51, H24, H31)

Trading on Up: An Examination of Factors Influencing the Degree of Upgrade: Evidence from Cash for Clunkers

Durable goods firms often create product lineups to provide a clear upgrading path as consumers make replacement decisions. Consumers can upgrade a little (i.e., spend a bit more than last time) or a lot (i.e., spend substantially more). However, the factors affecting the degree of such vertical “moving up” have received limited scholarly attention. In particular, little is known about how trade-in characteristics and the marginal costs–benefits of the new purchase influence the degree of upgrade. The authors use 320,000 Cash for Clunkers automobile transactions to provide the first examination of how mental accounting surpluses from trade-in ownership time and trade-in windfall, in addition to brand loyalty, affect the degree of upgrade. The authors find that trade-in ownership time and brand loyalty enhance the replacement’s degree of upgrade. However, trade-in windfall size has a negative effect, revealing the downside of this common promotional practice. Two experiments and additional dealer data indicate that this finding is robust to different economic conditions. Thus, these findings provide valuable new guidance for durable goods firms to facilitate the degree to which consumers upgrade.

Cash for Corollas: When Stimulus Reduces Spending

The 2009 Cash for Clunkers program aimed to stimulate consumer spending in the new automobile industry, which experienced disproportionate reductions in demand and employment during the Great Recession. Exploiting program eligibility criteria in a regression discontinuity design, we show more than half of the subsidies went to households who would have purchased during the two-month program anyway; the rest accelerated sales by no more than eight months. Moreover, the program's fuel efficiency restrictions shifted purchases toward vehicles that cost on average $7,600 less. Thus, we estimate on net the $3 billion program reduced total new vehicle spending by $5 billion. (JEL E32, E62, E65, H24, H31, L62)